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Abstract 
 
This thesis forwards a path-based hermeneutics as a middle path (Skt. 
madhyam!-pratipad) between Deconstruction and M!dhyamaka, in order to 
understand our existential relatedness without reference to Being. It does not attempt 
to do so by way of a comparative analysis, which I believe results inevitably in some 
form of reification of both in terms of their method. Rather, what I see as unique to 
both Deconstruction and M!dhyamaka is this very lack of method Ð hermeneutical or 
otherwise Ð hence underscoring the significance of this path (either as dmarche or 
m!rga) that demands our existential response. The method is the argument, and in 
working through the various linguistic, epistemological, and ontological assumptions 
we thus engage (as our response and responsibility at once) with our very conditions 
of possibility that make them impossible at the same time.  
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Notes to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) 
 
M!dhyamaka School 
N!g!rjuna 150 C.E 
"ryadeva 180-200 C.E 
 
Pr!sa"gika-M!dhyamika School 
Buddhapalita 5th century C.E 
Candrak#rti early 7th century C.E 
Santideva 691-743 C.E 
 
Sv!tantrika-M!dhyamika School 
Bh!vaviveka 5th century C.E 
 
 
The MMK was written originally in Sanskrit by N!g!rjuna (second century 
C.E) containing 448 verses in 27 chapters, with each verse written in metered 
couplets (of two lines) consisting of exactly 16 syllables. The MMK has been 
translated into Chinese (奩❸, Hanyu Pinyin: Chung-Lun) by Kumarajiva 
(beginning of fifth century C.E). Its corpus was further enlarged by 
Candrak#rtiÕs (seventh century C.E) commentary on the MMK in his 
Prasannapad!, where chapter divisions of the MMK were first introduced. It 
is with Candrak#rti that the pr!sa"gika (trans. reductio ad absurdum) method 
of the M!dhyamaka was firmly established and consolidated. The MMK is 
also translated into Tibetan, of which the canonical text is dBu-ma rtsa-ba 
shes-rab. 
 
M!dhyamaka is the correct term for the philosophy of the middle, while 
M!dhyamika names the adherents of the M!dhyamaka school. S#tras refer to 
the discourses of the Buddha, while $!stras are the philosophical elaboration 
or system based on the discourses of the Buddha. 
 
Pr!sa"ga means Òlogical consequenceÓ, and the M!dhyamika only needs to 
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convince his opponent that his theory entails by logical consequence 
conclusions that are unacceptable to reason. The method of reductio ad 
absurdum is also known as pr!sa"ga-vakya in Sanskrit. 
 
Sv!tantrika means ÒautonomousÓ, or Òautonomous argumentsÓ. Bh!vaviveka 
thought that a M!dhyamika could advance self-contained, autonomous 
arguments, or counter-theses to those of his opponent, a position that has come 
under heavy criticism by Candrak"rti for being inconsistent. 
  
Modern Translations of the MMK: 
 
(1967) Frederick J. Streng. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. 
Streng wrote from a position of religious phenomenology, with emphasis on 
the soteriological significance of #$nyat! in attaining enlightenment. 
 
(1970) Kenneth K. Inada. Nagarjuna: A Translation of his 
M#lamadhyamikak!rik! With An Introductory Essay. 
Inada wrote from the perspective of Zen Buddhism, and his text is derived 
from Candrak"rtiÕs Prasannapad! which was edited by Louis de la Valle 
Poussin published by the Bibliotheca Buddhica between 1903 to 1913. Inada 
also lauds the Chinese translation/commentary Chung-lun (Taish$ Shinsh# 
Daiz$ky$,  XXX, No 1564) 
 
(1979) Mervyn Sprung. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way.  
SprungÕs translation (co-translated with T.R.V Murti) is taken from 
Candrak"rtiÕs Prasannapad!, with only 17 chapters of the original 27. His 
contention was that these constituted the ÒessentialÓ chapters as the rest was 
prone to repetition. He further considers Candrak"rtiÕs Prasannapad! as 
homogeneous with N!g!rjunaÕs MMK. This also stresses then the pr!sa"gika-
m!dhyamika approach of N!g!rjuna.Sprung used the Sanskrit text from Louis 
de la Valle PoussinÕs M#lamadyhamakak!rik!s de N!g!rjuna avec la 
Prasannapad! de Candrak%rti (itself compiled from three Sanskrit manuscripts 
in Paris, Cambridge, and Calcutta). In fact, Poussin himself views the Tibetan 
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translation to be superior to the Sanskrit text, which was not consulted by 
Sprung even though he shares the same view. 
 
(1986) David J. Kalupahana. Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. 
KalupahanaÕs translation is taken from the Sanskrit text, though he felt the 
Chinese version Chung-Lun by Kumarajiva (401Ð 413 A.D) to be closer to the 
original spirit of the MMK than Candrak!rtiÕs Prasannapad!. His main 
contention with Stcherbatsky and Murti was they held that N"g"rjuna rejected 
the BuddhaÕs theory of elements with his conception of "#nyat!. Kalupahana 
considers instead N"g"rjuna as a grand (Theravadin) commentator on the 
BuddhaÕs Kacc!y!nagotta-s#tra. While the Kacc!yanagotta-s#tra is 
significant to the MMK (This s#tra is included in Appendix B), KalupahanaÕs 
view is not a widely held one neither in ancient nor modern scholarship. 
 
(1995) Jay L. Garfield. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. 
GarfieldÕs text was taken from the Tibetan translation of the original Sanskrit 
text, which reflected an Indo-Tibetan tradition that read N"g"rjuna in terms of 
a pr!sa$gika-m!dhyamika tradition. GarfieldÕs text is currently considered the 
most accurate modern-day philosophical translation of the MMK to date. This 
may be supported by ThurmanÕs claim that the Tibetan tradition inherited the 
full scriptural and hermeneutical textual traditions from India (1978: 21). 
Garfield has also proposed breaking down the chapters of the MMK into the 
following four sections: 
 
Framework of the MMK: 4 Sections (Garfield) 
Section 1: Chapters I Ð VII Dealing with fundamental theoretical constructs in 
Buddhist ontology 
Section 2: Chapters VIII Ð XIII Self and subjective experience 
Section 3: Chapters XIV Ð XXI External world and relation of self to objects 
Section 4: Chapters XXII Ð XXVII Ultimate truth, relation of conventional to 
ultimate, sa%s!ra to nirv!&a 
*Unless otherwise indicated, all citations from the MMK are taken from 
GarfieldÕs translation.
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Preface 
 
The initial idea guiding this thesis was that of relation. Specifically, I was 
concerned about the ineluctable relations that mark our conditioned existence, along 
with how to make sense of them. These included categories of existence, truth, 
meaning, and ultimately Being, as the absolute substratum of any possible 
philosophical inquiry. This did not seem natural to me. Or rather, it seemed too 
natural, like an ontological sleight-of-hand being performed to which one cannot 
place a finger upon. 
 
DerridaÕs anti-metaphysical stance made sense, even though it was counter-
intuitive. So did N!g!rjunaÕs thorough emptying of philosophical categories. Both, 
however, achieved this at the cost of making utter nonsense the founding concepts of 
philosophy Ð origin, causation, essence, identity, and being. Only Otherness made 
sense, to the extent that this means it is capable of orienting us towards a certain 
direction, pulling us this way and that; the very thing traditionally defined as the 
diametrical and dialectical opposite of all that is rational and intelligible.  
 
But this Other goes by just as many names as those founding concepts, 
through the many detours (or metaphors) of language: aporia, !"nyat#, diffrance, 
kh$ra, prat%tya-samutp#da. I am not trying here to maintain or conserve this dualism 
(between Self and Other), for it implodes on itself. That moment is affirmed in 
DerridaÕs assertion that language bears the necessity of its own critique, or better yet, 
in N!g!rjunaÕs proclamation that the limits of sa&s#ra are those of nirv#'a.  
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There was one problem: this Other is not absolute. Just as the principle of 
identity is not absolute. They are both ineluctably related, pivoting around a 
treacherous blind spot that is at once its condition of possibility as well as its 
impossibility. Indeed, it is far easier writing this treachery than it is to think it. Both 
Derrida and N!g!rjuna appear to be prima facie unrelated, despite having some 
inexplicable form of affinity. Even so, there were significant differences in 
intellectual milieu, conceptual terrain, and discursive space that refuse to be 
homogenised.  
 
To better illustrate this I shall seek recourse to an argument by analogy. There 
are two leading theories within the field of Physics: EinsteinÕs theory of General 
Relativity along with PlanckÕs theory of Quantum Mechanics. The former allows us 
to predict the orbital trajectory of stars, planets and galaxies by explaining the 
gravitational pull they exert in bending space-time. EinsteinÕs theory also predicted 
the formation of black-holes, objects that are infinitely dense in mass occupying an 
infinitesimal space of such gravitational power that it threatens to rip apart the space-
time continuum. However, to understand the very big and very fast (which EinsteinÕs 
theory did with great precision), physicists had to turn in a completely different 
direction Ð that of the sub-atomic world of Quantum Mechanics. This is because right 
at the heart of a black-hole is a Singularity that eludes EinsteinÕs formula. It is at this 
single point where our understanding of physics (and matter) breaks down completely 
due to its radical indeterminacy. We simply do not understand it. The holy grail of 
Physics is to present a unified Theory of Everything (ToE), by unifying General 
Relativity with Quantum Mechanics (through postulating the missing vector of 
Quantum Gravity).  
! x 
 
Of course, any notion approaching anywhere near the possibility of a ToE 
within the Social Sciences results in nothing less than cries of totalitarianism and 
universal scorn. The neat form of a final integral is perhaps the bugbear par 
excellence of the Social Sciences itself as a discourse. I am not here trying to enter 
such a debate, and am certainly not implying some Monty-Pythonesque holy grail 
quest in the process1. The analogy has a certain attraction for me, however, in 
attempting to articulate this affinity between Derrida and N!g!rjuna. 
 
 N!g!rjunaÕs magnum opus Ð the M!lamadhyamakak"rik" (hereafter MMK) Ð 
is like EinsteinÕs theory of General Relativity, arguing for prat#tya-samutp"da (trans. 
dependent arising) that the Buddha taught as the reality of our conditioned existence. 
The MMK is arguably encyclopaedic in its scope, engaging with philosophical 
categories of causation, time, motion, essence, and elements. Everything in our 
phenomenal world may be explained within the doctrine of prat#tya-samutp"da, but 
there is a hidden sting in N!g!rjunaÕs discourse: he equates prat#tya-samutp"da with 
$!nyat", such that the limits of sa%s"ra are at once those of nirv"&a. This has a 
devastating effect of seismic proportions, challenging everything that we thought we 
understood hitherto in our conception of the world. Entire factions of Buddhism 
                                                
1
 In fact, I am tempted to argue that this blind fear of ToE is a misplaced one and an abdication of our 
critical faculty. A ToE does not mean we have the final answer to everything, because answers beget 
further questions in their turn. We may then understand how things work, but crucially, we will also 
need to understand why. To the extent we do not stop questioning we will not stop having new 
answers. This questioning spirit cannot be taught, but it can be learnt. The moment all questions are 
laid to rest is also the very moment of our mortality. The great brain of Einstein has stopped. That has 
not stopped us from the sanguine hope that another Einstein might come. Or another Messiah. Or 
another Buddha. My point is, human consciousness does not stop projecting, and if what allows to do it 
is something that is radically Other, then it will continue to seek that frontier, if only to try and cross it. 
In arriving finally at a ToE, a cycle is thus complete, and another shall commence, even if we do not 
yet know what form it might take. 
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emerged based upon differing (and contesting) interpretations of that singular verse Ð 
the MMK XXIV: 18.  
 
DerridaÕs oeuvre, on the other hand, started from looking at language and 
arguing how the history of Western metaphysics has always prioritised voice over the 
written word as the sign of a sign. Employing this as leverage he proceeds to unhinge 
the edifice of philosophy through his critical intervention at the very stress points of 
its discourse, one by one. Derrida has argued, successfully, for the untenability of the 
conceptual atom in its ideal unity. Just as nothing escapes Quantum Mechanics (and 
the sub-atomic particles of its discourse that compose all matter), nothing escapes the 
deconstructive turn, insofar as all discourses are constituted by language. Derrida 
insists, however, that this is not an analysis. Because at the fundamental level there is 
no identity, no simple constituent. Except for this Ð indeterminacy. This work of 
dismantling is deeply unsettling. It is for these reasons I maintain that despite his 
prolific output DerridaÕs work cannot be considered monolithic in any strict sense. 
Rather, the dissemination of his texts take the form of monographs instead; as 
detailed, sustained engagement within the system it inhabits and overthrows. Not 
unlike an intrepid form of intellectual guerrilla warfare. 
 
As I have pointed out earlier, the conceptual terrain and discursive space 
engendered by both thinkers are radically different. They seem to be occupying the 
diametrical ends of the same spectrum, and if this assumption is to be valid, it is only 
because they appear to converge around one gaping hole in our understanding. If so, 
the protocols determining our rules of engagement have to be varied. This does not 
mean I am trying to unify both discourses, as that would be navely reductive and can 
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only come at the cost of reifying both thinkers. It might be objected that the analogy 
forwarded here is inherently isogetical (i.e., one sees what one wishes to see), and I 
accept this criticism with a cheerful optimism, viz., to the extent that we do not, as 
yet, have any direct mode of apprehension to address the Other without mediation. 
All philosophical argumentation is thus by necessity analogous in this regard. But it 
does allow us to restate the possibility of their relation in an interesting way.  
 
I propose to do so by forwarding a path-based hermeneutics as a middle path 
between Derrida and N!g!rjuna. The protocol in question governing this path-based 
hermeneutics is thoroughly Ð first and foremost Ð a meditation on the possibility of 
method as part of our hermeneutical engagement. This is desideratum in avoiding 
reductivism of any sort, especially in the absence of a determinable method. 
GadamerÕs philosophical hermeneutics is central to this notion of path-based 
hermeneutics as a form of hermeneutic questioning that is oriented towards openness. 
It is conceptually adequate in addressing both DerridaÕs and N!g!rjunaÕs common 
refusal of dogmatism, as this orientation towards the Other is always contingent. The 
notion of a path beautifully expresses the exigencies of this orientation and 
contingency at once, as avenues of m!rga and dmarche leading to and coming from 
the Other. Moreover, as I will stress throughout this thesis, this path is always ethical, 
and the possibility of an ethical response cannot take place in the absence of this 
Other, just as there can be no meaningful dialogue without an Other; regardless 
whether we advert to it explicitly or not. Oui, oui, jÕaccepte, jÕaccepte; even if what is 
admissible to understanding is not always given to perception, except in gestalts of 
chiaroscuro. This has to be accepted. Its acknowledgement, however, is quite a 
different proposition. 
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Does this then entail negative theology? Far from it, this path-based 
hermeneutics is deeply anti-theological in character. Because there is no Being. 
Because the very acceptance of that Other nullifies any stable notion of Self; the term 
ÒOtherÓ being a shorthand designation for the relation between conditions of 
possibility and impossibility. This relation may go by different names Ð emptiness, 
differentiality, contingency, indeterminacy Ð because no single name is proper to it, 
names its essential property, or belongs to it. In this respect, the succinct X of the 
aporia remains the most celebrated cipher. 
 
Of course, we are still arguing analogously, through the detours of language. 
Rather than dismissing this out of the equation, however, can it not be the case that 
this Otherness manifests itself through myriad permutations and possibilities, 
precisely because it holds all of that in its reserve? We speak its reserve, though this 
utterance must nonetheless make certain decisions in the face of what is indecideable. 
I argue this remains an existential choice, though such a notion of existence is utterly 
divested of any ontic content whatsoever. 
 
Therefore, absolute positivism of any sort is incommensurable within a 
heterological discourse. This has at least two implications: On the methodological 
level, we are compelled by the spectre of a smoking gun, though decisively, this is the 
one area where all our attempts are hitherto foiled. On the theological level, I 
understand it in the expression of a salvific impulse (to reach the other shore of oneÕs 
discourse). Of course, we cannot prevent nor forestall heterological discourses from 
becoming re-territorialised into the body of logocentrism (or God, depending on oneÕs 
! xiv 
persuasion). I stress, however, that this remains a choice between faith and belief2. 
Which boils down to a fundamental question of orientation (towards the other shore), 
or attachment (to the tools or vehicle we use to get there)3. A further possible 
objection may even invoke EinsteinÕs famous maxim: God does not play dice with 
humans. Yes, perhaps so, but logically speaking, He did create the game. Questions 
of necessity and contingency invariably dissolve into dilemmas of contingent 
necessity or necessary contingency. It does not follow from this acknowledgement, 
however, that an insistence upon absolutism (entailing reification) would be far 
preferable, for the simple reason that un coup de ds jamais nÕabolira le hazard.4 To 
think that one might do so would be misguided, much like mistaking emptiness itself 
for a view, and a necessarily nihilistic one at that. This amounts to nothing more than 
the flip side of the same coin; and, pursuing this objection to its logical conclusion, it 
is a loaded one for in spite of their dialectical opposition they are both very much the 
same. Which is precisely the ontological sleight-of-hand I have cautioned about from 
the very beginning. 
 
                                                
2
 While faith and belief may share a common root of sense and orientation, they ultimately part ways 
in the sense that faith is linear (always pointing to True North, as it were) whilst beliefs may change 
and are thus more malleable. 
3
 It is for this reason I have eschewed discussing either the theistic devotional practices of M!h!yana 
Buddhism or the Judaism of Derrida. While this may draw criticism that my consideration of both 
thinkers is thus incomplete because of this potential incompatibility, it is my considered view that these 
do not invalidate the incipient premise that makes these later expressions possible. Also, as I have 
made clear, my motive is not to unify both discourses in a homogenising manner. That would be 
conceptually inconsistent. Despite his stature as a Buddhist philosopher, the beauty of N!g!rjunaÕs 
MMK is that it does not seek recourse to mystical insight gained from meditational practices (dhy!na) 
but employs philosophical arguments (j!na) instead, thus satisfying the preconditions necessary for a 
meaningful dialogical approach. My interest is in continuing this dialogic between the ecclesiastical 
and secular, East and West, ancient and modern; thus demonstrating that these labels of genres and the 
prejudices they incite are, at heart, empty and contingent. 
4
 A throw of the dice will never obliterate chance (Mallarm). 
 ! 1 
§ Not what/not What, or Why Deconstruction & Buddhism?  
 
What deconstruction is not? everything of course! 
What is deconstruction? nothing of course! (Derrida, 1991b: 275) 
 
If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical 
error; But I do not make a proposition; therefore I am not in error.  
(N!g!rjuna, Vigrahavy!vartan": 29) 
 
Both epigraphs above are equally well-known dictums in their own right, and they 
demonstrate a particular style of writing and thought that has been labelled obscurantist, and 
at times downright provocative. They are provocative, because they challenge unabashedly 
the complacency of our common sense. I am interested in arguing that despite the obscure 
and counter-intuitive style of both thinkers they demystify our notion of common sense as 
being anything but common, by exposing its complicity with metaphysical assumptions. In 
doing so I hope to demonstrate their significance not only to recherch areas of philosophy 
but also their relevance to how we orient ourselves in our daily lives. And as we cannot or 
will not harbour such seemingly contradictory propositions, we tend to dismiss them as being 
obscure or even irrational. After all, they are disturbing. They are, relentlessly, not. Not what, 
one begins to ask, though what is at stake is not so much the negation but the pronoun itself: 
not What?1 That has never been in question, not something that can be verified or falsified. It 
                                                
1
 One should draw the distinction between the form of negation here and the apophatic Neti neti (trans. Not this, 
not this) of Advaita Ved!nta, where the latter is the expression par excellence of negative theology. While I 
agree that there is an affirmative note in both Derrida and N!g!rjuna despite their negative critiques, it is critical 
to note that they do not affirm anything transcendental. Doing so would merely take the form of an over-turning. 
That being the case, the focus must shift from the thoroughgoing negations to whatever that is submitted under 
consideration instead as an immanent critique. This inversion is disturbing, as it also reinscribes otherness 
within the field of the same, such that we cannot affirm one without the other, nor can we affirm both 
simultaneously. 
 ! 2 
just is. We take it, for granted. What here can be essence, identity, being, reason, structure, or 
truth. An economic exchange of impossible names, each lending itself to the other, 
underwritten by correspondence. They are impossible, because we never fully arrive at the 
identity they purportedly designate, even if they present themselves otherwise. This myth of 
common sense is tenacious, and if we accept that desire is a fundamental aspect of the human 
condition then it will endure. Note that I am not here disparaging the efficacy of daily 
common sense Ð in fact, one cannot possibly function without it. That does not necessarily 
mean, however, one is therefore justified in mistaking a functional property for a substantial 
one. In other words, treating common sense as if it has ontological basis, when that is 
precisely in question. Therefore, if desire is considered a form of attachment in Buddhism, 
then I also see it as the need for reification and identification. It is not a lack, nor even a 
constitutive lack, as it is first and foremost the lack of an impossible attribute (essence). 
 
So then, why Deconstruction and Buddhism, and in particular Derrida and N!g!rjuna? 
It would be prudent to point out here that the history of Buddhist philosophy is hardly 
homogeneous2, and my primary interest in N!g!rjuna lies in the pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika 
approach that he espouses3. In doing so, I am not suggesting that N!g!rjuna is some proto-
deconstructivist avant la lettre, just as it would be equally absurd to consider Derrida as a 
post-Mah!y!nist thinker. Both thinkers were clearly writing in different intellectual and 
cultural milieus. Nevertheless, while the spectre of logocentrism remains a thoroughly 
Western one, the tendency (and need) for reification remains deeply entrenched in the human 
                                                
2
 For a survey of Buddhist history, see (Robinson and Johnson, 1997). 
3
 A background to Buddhist history is provided in the following chapter. 
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psyche4. Interestingly enough, however, it is my view that as a result of the paradigm shifts 
brought about by (post)structuralist thought, the rapprochement between the two thinkers 
may be articulated in a novel way while respecting the technical jargon (along with the 
subtleties) of both at the same time. This is desideratum in furthering the dialogic between 
ancient and modern scholarship both in the East and West, by borrowing the resources of one 
tradition to read another5. 
 
While some have pointed out how either thinker exposes the limits of philosophical 
thinking6, they are perhaps both unique in redeploying its blind-spots into an enabling 
constraint whilst remaining vigilant to their own critical assumptions. In fact, what allows 
them to do so (and which is common to both) is a systematic refusal to either characterise or 
identify with their own modi operandi. Understanding the reason for this is a first step 
towards understanding what these two thinkers are about. Derrida and N!g!rjuna are famous 
for deconstruction and emptiness (Skt. $%nyat!) respectively; and perhaps as equally 
infamous is their refusal to identify with them: 
 
That is why this word [deconstruction], at least on its own, has never appeared 
satisfactory to me (but what word is), and must always be girded by an entire 
discourse. (Derrida, 1991b: 272, emphasis mine) 
 
                                                
4
 While I have consciously eschewed any form of essentialism in my consideration of both thinkers, it is 
untenable to theorise in a self-made vacuum. In identifying the human tendency for desire through reification as 
a point of entry, I am not therefore affirming some quasi-human essence. This is crucial, for otherwise there 
would be no possibility of its cessation, which violates a fundamental tenet of Buddhism. 
5
 The choice of ÔdialogicÕ here reflects a particular form of path-based hermeneutics I am advocating here with 
regard to Derrida and N!g!rjuna. It is informed by the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer and what he 
called the fusion of horizons, by regaining the concepts of a historical past in such a way that they also include 
our own comprehension of them (1989: 374). 
6
 E.g. (Garfield and Priest, 2003); (Gasch, 1986); (Magliola, 1984); and (Murti, 1955). 
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ÒEmptyÓ should not be asserted. 
ÒNonemptyÓ should not be asserted. 
Neither both nor neither should be asserted. 
They are only used nominally. (MMK XXII: 11) 
 
Both Derrida and N!g!rjuna would maintain that emptiness is itself to be emptied, just as 
deconstruction is subject to further deconstruction. This form of vigilance is significant, for 
whilst the critical leverage afforded by these terms are key, to assert their absolute value on 
its own, however, we effectively mistake the key for the treasure. In pointing out their 
nominal status I also stress their relative dependency upon specific contexts. Both are acutely 
aware of this dependency7, and are careful in their own attempts at addressing it without 
elevating it to the status of a transcendental signified in the process of doing so. We may 
surmise from this systematic refusal that for both thinkers, the method is the argument8. In 
doing so we also begin to discern a certain style, or gait, that cuts a path between dialectical 
extremities within binary logic (is/is not). In claiming that the method is the argument, I am 
also pointing out that the key concepts are only employed for strategic purposes without 
having any ontological basis nor essence to it, thus preventing them becoming fixed as 
hegemonic methods of inquiry.  
 
In the absence of a determinable method, I understand both Deconstruction and 
M!dhyamaka as pursuing a path-based hermeneutics (as opposed to traditional text-based 
hermeneutics). The focus of this thesis sets out to address the implications of the following 
                                                
7
 Both Derrida and N!g!rjuna address this dependency or relationality that is manifest in language, 
philosophical thinking, as well as our conditioned existence. This is also where the traditional bifurcation 
between textuality and reality becomes malleable Ð a certain form of textuality is thus inscribed in our notions of 
what passes off as reality. 
8
 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three on methodology. 
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statement: everything has a context, insofar as they are dependently arisen. Specifically, they 
allow us to better understand the notion of dependency in bridging the traditional gap 
between textuality and reality. Now, this does not preclude Derrida and N!g!rjuna from 
ultimately pursuing divergent hermeneutical paths, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
account for their variances. These hermeneutical paths are, however, capable of addressing 
our existential relatedness without having to postulate an ontological basis within 
Heideggerian hermeneutics. This path-based hermeneutics I am advocating is informed by 
GadamerÕs philosophical hermeneutics in addressing our daily experience, hence my earlier 
emphasis on the myth of common sense. Thurman (1978) and Lopez (1992) have both made 
a notable case for Buddhist hermeneutics, with the latter claiming that: ÒThose who are not 
yet enlightened must interpretÓ (1992: 9). If so, this then has real pertinence to most, if not all 
of us. In looking at how both thinkers address the various linguistic, epistemological, and 
ontological issues I hope to course a middle path between deconstructive dmarche and 
m!dhyamika m!rga. 
 
 ! 6 
§ Philosophia East and West: Love & Suffering 
 
ÔHermeneuticsÕ as a philosophical discipline of rational interpretation of a 
traditional canon of Sacred Scriptures authoritative for a religious community 
has usually been considered peculiar to the West. This notion is anchored only 
in the misconception that ÔEasternÕ thought is somehow Ônon-rational,Õ or 
Ômystical,Õ hence excused from the burden of reconciling the tensions between 
some forms of authority and philosophical reason. (Thurman, 1978: 19) 
  
This section will develop the notion of path-based hermeneutics with regard to 
Derrida and N!g!rjuna. In doing so, I will employ GadamerÕs philosophical hermeneutics to 
clarify my earlier claim that everything has a context, insofar as they are dependently arisen. I 
will not present here a detailed case for Buddhist hermeneutics, except to point out its 
heterologous development over two and a half millennia independent of the hermeneutic 
tradition in the West9. One of the key points Lopez makes is that the consequence of a 
Buddhist hermeneutics is to identify with the BuddhaÕs original enlightenment in accordance 
with Schleiermacherian hermeneutics: ÒIt would follow then, that it is the experience of the 
BuddhaÕs enlightenment that provides final validity in interpretationÓ (1992: 7). While I am 
convinced of the soteriological dimension in a consistent Buddhist hermeneutics, to assert 
BuddhaÕs enlightenment as providing final validity in interpretation seems absolutist, even if 
one is able to circumvent dogmatism through employing up!ya as a hermeneutical principle. 
While I do not disagree with LopezÕs arguments in general, I believe this premise to be 
                                                
9
 Thurman (1978) presents an overview of the development of Buddhist hermeneutics from its very inception, 
beginning with the utterances of the historical Buddha over the lengthy course of his teaching career, along with 
the different hermeneutical traditions that proliferated with its transmission. In it, Thurman points out the 
hermeneutical significance of the four reliances in Buddhist hermeneutics according to Tsong Kha-Pa (1407). 
This was further developed in a conference (1987), which is collected in Buddhist Hermeneutics edited by 
Lopez (1992). 
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fundamentally flawed, and is for me, conceptually inconsistent with the arguments that 
follow. I draw support from N!g!rjuna: 
 
Whatever is the essence of the Tath!gata, 
That is the essence of the world. 
The Tath!gata has no essence, 
The world is without essence. (MMK XXII: 16) 
 
It is inconsistent to identify with the tath!gata, as it necessarily involves an element of 
objectification of that which is thus defined as empty. Regrettably, GriffithsÕ review of 
Buddhist Hermeneutics accepts uncritically LopezÕs premise, which is Romanticist in 
orientation, and in doing so, confuses Gadamer with Schleiermacher: 
 
[É] For the scholastics of the Buddhist tradition, true understanding of a 
sutraÕs definitive meaning consists, finally, in having the same insights, and 
thus the same transformation of consciousness, as that possessed by its 
omniscient author. Buddhist hermeneutics thus tends to be based upon a 
theory of understanding whose ideal goal is a fusion of the cognitive horizons 
of the hearer/reader with those of the author in a sense more radical than any 
envisaged by Gadamer. (1990: 259, emphasis mine) 
 
The path-based hermeneutics I am urging here departs from any such form of identification, 
and is oriented towards openness. In claiming Buddha as an omniscient author we also 
elevate him to the status of a metaphysical principle. This is untenable. Ironically, the support 
for my objection may be found in the four reliances of Buddhist hermeneutics raised by 
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Thurman (1978), which Lopez (1992) accepts and follows, the chief of which is: rely on the 
teaching, not the teacher. If Buddha had intended himself to be regarded as an Òomniscient 
authorÓ, it then follows that 1) Buddha has the same onto-theistic status as God; 2) The first 
reliance would therefore be on the teacher rather than the teachings, stressing religious faith 
rather than a spirit of hermeneutical questioning; and 3) he would not have admonished the 
disciples to diligently work out their own salvation upon entering parinirv!&a. The logical 
conclusion to draw from the first reliance promulgated and the third point raised here is this: 
Buddhist philosophy cannot be divorced from its unique hermeneutical character, in working 
out its fundamental tenets without seeking any final form of identification10. 
 
Traditional Western and Buddhist hermeneutics are thus arguably diametrically 
opposed in their discursive trajectories, as a result of their philosophical and theistic 
orientations. Traditional hermeneutics in the West cannot be separated from its onto-
theological element, and is necessarily so, being the interpretation of the Word of God. The 
interpretation of BuddhaÕs teachings raises a complex of issues as a result of his long 
teaching career, and the fact that those teachings were dispensed according to the particular 
malaise (philosophical or otherwise) of his audience. In fact, his final exhortation was to seek 
refuge in the teachings themselves (which, in itself, is no mean hermeneutical task), and in 
doing so, excluding himself from serving as the ultimate seat of authority. From a 
philosophical perspective, a declared love of wisdom (Òto know thyselfÓ) in the West 
culminates in an Enlightenment celebrating the preeminence of Reason and Truth. In the 
East, however, all philosophising gains impetus from the fact that suffering exists (Òall is 
du'khaÓ), and Enlightenment is thus attained when suffering ceases. There is, therefore, a 
                                                
10
 This is what also prompts Thurman to claim that Buddha was the first hermeneutician of his own doctrine, 
which coheres with Tsong Kha-PaÕs description of the role of philosophy in Buddhist thought as primarily 
hermeneutical (1978: 20). 
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pragmatic dimension which is absent in the Western philosophical tradition.  
 
 A further distinction between Oriental and Occidental modes of thinking lies in the 
criterion of rationality (or its putative lack thereof). This can imply dualist knowledge (within 
the traditional subject-object dyad) vis--vis a non-dualist apprehension of the world11. The 
reason I have chosen to focus on N!g!rjunaÕs MMK is because it extensively employs 
philosophical arguments without recourse to praj! or insight gained from meditational 
practices. McCagney makes a similar point regarding the MMK, claiming that N!g!rjuna 
applies j!na to break the chain of conditioning instead of praj! (1997: 99). In light of this, I 
am therefore bemused by LoyÕs and MagliolaÕs penchant for employing Zen koans in their 
exegeses of N!g!rjuna, despite the apparent affinities between M!dhyamaka and Zen; it 
seems to me a rather back-handed way of coming to terms with N!g!rjuna, which is 
compromised by the even wider latitudes in interpretation afforded by the koans. In fact, this 
purported affinity between ChÕan/Zen and Indo-Tibetan pr!sa"gika-m!dhyamika is itself 
questioned in RueggÕs review, claiming it as Òsimply a misconception [that] will very clearly 
require more rigorous investigation in light of the history of Buddhist thoughtÓ (Ruegg, 1995: 
576). I also read in ThurmanÕs claim a caveat against exoticising aspects of Buddhist (or 
indeed, any Oriental) thought in terms of mysticism as its defining hallmark. Such deliberate 
obfuscation (viz., appeals to some mystical Ôin-betweenÕ realm) is not only unnecessary, but 
also constitutes a regrettable form of intellectual flneurie under the guise of cross-cultural 
analysis. In fact, part of what I am committed to demonstrate in this thesis is that the prima 
facie mysticism demystifies for us the sedimented metaphors that constitute common sense.  
 
What is this path-based hermeneutics that I am forwarding, and how does it address 
                                                
11
 The latter would be dismissed as intuitive and non-rational for failing the epistemological dyad, though this 
nondual apprehension is understood as advaya rather than advaita. 
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our existential relatedness12? The notion of a path implies orientation, without coming to rest, 
and therefore, no fixity. This non-fixity may mean indeterminacy (as in Derrida), or it may 
also imply emptiness (as in N!g!rjuna): 
 
If the path had an essence, 
Cultivation would not be appropriate. 
If this path is indeed cultivated, 
It cannot have an essence. (MMK XXIV: 24) 
 
If the path were fixed, then it would be more appropriate to speak of linearity rather than 
cultivation Ð that which is already determined need not be cultivated Ð for there is no profit 
(nor growth) for the practitioner13. As a middle path it depends upon its terminus a quo and 
ad quem, though they themselves cannot be fixed (as possessing an essence)14: 
 
Where there is no beginning or end, 
How could there be a middle? 
It follows that thinking about this in terms of 
Prior, posterior, and simultaneous is not appropriate. (MMK XI: 2) 
 
If suffering had an essence it would be ipso facto independent (to whom then does suffering 
                                                
12
 By this Òexistential relatednessÓ I also refer to the Buddhist tenet of prat"tya-samutp!da that all things are 
dependently arisen. Within the doctrine of Two-Truth promulgated by N!g!rjuna this would have the same 
modal status as the conventional nature of conventional phenomena. See also (Fig. 1: Heuristic Structure of 
Two-Truths) in Appendix A. 
13
 This would violate conventional understanding, as i) Enlightenment is thus guaranteed; without ii) anyone 
striving for it. It becomes, then, a mere issue of logical necessity. It also obviates the existential demand for 
oneÕs own response and responsibility (in accordance with Derrida), which for me takes the form of an 
engagement by working through the concepts that we otherwise accept uncritically. 
14
 As will become clear, the reification of a particular concept involves treating it as if it were in possession of 
an independent essence, which in N!g!rjunaÕs terms, would be Ònon-emptyÓ. 
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occur?), and it cannot, by definition, cease to exist (nor lapse). Garfield argues: ÒThe path, 
after all, is a path from suffering and to awakening. If the former cannot cease and the latter 
does not depend on cultivation, the path is nonexistentÓ (1995: 310). The notion of a 
hermeneutic path therefore emphasises the existential condition in which we find ourselves, 
in medias res, without being underwritten by ontological foundations. This is prima facie 
self-contradictory, for how can we talk about the existential significance of something 
without also referring to its ontological basis? In what capacity then do we understand this 
notion of existential relatedness, along with its hermeneutical significance?  
 
Gadamer opines: ÒThe point of HeiddegerÕs hermeneutical reflection is not so much 
to prove that there is a circle as to show that this circle possesses an ontologically positive 
significanceÓ (1989: 266). While we perhaps cannot avoid this hermeneutical circularity, the 
section on Up!ya & Bricolage will demonstrate how this circle is a self-destroying one. The 
Romanticist approach advocated by Schleiermacher defines the hermeneutic enterprise as one 
of identification with the author as an autonomous, self-conscious, agent. Hence the ensuing 
hermeneutic circularity which necessitates its ontologically positive character. This is what I 
understand Lopez to be endorsing in his claim that the end of Buddhist hermeneutics is to 
identify with the enlightenment of the Buddha15. N!g!rjuna, however, has this to say: 
 
The pacification of all objectification 
And the pacification of illusion: 
No Dharma was taught by the Buddha 
At any time, in any place, to any person. (MMK XXV: 24) 
                                                
15
 The choice of diction in LopezÕs characterisation of this hermeneutics is revealing of what I see as a need for 
fixity and authority: ÒThe exegete is constantly in search of his place in the absent circle, and his hermeneutics 
provide the compass (1992: 9, emphasis mine). 
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I should like to point out here that: any form of identification cannot be divorced from 
objectification. It is for this reason I believe LopezÕs fundamental premise to remain a 
grasping of the subtlest sort. It would be more consistent to claim, pace Gadamer, that Òto 
understand what a person says is [É] to come to an understanding about the subject matter, 
not to get inside another person and relive his experiences (Erlebnisse)Ó (1989: 383). Now, 
one may attempt to circumvent this by claiming LopezÕs assertion as ney!rtha (i.e., subject to 
further interpretation), that it constitutes a conventional understanding by urging this 
soteriological vision Ð which is not false per se Ð and thus maintaining its validity. However, 
this move is vitiated when Lopez claims it (without further qualification) as providing the 
final validity in interpretation Ð it is therefore definitive (or n"t!rtha) for him in a 
hermeneutically positive sense.  
 
I mentioned earlier that a path necessarily implies orientation as part of its structure, 
and a path-based hermeneutics capable of addressing existential relatedness without an 
ontological basis allows us to realise the radical hermeneutical possibilities that I understand 
Gadamer to be forwarding16. This orientation is towards what Gadamer calls Òthe logical 
structure of opennessÓ that characterises hermeneutical consciousness, which cannot be 
divorced from its attitude of critical questioning (or intervention), such that, Òwhen a question 
arises, it breaks open the being of the object, as it wereÓ (1989: 362, emphasis mine). What is 
in question therefore is the intimate relation, hitherto, between existence and Being. In 
freeing the hermeneutical project from the question of Being we are also calling it into 
question: ÒThe hermeneutical task becomes of itself a questioning of things and is always in 
                                                
16
 This realisation is also soteriological, but it is a form of becoming, without Being. Thurman claims that Òthe 
Buddhist hermeneutical tradition is a tradition of realization, devoid of any intellect/intuition dichotomy (1978: 
35). This is correct, and hermeneutical approaches stressing either j!na or praj! to the exclusion of the other 
is misguided. 
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part so defined (Gadamer, 1989: 269). This questioning of things also means: whether it is 
this or that, whether it exists or not, etc. 
 
 In doing away with the ontological foundations of our existence we also stress its 
relative dependency, and in the absence of Being (that otherwise determines us in advance) 
we are also free to make connections depending upon our orientation (via the questions we 
ask); in doing so we are able to maintain those undetermined possibilities as possibilities: 
 
Questions always bring out the undetermined possibilities of a thing. That is 
why we cannot understand the questionableness of something without asking 
real questions, though we can understand a meaning without meaning it. To 
understand the questionableness of something is already to be questioning. 
(Gadamer, 1989: 375) 
 
A path-based hermeneutics has to be oriented towards this logical structure of openness in 
order for it to be conceptually consistent. This hermeneutical questioning differs from 
Hegelian dialectics, which Gadamer characterises as Òa monologue of thinking that tries to 
carry out in advance what matures little by little in every genuine dialogue (1989: 369). I am 
thus able to understand BuddhaÕs silence when faced with the fourteen questions17 in that 
they did not constitute real questions: ÒWe say that a question has been put wrongly when it 
does not reach the state of openness but precludes reaching it by retaining false 
presuppositions. It pretends to have an openness and susceptibility to decision that it does not 
haveÓ (Gadamer, 1989: 364). One may also find support here for MurtiÕs claim that Buddha 
                                                
17
 The famous avy!krtavastun", namely, 1) Buddha exists after death, 2) does not, 3) both does and does not, 4) 
neither, 5) The world is limited, 6) is not, 7) is both limited and infinite, 8) is neither, 9) The world has a 
beginning, 10) has not, 11) both, 12) neither, 13) The self is the same as the body, 14) The self is different from 
the body (Thurman, 1978: 38, fn. 13). 
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was the first person who discovered the dialectic, though not necessarily in the Kantian 
idealistic tradition he had intended, but rather in the dialogic form of hermeneutical 
questioning (1955: 9). N!g!rjunaÕs subsequent systematisation of that eloquent silence in the 
MMK can then be understood in terms of this dialectical openness: 
 
As the art of asking questions, dialectic proves its value because only the 
person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his questioning, 
which involves being able to preserve his orientation toward openness. The art 
of questioning is the art of questioning ever further Ð i.e., the art of thinking. It 
is called a dialectic because it is the art of conducting a real dialogue. 
(Gadamer, 1989: 367) 
 
I have thus far demonstrated the pertinence of this path-based hermeneutics in 
addressing our existential relatedness, along with its ontological significance. Gadamer 
claims language to be the medium of the hermeneutic experience. This is hardly revelatory, 
for there can be no interpretation without language, but it also sets certain limits on how this 
language may be conceived. This language cannot be logocentric, with a transcendental 
signified governing its play of possibilities. It also has to be structural, in terms of its internal 
dependency (Gasch prefers to call it infrastructural). This does not mean, however, that we 
are simply extrapolating the functional features of structural linguistics to determine the 
substantial nature of reality18. There is an element of translation involved, and in the process 
of this translation, traditional notions (or indeed, bifurcations) of textuality, reality, meaning, 
and reading would have to be reinscribed. Derrida claims: ÒBeing must be conceived as 
presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way aroundÓ 
                                                
18
 This, as we shall see later, is what Loy ultimately does, in extrapolating a multidimensional textuality from 
Derrida to the entire universe, thus arguing for its essential nonduality. 
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(1978: 369). The state of play in language determines the character of Being instead, and this 
notion of play cannot be divorced from its relative dependency: 
 
The movement to-and-fro obviously belongs so essentially to the game that 
there is an ultimate sense in which you cannot have a game by yourself. In 
order for there to be a game, there always has to be, not necessarily literally 
another player, but something else with which the player plays and which 
automatically responds to his move with a countermove. (Gadamer, 1989: 
105-6, emphasis mine) 
 
In stressing that there is not necessarily literally another player I am also pointing out its non-
actuality (as being essentially other), for the starting point of structural linguistics is that it is 
a system of differences without any positive terms. In denying the essence of any entitative 
identity, any form of alterity has to be subsumed within the context of its relative play. 
N!g!rjuna makes this clear for us: 
 
If there is no essence, 
How can there be difference in entities? 
The essence of difference in entities 
Is what is called the entity of difference. (MMK XV: 3) 
 
Derrida would add that: 
 
Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system 
within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the 
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systematic play of differences. Such a play, diffrance, is thus no longer 
simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual 
process and system in general. (Derrida, 1991a: 63) 
 
Therefore, any charge of textualism (or conventionalism) levelled at Derrida (or N!g!rjuna) 
may only be made from an entrenched realist position that persists in upholding the 
distinction between text and reality when it is precisely being suspended, or called into 
question. 
 
Finally, I would like to forward GaschÕs characterisation of infrastructure as a 
general starting point of how we may understand this notion of dependency in language19: 
 
1. An infrastructure is not an existent. It is not. Nor, however, is it simply 
absent [...] Although not a being (on), it is not a nonbeing (me on). 
2. Its preontological nature aside, the infrastructure acquires its interpretive 
efficiency with regard to the specific problems it clarifies through being in 
excess of the opposition of sense and non-sense, meaning and the absence of 
meaning. [having no meaning in itself] 
3. An infrastructure, moreover, is not an essence, since it is not dependent on 
any category of that which is present or absent [...] Its ÔessenceÕ is to have no 
essence. And yet an infrastructure is endowed with a certain universality. 
(Gasch, 1986: 149-50) 
 
It is my view that the points adumbrated above may also be said of prat"tya-samutp!da, with 
                                                
19
 This is done more for purposes of pedagogy, as there are certain points which require further discussion, and 
which will be considered in Chapter Five on Derrida. 
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adequate qualification. I agree that this notion of infrastructure is endowed with a certain 
universality, though this is also an area of potential confusion, as it is subject to metaphysical 
reincorporation. This happens once we take this universality to be definitive in one way or 
another Ð i.e., as having some form of essence Ð  while what should be stressed is its capacity 
in keeping those conditions of possibility open. One of those possibilities necessarily includes 
the reversion to essentialist reification, what Derrida might also call, the metaphysical lure. 
Without this acknowledgement and the vigilance necessitated by it this notion of 
infrastructure (whether we decide to call it textuality or prat"tya-samutp!da) would end up 
becoming a form of hyper-essentiality, approaching the mysticism of negative theology 
which does not obtain in either Derrida or N!g!rjuna. This will be made clear in Chapter Six 
where I intervene between the comparative analyses of Magliola and Loy. What I have 
attempted to do in this section is to locate the interface (or one may call it relation or 
dependency instead) between linguistics and life through a specific form of hermeneutics that 
is not predetermined by Being. I have also argued for the orientation of this path-based 
hermeneutics towards a logical structure of openness. This, in turn, is guided by a critical 
questioning and vigilance that has soteriological significance. This notion of soteriology, 
however, cannot be conceived in terms of a hypostatised being, which would amount to 
foreclosure. The difference, such as it is, lies in the hermeneutical choices we make, and the 
ends to which we subsequently deploy them. In doing so, we thus cultivate a middle path 
between Deconstruction and M!dhyamaka in addressing our existential relatedness. This 
cultivation also means engaging with the sedimented metaphors of philosophy in an attitude 
of hermeneutical questioning. 
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§ Buddhism and Critical Theory 
 
I have argued for a path-based hermeneutics as a middle path between Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna, and I have also pointed out how this cannot be separated from its methodological 
concerns. The literature review presented in this chapter serves then at least two purposes, 
one pedagogical and one conceptual: Firstly, it attempts to reconstruct in brief the 
hermeneutical horizon of N!g!rjuna to understand the intellectual milieu in which he was 
writing. As this thesis does not presuppose any prior knowledge of Buddhist philosophy nor 
its intellectual history this is desideratum, especially in making sense of the various debates 
employing technical terms that may not otherwise be immediately apparent to a reader 
trained in the Western philosophical tradition. It is my view that without first situating 
N!g!rjuna in his own philosophical tradition and engaging with him there on his own terms, 
we cannot hope to translate, with any degree of accuracy, the issues that could have a positive 
contribution to cross-disciplinary discourse. This also allows me to justify, in the process, my 
preferred reading of N!g!rjuna, as well as deciding upon a particular translation from the 
other versions to date. From a conceptual perspective this allows me to highlight certain 
issues that I will go on to address in the thesis which I think is relevant to pursuing this path-
based hermeneutics between both thinkers. This is certainly the case with GarfieldÕs reading 
of the opening chapter of the MMK Ð this is given further attention in Chapter Four on 
N!g!rjuna. The preliminary section on Deconstruction and M!dhyamaka provides a brief 
look at the attempts thus far comparing Derrida and N!g!rjuna. This would become 
conceptually formative in shaping my own methodological approach vis--vis Magliola and 
Loy, which I shall discuss in Chapter Three.  
 
This section begins with a discussion on the possibility of relating to each other both 
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Buddhism and Critical Theory, as general discourses in their own right. It will be 
consequently argued that the possibility of making this relation is also, inevitably, a question 
of translation (by crossing genres and contexts). At first sight, both discourses stress an 
emancipatory dimension within them: Truth is achieved through the critical faculty of our 
philosophical enterprises that is free from error, ignorance, or illusion. This touches upon the 
end in and of philosophy in general, as a form of eschatological redemption. However, when 
Murti asserts this to be the Òtrue M!dhyamika standpointÓ (Murti, 1955: 41), it also points to 
the actual and decisive end of philosophy itself and all forms of philosophising, in accordance 
with M!dhyamaka thought. This is because M!dhyamaka maintains that emancipation (or 
nirv!&a) is only achieved when we relinquish all philosophical views. In other words, 
criticism not only affords us freedom from error or ignorance then, but even from philosophy 
itself. How is this possible, as criticism is clearly a function of philosophical theorising? This 
may be a commonly held view, though M!dhyamaka also argues that what passes for 
common sense in everyday understanding is in fact complicit with metaphysical 
presuppositions such that they become untenable, consequently reinscribing what we 
understand to be common sense20.  
 
Now, given the context of this thesis within the field of Critical Theory rather than 
Buddhology, I have given more attention to the philosophical aspect of the debates rather 
than philological ones. This might elicit objections of fidelity and violence to N!g!rjunaÕs 
work, though I should also point out here that even within the field of Buddhist studies this 
issue of fidelity (which more often than not are determined by partisan interpretative choices) 
remains a much-debated topic. While there is without doubt a great deal of interpretative 
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 Part of N!g!rjunaÕs attraction for me lies in the fact that while he is widely hailed as Òa philosopherÕs 
philosopherÓ because of his erudition, he ultimately demonstrates the untenability of these reified philosophical 
arguments, such that the insights gained no longer remain the sole province of professional philosophers, but 
has a real pertinence to our everyday practices. 
 ! 20 
violence committed in the name of textual fidelity I hope to demonstrate here that the 
problems surrounding the reception of N!g!rjuna in the West are, if anything else, legion21. 
As I have mentioned earlier, the ultimate goal within the context of Buddhist philosophy is 
the attainment of nirv!&a, which is considered by M!dhyamaka to be the cessation of all 
attachments and relinquishing of all views. This means, inter alia, that the entire 
philosophical edifice upon which this goal is made possible to be discarded once it has been 
attained, much like kicking the ladder under oneÕs feet after reaching the top22. As we shall 
see, the attraction of this trope is particularly enduring, though I would also maintain a 
critical difference between non-attachment to oneÕs tools (or methods) of inquiry, and 
attempting to pull oneself up by the boot-strings: the former is groundless in a way while the 
latter hypostatises some form of groundless-ground. This brings us to a particular form of end 
in M!dhyamaka, that is no longer understood in terms of teleological closure but an Òopen-
endednessÓ that resists metaphysical annexation through an on-going hermeneutical 
vigilance23. 
 
Before going further, the inevitable question needs to be posed: what is the value of 
reading N!g!rjuna, and furthermore, within the context of critical theory today? I think this 
has to be answered in a round-about manner. Take for example the prevalence of 
deconstruction within critical theory, it has been almost fashionable for theorists to apply the 
Òdeconstructive methodÓ as a powerful tool of critique to challenge and contest the dominant 
ideologies within their respective fields, from gender studies to post-colonial debates. This 
certainly covers a wide spectrum, and there is not very much to which the Òdeconstructive 
balmÓ cannot be applied these days. Now, I am not suggesting that it is fruitful we apply 
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 For further discussion on the topic, see (Bharati, 1992). 
22
 For these reasons parallels have been drawn between Buddhism and Wittgenstein of Tractatus. See 
(Anderson, 1985). 
23
 See (McCagney, 1997) for a reading of $%nyat! as openness. 
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N!g!rjuna to a field like gender studies for example, but neither am I entirely convinced by 
the assiduous applications of Derrida himself (like so much pharmakon) to the varying 
contexts of critical debates. In fact, I am curious about the viability of such applications, and 
it makes a lot of critical sense to ask why such applications are even possible in the first 
place, considering that deconstruction first began within literary theory? These are 
immediately questions of genres and categories, along with the conceptual boundaries or 
limits that circumvent and determine them. In this respect, both Deconstruction and 
M!dhyamaka are similar in that they both outstrip their own philosophical horizons; in 
another sense, one may also say that they lend themselves to translation, though that 
nevertheless obliges us to identify a core theory as well. The rather awkward truth, however, 
is there is no such core to begin with. In fact, this problem extends also to N!g!rjuna 
 
It is something of a scandal, then, that the basic meaning of this difficult text 
remains so obscure. This is not for want of interpreters Ð no Buddhist thinker 
has received more attention Ð yet there is little agreement among his Western 
expositors. It is curious, and more than a little suspicious, that N!g!rjuna 
usually ends up expounding something quite similar to oneÕs own favorite 
philosopher or philosophy: ShayerÕs Hegel, StcherbatskyÕs Kant, MurtiÕs 
Ved!nta, GudmundsenÕs Wittgenstein, MagliolaÕs Derrida, KalupahanaÕs 
empiricism and pragmatism, and so forth. (Loy, 1999: 246)  
 
This has not, however, prevented critics from continuing to do so Ð certainly not Loy himself 
in spite of his protestations, for he is committed to constructing a core theory of nonduality. 
While one might say the possibilities opened up by both thinkers lend themselves to different 
philosophical debates, it would be more accurate to say that they completely infect and 
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undermine philosophical systems and their categories Ð which includes us (as supposed self-
conscious agents). This also implies the metaphysical assumptions found in our everyday 
lives that may or may not be apparent, and regardless of which we are always already bought 
into an economy of metaphysics. The possibilities both thinkers open up are possibilities of 
freedom and openness, and I argue we may find in Derrida and N!g!rjuna these conditions of 
possibilities (for philosophical speculation) that become at once the very conditions of its 
impossibility (by resisting determination and reification).  
 
Having said that, the cultural and historical gaps between both thinkers inevitably 
raises insuperable difficulties for a consistent hermeneutics: 
 
What we do seem to have is a collection of intelligent misreadings, and that 
may be enough [É] We should not be surprised that interpretation is not an 
exact science. After all, translation is not an exact science.  Science is not an 
exact science. (Tuck, 1990: 100) 
 
TuckÕs main contention was that Western interpretations of N!g!rjuna were largely 
determined by the philosophical trends current at the time in the following phases: 1) 
dismissing Buddhism as a form of idealist nihilism in the 19th century24; 2) stressing the 
antinomy and absolute in N!g!rjuna by neo-Kantians and neo-Hegelians25; 3) emphasis on 
the logical form of the catu(ko)i by analytic philosophy26; and 4) post-Wittgensteinian 
analyses on the M!dhyamika philosophy of language. The point here is not to underscore the 
correctness of any interpretative method in particular, but rather to highlight the 
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 See (Stcherbatsky, 1927; and de la Valle Poussin, 1913). 
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 See (Murti, 1955). 
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 See (Gunaratne, 1980, 1986; Jayatilleke, 1967; Robinson, 1957; Wayman, 1977). 
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presuppositions we bring to any text: 
 
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the 
text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text 
with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. (Gadamer, 1989: 
267) 
 
In pointing this out I am also acknowledging the circumstances surrounding my own 
interpretative choices. Where comparative analysis was previously a favoured form of 
approach to cross-cultural texts we now prefer to seek out Òfamily resemblancesÓ instead. 
However, it should be clear that the insertion of fashionable theoretical cues do not warrant a 
rigorous or even intelligent reading. What I can agree with Tuck, however, is that all forms of 
interpretation involve a level of translation, and that the relationship between them is an 
Òinexact scienceÓ Ð the science in question being the scientific model of method. What Tuck 
called Òisogetical interpretationÓ (1990: 98) is a perennial problem in Buddhist hermeneutics, 
and to the extent we might possess definitive translations of a text we do not necessarily 
always arrive at the same interpretations. This problem is further compounded when we 
consider that N!g!rjuna wrote in cryptic Sanskrit verse with later translated sources available 
to modern scholarship taken from Tibetan and Chinese versions of the 
M%lamadhyamakak!rik!. More often than not, interpretative methods themselves in turn 
determine the translations (and indeed, entire traditions) that are made available to us. This is 
certainly true of the two recent translations of the MMK by Kalupahana (1986) and Garfield 
(1995), at both of whom we shall take a close look in this review. One might argue that any 
difference lies in the method, as if one believes a stringent application would guarantee 
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commensurability between the source and target language. Applications cannot be definitive 
in this way as it already presupposes the bifurcation of a theory and practice of reading that 
determines to us in advance how to read a text, and where its utility would be a tool that one 
may employ or administer at leisure.  
 
A similar caveat is to be found in Indian philosophy exhorting one not to mistake the 
map for the terrain. In both the Upani(ads and Buddhism the notion of a path (Skt. m!rga) is 
highly significant. The relation we have with the text we read therefore takes the form of an 
ethical engagement or solicitation, which I believe forms the middle path between theory and 
practice as a hermeneutical approach. To the extent that we are unable to jettison our 
respective philosophical heritage I believe it is not impossible to use tradition as a form of 
enabling constraint to revisit certain texts with a fresh perspective, as Gadamer also urges: ÒIt 
is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to what speaks to us in traditionÓ 
(1989: 270). Ultimately, misgivings about textual fidelity (by the nit-pickers) regarding 
interpretative violence (by the cherry-pickers) at times amount to no more than the flip side 
of the same coin. In the next section I will consider MurtiÕs narrative of Buddhist history in 
light of recent scholarship so that we might better appraise the recent developments in 
Buddhist studies, along with attempts to link both Deconstruction and M!dhyamaka. 
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§ Historical Background to Buddhism 
 
In this section I will outline a brief history of Buddhism taking on MurtiÕs narrative as 
well as recent scholarship in the field. A diachronic study will have to take into proper 
consideration the historical development of Buddhism within the context of Indian 
philosophy, though such reconstructions are at risk of being deterministic in the need for 
coherence. In fact, what we come to understand by the term ÒBuddhismÓ is itself a fairly 
recent name that comes from eighteenth-century European Enlightenment thinkers, and their 
quest to subsume religion under comparative sociology and secular history (Robinson and 
Johnson, 1997: 1). The original term that Buddha himself used was Dharma-Vinaya (trans. 
Doctrine and Discipline). Robinson and Johnson explained that Dharma-Vinaya was meant 
to be prescriptive whilst Buddhism is descriptive in that Òit simply denotes the actions of 
people who follow a vision of Dharma-Vinaya without suggesting that the reader accept that 
vision or follow itÓ (1997: 1).  
 
While this distinction is pedagogically useful I do not find it particularly insightful, as 
the term ÒBuddhismÓ itself raises an entire complex of issues which I will only adumbrate 
here. To what extent can Buddhism be considered an ÒismÓ, and furthermore an ÒismÓ of the 
historical Buddha? The Buddha himself certainly did not encourage devotion to his person 
(nor any such conception of self-hood in fact). The alternative is to consider Buddhism in its 
onto-theistic aspect as a religion, which is the view that Robinson and Johnson subscribe to. 
This may not be entirely wrong, as later Mah!y!na devotional practices are indeed theistic. 
However as a descriptive term there are shortcomings, as it brings to the fore a religious 
conception of the teachings of the historical Buddha that supervenes the other philosophical 
ÒismsÓ or movements that have developed, by recuperating them under its name. I argue this 
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takes the edge off the conceptual breakthroughs made by some Buddhist philosophers such as 
N!g!rjuna, for whom I am inclined to believe that his understanding of ÒBuddhismÓ would 
be rather different from the term that is in current usage. This point is made to forestall 
arguments whether he is Mah!y!nist or not, as given the points made above it is as moot as 
asking whether N!g!rjuna himself was a Buddhist in the way we have come to understand 
this term? The term ÒBuddhismÓ is therefore deployed for pedagogical purposes, though it is 
used with an awareness of this problematic.   
 
 Historically, there were two main branches within Indian philosophy, which differed 
according to whether they accepted or not the authority of the Vedas. With the exception of 
Buddhism and Jainism (termed as n!stika or unorthodox), all others were considered !stika 
or orthodox. The fundamental difference lay between the !tma-vada doctrine (substance 
view) of the Upani(ads that taught the existence of the soul (!tman), and the an!tma-vada 
doctrine (anti-substance view) of the Buddha that denied the existence of the soul. Jainism 
lay mid-way between the two doctrines, teaching the existence of an !tman (which conflicted 
with Buddhism) that could be changing (which conflicted with the Br!hmanic teaching of the 
Upani(ads). For the most part, Jainism did not exert significant influence on the course of 
Indian philosophy. The Br!hmanical systems accepted without question the authority of the 
Vedas (and hence more dogmatic) while Buddhism was from its very inception more critical 
of empirical experience, and employed a method of critical analysis (Skt. vibhajyav!da). The 
fact of human suffering (Skt. du'kha) was a common issue both had to address. The 
Upani(ads found salvation through a principle of identification (!tman) with the universal 
(Brahman) that is positively characterised as a state of consciousness and bliss. This is 
famously summed up in the dictum: ÒTat tvam asiÓ (trans. That thou art).  
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In Buddhism, however, there is a strong sense of opposition to the !tma-vada and 
salvation is to be found in nirv!&a instead, which is characterised negatively as the 
annihilation of suffering, as a state that is $%nya (trans. empty). Buddha rejected the substance 
view of the Upani(ads that asserted both existence of the universal and the individual as 
being illusory due to wrong belief or ignorance (Skt. avidy!). Instead of Being, Buddha 
taught Becoming (such that reality is in flux) with the doctrine of prat"tya-samutp!da (trans. 
dependent co-origination). Buddha taught the theory of elements to avoid affirming the 
existence of a soul. The five aggregates (Skt. skhandas) are the burden and the bearer of that 
burden is what we conventionally understand as the empirical self or ego (Skt. pudgala). This 
is also known as the modal view of reality, in contradistinction to the substance view 
promulgated by the Br!hmanical systems. In Buddhism, Dharma refers to the law and 
teachings of the Buddha (e.g. the Four Noble Truths and Eight-Fold Noble Paths) while 
dharma (or dharma-sanketa) refers specifically to the constituent elements of experience held 
up by prat"tya-samutp!da. All Buddhist systems accept the dharma-theory taught by the 
Buddha, though it is the way they interpreted prat"tya-samutp!da that formed their respective 
differences.  
 
After Buddha passed into parinirv!&a (544 or 487 B.C.E), the First Council was 
convened by the Elders (Sthaviras) at Rajargha to synthesise the teachings of the Buddha into 
pi)akas (trans. baskets or collections of oral traditions) that consisted of Vinaya-pi)aka (rules 
of conduct) and Sutta-pi)aka (discourses or dialogues). The third, Abhidhamma-pi)aka 
(philosophical doctrines) was later added to comprise what we now have as the tripi)aka. 
Robinson and Johnson add, ÒThe complete canon existing in a language closest to Magadhi is 
that of the Therav!da sect, which has been preserved in Pali, a literary vernacular similar to 
SanskritÓ (1997: 52). This was then memorised and passed down orally as writing at the time 
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was reserved for secular purposes.  
 
*bhidharmika schools (circa 300 B.C.E) represented the earliest attempts at synthesising 
the philosophical doctrines of the Buddha, and the *bhidharma texts were annotations that 
interpreted and systematised the m!t+k! (trans. lists) of essential teachings drawn from the 
s%tras dating from BuddhaÕs time, though they were actually composed much later (Robinson 
and Johnson, 1997: 54). This is contrary to traditional claims that #nanda recited the 
Abhidhamma-pi)aka as well as the Sutta-pi)aka during the First Council, which Warder also 
agrees is unlikely to be the case (1970: 202). This was also a period of intense philosophical 
speculation, and almost every sect had their own *bhidharma texts, which tradition numbers 
as eighteen excluding the later Mah!y!na schools. Recent Buddhist scholarship holds that 
this number is likely to be wrong. Doctrinal disputes in presenting a coherent system of the 
BuddhaÕs teachings led to a schism within Buddhism. Robinson and Johnson make a very 
good point regarding this:  
 
If one assumes that the BuddhaÕs teachings were primarily therapeutic, the 
inconsistencies are no great issue. Differing approaches were found to work 
for different types of problems. But if one is looking for a logically consistent 
system, one has to explain the inconsistencies away. (1997: 56) 
 
The *bhidharmikas understood prat"tya-samutp!da as denying substance (!tman) and 
establishing the reality of separate elements (dharma) subject to causal law. *bhidharmika 
systems recognised seventy-five such dharmas that they considered real. This was the early 
stage of realist pluralism in Buddhism. The middle path for the *bhidharmika as a criticism 
of !tma-vada is that between eternalism (Skt. $!$vata-v!da) and nihilism (Skt. uccheda-
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v!da). A permanent (or eternal) !tman that exists cannot explain change (as it cannot lapse) 
and is therefore not conducive to spiritual life, for there is no possibility of liberation from 
suffering. The nihilist position would mean there is no suffering whatsoever, and therefore 
there is also no path to liberation. The differences between the Sthaviras and Vaisalian 
monks led the latter to convene a Second Council at Vaisali where they formed a separate 
school known as the Mah!sanghika (trans. Great Assembly). It is also from the 
Mah!sanghika school that the later Mah!y!na movement (circa 100 B.C.E.) was born. 
 
The Sthavir!dins were further split amongst themselves during the Third Council 
(circa 250 B.C.E) at Pataliputra into two factions, Vibhajyav!dins and Sarv!stiv!dins. During 
the two centuries from 100 B.C.E to 100 C.E. India switched from an oral to a written culture, 
and, as can be imagined, this lent fuel to the rife speculation that were already taking place 
within Buddhism:  
 
In the early years, when canons had to be memorized, a monk belonged 
exclusively to the school whose texts he had memorized. Beginning with the 
first and second centuries C.E., however, as written culture supplanted oral 
culture and the texts were written down, monks and monasteries were freed to 
study and even to adopt specific tenets of rival schools without risking 
expulsion from their own. (Robinson and Johnson, 1997: 62) 
 
Freed by the Mah!sanghika split from the Sthavir!dins asserting that scriptures did not 
constitute the final authority of the Buddha-word, along with the proliferation of writing 
which was also having profound influence on Hinduism elsewhere, this led to a surge of 
$!stras (treatises) being written, citing s%tras as proofs which is characteristic of the 
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Mah!y!na corpus (Robinson and Johnson, 1997: 85). Robinson and Johnson trace the 
development of the Mah!y!na movement from its earliest s%tras beginning from 100 B.C..E. to 
the Nirv!&a S%tra circa 200 Ð 400 C.E (1997: 85). 
 
It was during such an intellectually charged period that N!g!rjuna (circa 150 C.E. Ð 250 
C.E.) was writing, and the M!dhyamaka (,%nyav!da) school was a radical departure from the 
*bhidharmika. The M!dhyamika contends that prat"tya-samutp!da as dependent co-
origination is not the principle of temporal sequence (as the law of causality determined by 
karma), but rather designates the relative dependence of things on each other that is $%nya. 
The term $%nyat! is strictly an empty designation and should not be taken to refer to some 
mysterious realm of emptiness which is the common mistake we make in everyday language. 
,%nyat! appears in the S%tra Pi)aka but was generally ignored by the *bhidharmika 
systematisers. The M!dhyamika forwards the essential unreality of separate elements (Skt. 
dharma-nair!tmya) through the relative dependency between them. This re-interpretation of 
prat"tya-samutp!da is a radical one, and we shall see later in greater detail why this is so. It 
should be pointed out that when M!dhyamikas refer to the *bhidharmika they specifically 
have in mind the Sarv!stiv!dins. The middle path for the M!dhyamika is Òthe non-acceptance 
of the two extremes Ð the affirmative and the negative (Skt. sat and asat, respectively) views, 
of all viewsÓ (Murti, 1955: 8). However, recent scholarship now tend to view M!dhyamika as 
a middle-path between nihilist and reificationist positions, where nihilism about one kind of 
entity is typically paired with the reification of another27. 
 
Murti thought that Yog!c!ra (Vij!nav!da) as a later idealist position in the fourth 
century C.E was made possible by the $%nyat! of the M!dhyamaka, as the subject-object 
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 See (Garfield, 1990: 288; 1994: 228). 
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duality within the realm of consciousness is considered to be $%nya, while consciousness 
(Skt. vij!na) itself as a substratum of reality is held to be real. Vij!nav!dins argue that pure 
consciousness is to be identified with $%nyat!, for while both knower and object known are in 
themselves unreal there has to exist a pure consciousness that makes this process of knowing 
possible in the first place. Robinson and Johnson, however, claim contra Murti that Yog!c!ra 
in its original theoretical formulation in the writings of Asanga and Vasubandhu was not a 
doctrine of idealism. Rather, it was more a phenomenology of mind, focused primarily on the 
role that the mind played in forming experience, insofar as the mind was the principal factor 
in giving rise to suffering (Robinson and Johnson, 1997: 91). The middle path for the 
Vij!nav!dins therefore is between the realism of the *bhidharmikas and the scepticism of 
the M!dhyamikas.  
 
Despite their differences, all schools of Buddhism accept without question the denial 
of the soul (!tman), which is considered the source of attachment and bondage that leads to 
suffering. The middle path (Skt. madhyam!-pratipad) each school takes is immediately 
dependent upon their respective interpretations of prat"tya-samutp!da. Murti points out that 
madhyam!-pratipad Òis not a position in the sense of a third position lying midway between 
two extremes but a no-position that supersedes them bothÓ (1955: 46). What should be 
pointed out is that a path is strictly different from a position as it implies orientation instead 
of rest. However, the notion of a Òno-positionÓ has been debated and called into question 
variously by Kalupahana (1986), Ruegg (1986), and Matilal (1988). The more insightful 
point made by Robinson and Johnson is that, Òone of the greatest ironies of the Mah!y!na 
movement is that it began as a reaction against the Abhidharma and ended up developing the 
most elaborate Abhidharma tradition of any traditionÓ (1997: 95). This is certainly true, and I 
believe this demonstrates the reificationist tendencies latent in philosophical thought. In fact, 
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it may be argued here that the more certain one is in believing that such tendencies have been 
thoroughly dispelled that one is all the more susceptible to them. 
 
MurtiÕs exegesis regarding the development of Buddhism is insightful at times, and it 
represented a major attempt at synthesising earlier work by Buddhologists such as de la 
Valle Poussin (1913) and Stcherbatksy (1927). However, MurtiÕs approach betrays his own 
Kantian orientation, which was symptomatic of the current scholarship of Buddhism at the 
time. Murti stressed the emergence of dialectical consciousness in M!dhyamaka as 
precipitated by the antinomical conclusions of both S!-khya and *bhidharmika systems. 
According to his account, the dialectical consciousness of N!g!rjuna was borne out of logical 
necessity due to the conflict between Rationalism and Empiricism. Yet, this seems to conflict 
with his earlier suggestions at various junctures that it was Buddha who had first discovered 
the dialectic even though it remained implicit in his silence (Murti, 1955: 9, 40-41). If so, 
then the necessary conditions (viz., the conflict between Rationalism and Empiricism) Murti 
claimed for the emergence of dialectical consciousness would have to be present at the time 
of the Buddha, which it was not. One may therefore understand M!dhyamaka as a form of 
absolutism if and only if one subscribes to MurtiÕs view that the M!dhyamika dialectic 
offered a resolution or synthesis to the countervailing oppositions. Such resolution would 
inevitably mean closure, and this bears testimony to MurtiÕs effort in neatly categorising the 
development of both traditions within the unfolding narrative of dialectical consciousness. 
This criticism is not meant to detract from MurtiÕs canonical work, and while there is much to 
be contended regarding some of the claims it makes in light of recent scholarship my point 
here is to underscore its enterprise as ultimately an act of interpretation. In the following 
section we shall see how these hermeneutical problems continue to be a source of 
contestation in current debates, and how they contribute to further development in Buddhist 
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studies. 
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§ Development and Debates in Buddhist Philosophy 
 
I will trace some of the on-going debates and developments regarding N!g!rjuna in 
this section. In doing so I will employ two current modern translations of N!g!rjuna to 
juxtapose and draw out some relevant issues, as well as providing my justification for 
adopting one of them in the process. I will consider both KalupahanaÕs (1986) and GarfieldÕs 
(1995) translations to do so. KalupahanaÕs translation of N!g!rjuna was taken from the 
Sanskrit text of the MMK, though he felt the Chinese version by Kumarajiva (circa fifth 
century C.E.) to be closer to the original spirit of the MMK. This is because he believes 
KumarajivaÕs translation supports a non-Mah!y!nist reading of N!g!rjuna, compared to 
Candrak$rtiÕs Prasannapad! (circa seventh century C.E.). There are fundamental sectarian 
reasons for his thinking so, as KalupahanaÕs translation preferred a pragmatic empiricist 
reading of N!g!rjuna (1986: 81), stressing his continuity within a H$nay!nist tradition that 
was at odds with Candrak$rtiÕs pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika school that later led to N!g!rjuna 
being hailed as a Mah!y!nist philosopher. In doing so, Kalupahana i) effectively rejects both 
ancient (Candrak$rti) and modern (Stcherbatsky and Murti) accounts of Buddhist intellectual 
history; ii) stressing continuity while Stcherbatsky and Murti have emphasised the 
discontinuity of N!g!rjuna; as iii) where Stcherbatsky and Murti believed N!g!rjuna rejected 
BuddhaÕs theory of elements with his conception of $%nyat! as a form of radical break, 
Kalupahana considers N!g!rjuna as a Therav!din grand commentator on BuddhaÕs 
Kacc!y!nagotta-s%tra28 instead, remaining faithful to the Buddha-word (1986: 5). 
 
While this is not the place to go into the H$nay!na-Mah!y!na debate it is surely 
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 The significance of this particular s%tra in relation to the MMK cannot be overstated, and is provided in 
Appendix B. 
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shocking that fundamental issues of this sort remain contested to this day29.What Kalupahana 
proposes is bold and radical, because Òby implication, both the Tibetan tradition (based on 
Candrak$rti) and the Sino-Korean-Japanese trajectory of Mah!y!na (with its emphasis on a 
nonempiricist and ineffable awakening) misconstrue and distort N!g!rjunaÓ (Keenan, 1988: 
173-74). Keenan is right when he points out that such a bold rewriting of Buddhist doctrinal 
history occasions a host of questions (1988: 174). Indeed, a common criticism of Kalupahana 
lies in either his lack or ignorance of sources, both ancient and modern. Keenan points out 
that N!g!rjunaÕs Vigrahavy!vartan" is mentioned only once, while the Ratn!val" containing 
affirmations of the superiority of Mah!y!na is notably absent (1988: 174), an observation 
further corroborated by HalliseyÕs remark that Kalupahana had Òignored the scholarship of 
the last decadeÓ (1988: 403). Lindtner (1988) provided the most scathing criticism of all, 
pointing to the fact that KalupahanaÕs translation neglects (understandably so even if 
unjustified) the Tibetan sources, and that his Sanskrit text contains Òmore than one hundred 
misprints, omissions, interpolations and wrong readingsÓ (1988: 177). This is not even taking 
into consideration the numerous mistranslations by Kalupahana that Lindtner takes great 
pains to point out in his paper, and on grounds of which Lindtner alleges Òthese 
mistranslations show, needless to add, a serious lack of understanding of basic ideas in 
N!g!rjunaÕs thoughtÓ (1988: 177). To the best of my knowledge Kalupahana never did 
contest LindtnerÕs allegations. The only support Kalupahana found was from Matilal (1988), 
and on one particular point only, because Matilal argued against the Òno-positionÓ view 
commonly ascribed to N!g!rjuna. This is a significant point of contention for Kalupahana as 
well, as the no-position view is considered the hallmark of the pr!sa#gika approach (in terms 
of reductio ad absurdum). Instead of viewing the entire Mah!y!na tradition as a complete 
aberration of Buddhism as entailed by KalupahanaÕs text it might be more likely the case that 
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 See (Lindtner, 1982; Ruegg, 1986; Warder, 1973). 
 ! 36 
KalupahanaÕs translation stands in need of further scrutiny. I shall only point out here in 
passing that both Mabbett and Loy eschew the pragmatic empiricist reading of Kalupahana, 
along with the general scholarship in the field.  
 
GarfieldÕs translation on the other hand was taken from the canonical Tibetan 
translation (Tib. dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab) of the original Sanskrit text, which reflected an 
Indo-Tibetan tradition that read N!g!rjuna in a pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika approach. Garfield 
claims in his preface that his translation is not philological in intent but rather Òa presentation 
of a philosophical text to philosophers, and not an edition of the text for BuddhologistsÓ 
(1995: viii). I am in agreement with GarfieldÕs belief that Òalthough the text is interpreted in 
being translated, this text should still come out in translation as a text which could be 
interpreted in the ways that others have read itÓ (1995: ix). As GarfieldÕs text reflects the 
Indo-Tibetan tradition of pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika that follows Candrak$rtiÕs reading of the 
emptiness of emptiness in N!g!rjuna, one of the first challenges Garfield faces is to locate 
this within the MMK and successfully defend the philosophical viability of such a reading. 
Garfield sets out to do this in his paper (1994), part of which was later incorporated in the 
first chapter of his translated commentary to the book (1995)30. 
 
Garfield in his paper (1994) correctly locates MMK XXIV as the central chapter and 
climax of N!g!rjunaÕs argument, claiming that in particular verse 18 Òhas received so much 
attention that interpretations of it alone represent the foundations of major Buddhist schools 
in East AsiaÓ (1994: 221). GarfieldÕs approach is clearly set out, proposing to read this verse 
in such a way that coheres with Candrak$rti and claiming that the emptiness of emptiness is 
                                                
30
 It is for this reason Chapter Four on N!g!rjuna focuses upon this paper to reconstruct in detail some of the 
key ideas that shape this distinct tradition, as I am convinced that not only is the pr!sa#gika rendering accurate, 
it also bears certain similarities with DerridaÕs notion of deconstruction. This rapprochement would not be 
possible if N!g!rjuna were read as a Therav!din or even as a sv!tantrika-m!dhyamika. 
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not simply the philosophical conclusion to be drawn at the end of twenty four chapters, but 
instead is already anticipated right from the first chapter (ÒExaminations of ConditionsÓ). In 
doing so he demonstrates how a clear understanding of causality (which is not empiricist vis-
-vis KalupahanaÕs reading) is important for Buddhist philosophy and why N!g!rjuna began 
the MMK with it. Garfield further claims rereading the MMK with this understanding of 
emptiness of emptiness changes the way in which other chapters are read. A great deal of 
interpretative stake pivots around this single verse then, along with an entire host of 
epistemologico-ontological significance attached to it. The verse is given as follows: 
 
 Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
 That is explained to be emptiness. 
 That, being a dependent designation 
 Is itself the middle way. (MMK XXIV: 18} 
 
I should like to take a detour at this juncture to consider ArnoldÕs review (1999) of GarfieldÕs 
translation. This is useful for our purposes at hand for a number of reasons: Firstly, Arnold in 
his review provides both Sanskrit and Tibetan sources for this verse. Secondly, He juxtaposes 
GarfieldÕs translation of this verse vis--vis InadaÕs, StrengÕs and KalupahanaÕs translation, 
evaluating in what way is GarfieldÕs rendering of the verse preferable. Finally, Arnold 
provides a reading of GarfieldÕs Òventuresome claimÓ in his paper to which we shall return. 
The Sanskrit and the Tibetan text are presented respectively: 
 
ya' prat"tyasamutp!da' $%nyat!. t!. pracak(mahe;  
 s! prajaptirup!d!ya pratipatsaiva madhyam!. (Sanskrit text, emphasis mine) 
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 rten cing &brel bar &byung ba gang 
 de ni stong pa nyid du bshad 
 de ni brten nas gdags pa ste 
 de nyid dbu ma&i lam yin no. (Tibetan text, emphasis mine) 
 
As I do not possess any working knowledge of either language the reading here will 
have to depend on renditions by both Arnold (1999) and Lindtner (1988). Arnold points out 
the Tibetan text is characteristically close to the Sanskrit text and we may draw preliminary 
support from Lindtner in his earlier censure of Kalupahana that he has largely ignored the 
Tibetan translation of the MMK. Arnold highlights the problem to lie in the ambiguous term 
p!da found in s! prajaptirup!d!ya, which benefits from being restricted in the Tibetan 
version by brten nas to mean Òhaving dependedÓ. This ambiguity in the Sanskrit text 
presented a common problem for earlier English translations of this particular verse based on 
the Sanskrit source. InadaÕs translation reads thus: ÒWe declare that whatever is relational 
origination is $%nyat!. It is a provisional name (i.e., thought construction) for the mutuality 
(of being) and, indeed, it is the middle pathÓ (1970: 148). Arnold claims Inada has 
completely misconstrued the gerund and has made a stretch to translating it as Òfor the 
mutuality (of being)Ó. StrengÕs translation reads, ÒThis apprehension, i.e., taking into account 
[all other things]ÉÓ (1967: 213), sees the gerund but is not clear about its referent nor see the 
significance of the term prajapti. Kalupahana comes closer: ÒWe state that whatever is 
dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon conventionÓ (1986: 339), which 
correctly reads ÒthatÓ as referring to emptiness, though he errs in translating as though 
prajapti were in the accusative case when it is in fact in the nominative. I shall supplement 
here KalupahanaÕs own justification for his interpretative choice, because if it were taken as a 
nominative term this would mean that Òdependent arising or emptiness would either be a 
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mere description with no basis in cognitive experience or it would be an experience that is 
ineffableÓ (1986: 340). Kalupahana objects to this given his empiricist reading of N!g!rjuna, 
and is further rejected by various commentators mentioned earlier. Kalupahana then appeals 
to D"gha-Nik!ya III.202 to support his claim that sa.v+ti, vyavah!ra, and prajapti were 
used as synonyms Òas was intended by the Buddha himselfÓ (1986: 340) in support of the 
line, ÒThat is dependent upon conventionÓ. This is completely rejected by Lindtner: 
 
In XXIV,18, a celebrated passage s! prajaptir up!d!ya, becomes ÔThat is 
dependent upon conventionÕ Ð as if the text reads prajaptim Ð with reference 
to D"gha-Nik!ya III,202. In the DN there is, however, nothing at all under this 
reference to justify such a translation Ð at least in my copy of the text. (1988: 
178) 
 
Returning to ArnoldÕs review, he claims ÒGarfield alone understands ÔthatÕ to refer to 
ÔemptinessÕ and correctly sees this as being in apposition to prajapti, ÔdesignationÕ so that it 
is emptiness, being dependent, that is a ÔdesignationÕÓ (1999: 89). Arnold further points out 
that while GarfieldÕs text is taken from the Tibetan source it coheres with Candrak$rtiÕs 
reading (in Sanskrit) who glosses ÔthatÕ as referring to ÔemptinessÕ and says that emptiness, as 
dependent, is thus termed a designation (1999: 89). Garfield argues that in this passage 
N!g!rjuna asserts the fundamental identity of 1) emptiness, or the ultimate truth; 2) the 
dependently originated, that is, all phenomena; and 3) verbal convention (1994: 221). What is 
critical to note here is emptiness does not entail non-actuality (which would be absurd, even 
to N!g!rjuna) as they exist conventionally, i.e., dependently originated. All phenomena are 
considered conventional, insofar as we accept they are dependently arisen. This does not 
simply mean that things exist solely by social convention or agreement. Something that is 
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non-conventional would be non-dependently arisen, or independent, thus contravening the 
truth of prat"tya-samutp!da. Therefore, within the doctrine of two-truths these conventional 
phenomena may be characterised differently: To view conventional phenomena in its 
conventional character is to say that things exist (as having svabh!va) in the daily sense of 
the term. This is the mistake we commonly make in our everyday practices, making claims 
that there are indeed tables and chairs in the room. To view conventional phenomena in its 
ultimate character is also to say that things are $%nya. The Buddhist doctrine of Two Truths is 
critical here, and Garfield argues that the emptiness of emptiness is equivalent to the deep 
identity between the Two Truths (1994: 234). When we say something is dependently 
originated that is also explained as emptiness, we mean that ÒemptinessÓ as a term itself is a 
dependent designation and not, as it were, referring to some actual cement-of-the-universe (as 
Garfield is fond of saying) out there. It is not quite the same thing to say that emptiness is 
dependent upon convention, which would then imply the assertion of a non-empty existent 
(namely, emptiness) when we are actually referring to the term ÒemptinessÓ itself as being 
dependent. ÒEmptinessÓ, the term with which we explain or express the dependently 
originated, is just as empty as the ultimate truth (of emptiness) it designates conventionally. 
We move then from simply describing the emptiness of dependent origination (according to 
Kalupahana) to the emptiness of emptiness (according to Candrak$rti and Garfield). That Ð 
the emptiness of emptiness Ð is the middle way.  
 
Returning to GarfieldÕs paper from our brief philological excursus he proceeds to re-
read chapter one of the MMK (ÒExamination of ConditionsÓ) with the emptiness of 
emptiness as the middle way in mind to demonstrate that it is already anticipated from the 
very beginning. To do so Garfield makes a controversial distinction between causes (Skt. 
hetu, Tib. rGyu) and conditions (Skt. pratyaya, Tib. rKyen) in the following way: Causes 
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have the power (Skt. kriy!, Tib. Bya Ba) to bring about its effect as part of its essence (Skt. 
svabh!va, Tib. Rang bZhin), while conditions are an event, state or process that can be 
appealed to without any metaphysical commitment to any occult connection between 
explanandum and explanans (1994: 222). Chapter Four on N!g!rjuna and causality considers 
in greater detail the implications of this distinction, along with the challenge posed by Chinn 
(2001). My purpose here is served by pointing out that because of this distinction what we 
would normally (in a commonsensical way) think about causality is demonstrated to be 
flawed and self-vitiating as 1) it needs recourse to occult mystical powers possessed by 
entities; and 2) these entities if they are to be bearers of such causal powers would have to be 
existent (independently); such that, 3) it would then be impossible for them to give rise 
(dependently) to other entities. Conditionality on GarfieldÕs view would allow us to explain 
causality as a regularity view of reality: ÒExplanation relies on regularities. Regularities are 
explained by reference to further regularitiesÓ (1994: 224). He goes on to argue that:  
 
To ask why there are regularities at all, on such a view, would be to ask an 
incoherent question: The fact of explanatorily useful regularities in nature is 
what makes explanation and investigation possible in the first place and is not 
something itself that can be explained. (1995: 116, fn. 29) 
 
In other words we are really describing something when we assert something to be actually 
the case, which is a descriptive fallacy. In doing so we are thus able to reject Òthe very 
enterprise of a philosophical search for the ontological foundations of conventionÓ (see 
Garfield, 1990; Garfield, 1994: 226). It is this particular conclusion I am interested in 
drawing, and one that I believe has implications towards exposing the metaphysical 
underpinnings of our daily claims. I am therefore in agreement with Garfield that the prima 
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facie mysticism (i.e., the emptiness of emptiness) of N!g!rjuna enables us paradoxically to 
demystify the fundamental ways we view the world Ð views that certainly present themselves 
as common sense when in fact they are deeply metaphysical. 
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§ Negation & Nāgārjuna 
 
I have argued in the previous section for a pr!sa#gika reading of N!g!rjuna, and how 
this allows for a demystification of common sense by rejecting the philosophical search for 
the ontological foundation of convention. In doing so, I have also established the emptiness 
of emptiness as the middle path (Skt. madhyam!-pratipad) of the pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika, 
which results in the controversial no-position view commonly ascribed to N!g!rjuna. This 
cannot be established, however, without also considering the specific use of negation by 
N!g!rjuna. This section will briefly consider the two forms of negation found in classical 
Indian philosophy, as well as the catu(ko)i that N!g!rjuna deploys as the Four-Cornered 
Negation. This is a particularly problematic area of N!g!rjuna scholarship, with various 
methods applied to make sense of the logical form of the catu(ko)i. My position on the two 
forms of negation is that while it is desideratum to understanding the operations of 
M!dhyamika dialectic, I also maintain that these negations cannot be separated from the 
context of two-truths. The reason for this complaint is that in the process of over-stressing its 
logical form to establish coherence we also estrange it from the contexts in which they were 
deployed. I doubt very much that a purely logical formal presentation of the MMK would 
make sense, and even if it did, what would be the value of such a reading? The catu(ko)i 
remains within the purview of conventional truth, and the logical attempts at educing some 
essential coherence or truth-hood from it seem justifiable, if only in a sort of self-made 
vacuum. N!g!rjuna makes this clear: 
 
How could the tetralemma of permanent and impermanent, etc., 
Be true of the peaceful? 
How can the tetralemma of finite, infinite, etc., 
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Be true of the peaceful? (MMK XXII: 12) 
 
This demonstrates how the remit of tetralemma (catu(ko)i) does not extend beyond 
conventional truth. We are unable to predicate anything (permanent, impermanent, etc.) of 
the peaceful nirv!&a in the ultimate sense, because there is no entity of which the predication 
may be true. Garfield adds, ÒEmpty thing [sic] can exist conventionally; but about their 
ultimate status, nothing can be literally saidÓ (1995: 281).  
 
As a Buddhist philosopher N!g!rjuna advocated the middle path (Skt. madhyam!-
pratipad) against essentialist systems of thought that emphasised either ÒbeingÓ or Ònon-
beingÓ as the basis of their philosophical speculations. He argues instead that all such 
philosophical views (Skt. d+()i) are in fact empty (Skt. $%nya) and untenable, perhaps even to 
the impossibility of philosophy itself. It has been far easier to dismiss the M!dhyamikas as 
either nihilists or sceptics in the course of Buddhist intellectual history than it is to mount a 
successful defence against the M!dhyamika dialectic. In what way is such refutation of all 
possible views justified, and from what position is such a critique of philosophy undertaken?  
 
There are two general objections that may be raised against N!g!rjuna: Firstly, if 
N!g!rjuna negates all possible philosophical positions it then follows there is a counter-thesis 
from which this criticism is made possible, thus taking the form of a negative dialectic. 
Secondly, if all views are systematically exhausted and consequently shown to be empty 
(being false) it then follows that N!g!rjunaÕs conclusion at least is non-empty (or true), which 
ipso facto becomes self-vitiating. What becomes problematic is N!g!rjuna does not lay claim 
to any counter-thesis whatsoever, nor does he propose yet another (supplementary) view in 
the refutation of all others: 
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When an analysis is made through emptiness, 
If someone were to offer a reply, 
That reply will fail, since it will presuppose 
Exactly what is to be proven. 
 
When an explanation is made through emptiness, 
Whoever would find fault with it 
Will find no fault, since the criticism will presuppose 
Exactly what is to be proven. (MMK IV: 8-9) 
  
If the former objection is successfully countered in this manner the latter objection is also 
circumvented to a certain degree, and as a thoroughgoing critique of all philosophical 
concepts N!g!rjuna subjects his own analysis to the same process of criticism Ð ÒemptinessÓ 
as a philosophical concept is itself shown to be just as empty as the others. It is, in fact, a 
non-concept that allows for the possibility of conceptuality in general. This is where his 
radicalism lies. The question then becomes: ÒWhatÕs the point?Ó I believe there is a very real 
point N!g!rjuna wishes to make, even though it is a point that has to be demonstrated or 
realised instead of being merely stated. This is the attainment of nirv!&a. In this respect there 
is a soteriological significance to the process of negation that is oriented towards the 
attainment and realisation of Buddhist enlightenment. 
 
 Bh!vaviveka felt that a M!dhyamika could advance autonomous (Skt. sv!tantra) 
arguments of his own, which is rightly criticised by Candrak$rti for being inconsistent. Murti 
says of Bh!vaviveka that:  
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The characteristic M!dhyamika stand as a review or criticism of all positions 
and theories does not emerge from BhavavivekaÕs procedure. And to review a 
position, we should not have a position of our own but be alive to the 
contradictions of other positions. The M!dhyamika [sic] is a philosophy of 
higher order; it is a philosophy of philosophies. (1955: 97-8) 
 
Such an approach by Bh!vaviveka would inevitably fall prey to either one of the above-
mentioned objections. I disagree in part, however, with MurtiÕs characterisation of the 
pr!sa#gika method Ð it is precisely because one is alive not only to the contradictions of 
other positions, but including those of oneÕs own that one should not be committed to a 
singular position. Such commitment would remain nonetheless a form of grasping, which 
runs counter to the attainment of nirv!&a that N!g!rjuna considers to be the relinquishing of 
all views. I believe it is this attitude of openness that makes M!dhyamaka thoroughly self-
critical, which is quite different from what Murti characterised rather awkwardly as Òa 
philosophy of philosophiesÓ (1955: 98). The view that holds all views as being empty 
remains necessarily a view itself. What I believe is radical about the M!dhyamaka is that it 
engages with the conditions of possibility for all forms of philosophical views, including its 
own, such that the emptiness of emptiness entails its conjunctive dissolution. On such a 
reading then it would be inconsistent to maintain that M!dhyamaka is a philosophy of 
philosophies, because the Òmeta-Ó horizon cannot be attained, for the simple reason that no 
such putative grounds may exist in a non-empty manner. 
 
What is the pr!sa#gika method then and in what way does it allow for a criticism of 
all philosophical positions? The Sanskrit term pr!sa#ga means Òlogical consequenceÓ, and 
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Murti notes that pr!sa#ga is Ònot to be understood as an apagogic proof in which we prove 
an assertion indirectly by disproving the opposite. Prasa&ga [sic] is disproof simply, without 
the least intention to prove any thesisÓ (1955: 131). The pr!sa#gika operates by means of 
reductio ad absurdum, reducing the logical consequences of its opponents ultimately to 
tautology, contradiction, or infinite regress. In other words, the M!dhyamika only needs to 
convince his opponents that their theory entails by logical consequence conclusions that are 
antinomic and unacceptable to reason using the very principles espoused by them without 
having to offer an alternative thesis. Inada provides an insightful comment on this: 
 
Murti talks about the ÔConflict of Reason,Õ ÔCriticism,Õ or Ôreflective 
awareness of things,Õ as the dialectical import of the M!dhyamika Pr!sa#ga 
doctrine (reductio ad absurdum) but whether Pr!sa#ga is really a method for 
educing truth or only a method of criticism is a moot question. Perhaps, it is 
neither and that the whole tenor of the M!dhyamika might actually be to tax 
reason only to its discriminative limits and thereby render clear the absurdity 
of adhering to the discriminated objectified elements. Beyond that it might 
only be either sheer speculation on the function of reason or a case of reading 
in too much. It might he [sic] added that, in Buddhism as a whole, there is no 
logic (rational play) without reference to the ontological nature of things. In 
short, no logic without ontology31. (Inada, 1970: 34) 
 
Consequently, Murti chooses to characterise the M!dhyamika dialectic as a Òspiritual ju-
jutsuÓ (1955: 132) in a somewhat idealist fashion. This is potentially misleading, because as a 
purported spiritual ju-jutsu the M!dhymika arrives at his conclusion of emptiness solely on 
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 This notion of logic as rational play recalls for me the play of diffrance as the possibility of conceptuality. 
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logical grounds. Sprung raises an objection regarding this: 
 
According to N!g!rjuna and Candrak$rti [É] reasoning is not ontologically 
bound; yet they proceed, unshakably assuming that what fails the tests of 
reason Ð what is less than utterly intelligible Ð cannot exist. (1979: 9) 
 
It is quite obvious to say that thought is independent of reality (i.e. Òreasoning is not 
ontologically boundÓ), though that does not entail that reality is independent of thought. 
Sprung, however, wrongly ascribes to N!g!rjuna Òthat what fails the tests of reasonÓ is 
reality, from which he draws the nihilist conclusion that for N!g!rjuna, reality cannot exist. 
What does fail Òthe tests of reasonsÓ, however, are precisely propositions and not reality Ð 
truth-value applies only to statements, not facts32. This is SprungÕs mistake. Reality should 
not be confused with truth-hood, truth concerns the views or propositions we have or make 
about the world. Similarly, negation or affirmation is a mode in which propositions are stated. 
What remains open to debate, however, is the possibility of negating a position without 
necessarily affirming its opposite33. This is significant, because if negation for the 
M!dhyamika does imply the assertion of its opposite this would thereby commit him to a 
position, which in the face of his conclusion Ð that all views are ultimately empty Ð would be 
inconsistent and self-contradictory. 
 
The negations employed by the M!dhyamika deny simpliciter any propositions put 
forth by his opponents. Kajiyama argued in his paper (1973): ÒA M!dhyamika, when he 
negates a concept, actually intends to negate all the human concepts together with it; 
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 In this way, N!g!rjuna himself does not offer an analysis of the world as such, but analyses our ways of 
understanding the world. See also (Loy, 1999: 247). 
33
 In other words, this effectively foists dialectical oppositions upon N!g!rjuna, even when he has maintained 
otherwise throughout the MMK. 
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something other than the concept negated is not to be affirmed eitherÓ (qtd. in Wood, 1994: 
52). While I am not certain what Kajiyama meant by Òall human conceptsÓ, what is clear 
from this, however, is that we are no longer looking at a dialectical negation that is 
understood in the Western philosophical tradition because it does not operate within a binary 
system (either ÒisÓ or Òis notÓ). There are two points that need to be emphasised here: firstly, 
classical Indian logic admits of two forms of negation (Skt. prati(edha), viz., propositional 
negation (Skt. prasajya-prati(edha) and exclusion/term negation (Skt. paryud!sa-
prati(edha). The pr!sa#gika purportedly employs prasayja negation, from which no further 
inference (or implication) may be drawn, while paryud!sa negation is primarily affirmative. 
This itself is open to debate, as we shall see shortly. Secondly, N!g!rjuna redeploys the 
tetralemma (Skt. catu(ko)i) as the Four-Cornered Negation which, taken collectively, is 
considered logically exhaustive of any proposition. This devastating combination of 
prasajya-prati(edha and the catu(ko)i therefore allows N!g!rjuna to undertake a 
thoroughgoing criticism of his opponents. What is at stake is whether prasajya-prati(edha 
employed by N!g!rjuna is actually tenable such that no inference may be drawn from his 
negations; and also if the catu(ko)i is logically consistent which, in turn, depends on the 
particular form of negation (prasajya-prati(edha) employed. 
 
What is the difference between prasajya-prati(edha and paryud!sa-prati(edha? The 
form of negation employed has profound significance for the interpretation of $%nyat!. Take 
for example MMK I:1, where N!g!rjuna deals with the problem of causation: 
 
 Neither from itself nor from another, 
 Nor from both, 
 Nor without a cause, 
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 Does anything whatever, anywhere arise. (MMK I:1) 
 
The negation ÒNeither from itselfÓ (Na svata') is taken to be prasajya, such that MMK I:1 is 
a conjunction of the following four negations: 1) it is not the case that things arise from 
themselves, 2) it is not the case that things arise from others, 3) it is not the case that things 
arise from both self and others, 4) it is not the case that things arise from no cause. Therefore, 
the conclusion to draw is that things do not arise at all, as there is no fifth way that they might 
have arisen. If the four negations were taken as paryud!sa it would mean that, Òthings are as 
follows: not arisen from self, not arisen from others, not arisen from both, not arisen from no 
causeÓ, such that they might arise in some other way, or that there are things which do not 
arise. Within the context of Buddhist teaching we may establish that this, clearly, was not 
what N!g!rjuna intended. The question here is whether it is indeed the case that prasajya 
negations do not affirm anything whatsoever. This is critical to the interpretation of $%nyat! 
as it is not held to be yet another position or view. Wood argues that one cannot infer (in 
accordance to Buddhist teaching) from the negations Ònot from selfÓ, Ònot from othersÓ, Ònot 
from bothÓ, and Ònot from no causeÓ to mean either of the following: i) that things exist, but 
without originating, or ii) that things originate, but in some other way other than the four 
ways considered. I agree with this. He emphasises, however, that it does not follow from i) 
and ii) that N!g!rjuna believed nothing could be inferred at all, for he did accept at least one 
proposition, viz.,that Òthings do not originate at allÓ. Wood argues convincingly it is not the 
case that prasajya negations have no implications at all, and that Òa statement from which no 
inferences could be drawn would be a meaningless statement, and a meaningless statement 
cannot be an affirmation or a negationÓ (1994: 65). This would seem to commit N!g!rjuna to 
a nihilist position, which is something proponents wish to avoid at all costs because $%nyat! 
does not mean non-existence, but rather dependence in co-origination (prat"tya-samutp!da). 
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A number of approaches have been employed in debates between different camps that 
forward either nihilist (NI) or non-nihilist (NNI) readings of N!g!rjuna, which, among others, 
include Relevant Logic and Speech Act Theory. Both NI and NNI approaches try to salvage 
from N!g!rjunaÕs text aspects that support their theses, and I cannot help but wonder if we 
are truly concerned about identifying N!g!rjunaÕs questions, instead of trying to make him 
answer (and to a certain extent, answerable to) our own. I think it is fair to say the ostensible 
reading of MMK I:1 does support a nihilist reading, though a necessary caveat here is that 
atomistic approaches that deal with this section without due consideration to the rest of the 
MMK are at risk of being over-hasty and eliminative. 
 
The catu(ko)i is presented here below: 
 
It is not the case that X is P. 
It is not the case that X is not-P. 
It is not the case that X is both P and not-P. 
It is not the case that X is neither P nor not-P. 
 
It should be pointed out that the catu(ko)i does not violate the law of non-contradiction, 
found in the third proposition; nor the law of the excluded middle, found in the fourth 
proposition. Also, within the propositions of the catu(ko)i, ÒP and not-PÓ are considered 
contraries (e.g. Hot/Cold pair) rather than contradictories. Taken collectively, however, P; 
not-P; both P and not-P; neither P nor-not P; are considered to be exhaustive of all possible 
logical alternatives of any given proposition. The point of contention here is the logical 
consistency of the catu(ko)i, because if the negation of P entails the assertion of not-P (even 
if it is considered a prasajya negation) N!g!rjuna would have contradicted himself in the 
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catu(ko)i (such that it is possible a chair both weighs and does not weigh fifty pounds). 
Sprung maintains the catu(ko)i exhausts the ways in which the copula Òto beÓ may be 
employed, and hence within these four propositions language is being used in its ontological 
register: ÒIn all four ways language is being used ontologically; the verb ÔisÕ, in whatever 
variation, implies the being or nonbeing of what the assertion is aboutÓ (Sprung, 1979: 7). 
This ontological complicity is, however, ultimately repudiated by N!g!rjuna, and the 
M!dhyamaka philosophy of language is not referential and ontologically bound, but is 
instead self-referential and tautological. It does not claim that there is any form of 
correspondence between language and the world, nor does it reflect the world in any way. 
That is not to say language does not communicate anything meaningful whatsoever, but that 
while it is adequate at the conventional level (Skt. vyavah!ra) it does not make sense at the 
ultimate level (Skt. param!rtha). This is the Buddhist distinction of two-truths, and as 
N!g!rjuna has unrelentingly pointed out: 
 
Those who do not understand  
The distinction drawn between these two truths 
Do not understand  
The Buddha's profound truth. (MMK XXIV: 8-9) 
 
Even so, it has to be stressed that this notion of two-truths should only be understood in a 
conventional manner, as whatever we may say in language is empty of being or self-existence 
(Skt. svabh!va)34. While others have tried to analyse the catu(ko)i by formalising it in 
symbolic logic it remains open to debate still as to whether it is indeed logically consistent35. 
This is fine if we were solely concerned with the logical consistency of the catu(ko)i, but my 
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 This will be made explicit in section 6.1. 
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 See (Gunaratne, 1980, 1986; Jayatilleke, 1967; Robinson, 1957; Wayman, 1977) 
 ! 53 
concern here is whether this answers the need to understand the way in which N!g!rjuna 
employed it, or to what end did he have in mind using it? I believe these to be quite different 
questions altogether, and which are not adequately answered by truth-conditions. In fact, 
Sprung argues: ÒWhatever one concludes, however, it will have little, virtually, no, bearing 
on M!dhyamika method, for, with one egregious exception the catu(ko)i is not used as a 
means of investigation or of argument throughout the Prasannapad!Ó (1979: 7). Also, if 
N!g!rjuna did have a view about other views regarding the world does that necessarily 
commit him to self-contradiction? There is a difference between a view that regards other 
views, and views that make certain assertions about the state of the world. To the extent that 
both are possible in language we have to consider them as being equally empty of any 
inherent existence. It is surely possible to have a falsehood refuting another falsehood, but 
does that act of refutation necessarily institute a ÒtruthÓ then? That is the lure of metaphysics, 
such that any form of critical thinking is in danger of becoming reified, and which is 
precisely the kind of view that I believe N!g!rjuna was trying to guard against.  
 
In the following section I turn the discussion to recent attempts at linking both 
M!dhyamaka and Deconstruction. While the technical jargon in Sanskrit may seem at times 
forbidding and foreign, we nevertheless get a sense that N!g!rjuna was dealing with familiar 
(though not necessarily similar, because the spectre of logocentrism remains thoroughly 
Western in perspective because of its unique onto-theological character) philosophical 
problems. This Òfamiliarity without similarityÓ also underscores the rapprochement that I am 
urging between Derrida and N!g!rjuna, though I also believe we have yet to formulate a 
satisfactory methodological approach to engage with both. This will become more apparent 
in the next section. For now, I wish to point out that while N!g!rjuna may seem to be 
engaged in metaphysics proper, his argumentations through the deployment of  $%nyat! as 
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emptiness of emptiness allows him nevertheless to engage with the intimate possibilities of 
language; this I stress cannot be separated from the contexts of two-truths, and its distinction 
serve also to highlight the provisional status of language and its logical limits. 
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§ Deconstruction and Mādhyamaka 
 
This is a preliminary section outlining the attempts hitherto at bridging M!dhyamaka 
and Deconstruction. It serves a fourfold purpose: Its primary focus is to get a general sense of 
the current hermeneutical approaches employed in engaging with both Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna. Secondly, this also provides me with a conceptual platform to articulate an 
alternative methodological framework which I feel is more satisfactory to a fruitful 
hermeneutical engagement with both. This is developed in Chapter Three. Thirdly, it 
underscores the respective contexts in which these attempts have been made hitherto, by 
Robert Magliola (background in Comparative Literature and European Hermeneutics) and 
David Loy (background in Philosophy); this is pertinent especially in their reading of 
Derrida, which both have identified as the assault on the principle of identity in DerridaÕs 
deconstruction of metaphysics. This allows me to provide an alternative reading of Derrida in 
Chapter Five, and juxtapose it vis--vis both Loy and Magliola. Finally, this also highlights 
certain weaknesses in Magliola and Loy which I will attend to in greater detail in Chapter Six 
on Differentialism and Nonduality.  
 
The earliest attempt at bridging this cross-disciplinary gap was MagliolaÕs book titled 
Derrida on the Mend (1984). In it Magliola proposed a Buddhist epistemological approach 
healing what he called ÒDerridean anxietyÓ as a result of an irremediable split between 
ÒmindÓ and ÒoutsideÓ in DerridaÕs deconstructive practice (1984: 124). Magliola believed 
that DerridaÕs deconstruction of logocentrism left him nevertheless in a quandary, as he must 
still have the signs else the entire world and language will collapse for Òthere is no language 
available at all but logocentric languageÓ (1984: 46). Strictly speaking, no one deconstructs 
anything whatever Ð deconstruction is what happens to structures and systems of thought. 
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What Magliola has termed ÒlogocentrismÓ in Derrida really means for Magliola the principle 
of self-identity: Òlogocentrism is an identity at all that one conceives, or even Ôfeels,Õ and then 
ÔlabelsÕ or perhaps Ôbehaves towardsÕ as if it were an ÔideaÕ (1984: 89). Magliola commits a 
similar move himself nevertheless in identifying N!g!rjunaÕs $%nyat! and DerridaÕs 
diffrance, claiming it is Òthe absolute negation which absolutely deconstitutes but which 
constitute directional traceÓ (1984: 89). While there is a certain movement in $%nyat! it 
would not be entirely correct to say it is an absolute negation that allows N!g!rjuna to climb 
Òthe tetralemmatic ladderÓ (1984: 118). This I feel would amount to reading N!g!rjuna as a 
quasi-Ved!ntin instead. 
  
Inada points out in his review of Magliola that Òonly in the West has the philosophic 
thought of logocentrism reared its ugly head to somewhat crisis proportionsÓ (1985: 218). 
This innocuous remark is deeply insightful, because it points out for me not only the different 
philosophical enterprise of both Derrida and N!g!rjuna in terms of their orientation; more 
importantly, it is a caveat against homogenising cross-cultural philosophical exchanges 
within the common horizon of logocentrism. In fact, I will point out here that to do so would 
be deeply centristic. As a result, in his attempt to cure this putative metaphysical psychosis 
by bridging both M!dhyamaka and Deconstruction Magliola ends up reifying $%nyat! as a 
concept in the very process himself. From a Buddhist perspective, what would such an escape 
from the logocentric quandary possibly look like? Surely not the collapse of the phenomenal 
world as we know it, and one that is very likely to remain the same unless we were to 
understand deconstruction in a purely destructive sense (which appears to be MagliolaÕs 
reading of the term). Such sameness moreover would not be self-identical, but takes into 
account difference without the need to appeal to mystical differential grounds nor lexically-
challenged neologisms that serve only to obfuscate matters further. N!g!rjuna makes this 
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clear: 
 
Difference is not in a different thing. 
Nor is it in a nondifferent thing.   
If difference does not exist 
Neither different nor identical things exist. (MMK XIV: 7) 
 
To all intents and purposes, MagliolaÕs provocative book sparked a flurry of reviews and 
criticisms from both Buddhist and Literary Theory camps in its wake36. The criticism I have 
of Magliola is that in his desire to bridge both Derrida and N!g!rjuna he failed to take into 
due consideration the significance of each term (diffrance and $%nyat!) and how they 
actually figure in their respective systems. He translates one into the other as if they were 
entirely commensurable. Now, the reason why I stress the respective academic contexts of 
both approaches is precisely because at the very heart of engaging with both Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna is the question of translation. This translation does not simply mean extrapolating 
concepts from Derrida to N!g!rjuna and vice versa; but also translating from the immediate 
context of oneÕs own academic discipline vis--vis others. This is not simply a matter of 
academic elitism, nor am I here privileging any particular account over others. This is 
because if we take Derrida and N!g!rjuna seriously, a consistent hermeneutical approach 
towards their thought needs to be able to perform its own deconstructive dmarche, or it 
needs to empty out its own analysis. In other words, it has to do so, on their own terms, as far 
as possible. Therefore the movement of translation is always three-ways, rather than two, 
because the critic is necessarily implicated in what s/he observes, in bringing his/her own 
expectations and neuroses to bear upon the texts. For example, a Freudian rendering of both 
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 See (Inada, 1985; Koelb, 1986; Wiebe, 1986; and Zhang, 1986). 
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thinkers would be starkly different from a Zen rendering, this difference needs to be 
acknowledged in order to be conceptually consistent, though this can only be done Òby 
unflaggingly problematizing its own status as a discourse borrowing from a heritage the very 
resources required for the deconstruction of that heritage itselfÓ (Gasch, 1986: 168-9, 
emphasis mine). 
 
To be sure, forays into the twilight area of Deconstruction and M!dhyamaka 
philosophy have met with considerable difficulties and oppositions since37. These 
contestations inevitably return us to issues of fidelity and interpretation in Buddhist 
hermeneutics. Loy points out that no other Buddhist philosopher has received more attention 
than N!g!rjuna with fewer agreements as to what his MMK really meant as the precise target 
(the whom and what) of his criticisms often remains unclear (1999: 246). This is certainly not 
due to a lack in translations nor dearth of commentaries available to Western scholarship; 
rather, I see this as a hermeneutical problematic at the core of Buddhism itself. Loy makes 
this point clearly: ÒThe k!rik!s do not offer an analysis of the world itself but analyze our 
ways of understanding the worldÓ (1999: 246). Katz makes a similar claim, saying that for 
Buddhism, the awareness of a hermeneutical problem is the beginning of hermeneutics and 
that the problems of hermeneutics are the problems of life itself (1984: 189). This is an 
interesting restatement of the problematic. Katz also discusses the traditional classification of 
scripture, such that texts related to the goal are considered definitive (Skt. n"t!rtha), while 
those dealing with the path are considered indeterminate (Skt. ney!rtha). Without going 
further than is necessary, Katz also pointed out that the redactors placed the Brahamaj!la 
Sutta at the beginning of the Pali Canon, and its central focus involved the question of how to 
interpret the claims made by other Indian religions. In this way, Katz argues that Buddhism is 
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 See BharatiÕs (1992) extended rant against CowardÕs Derrida and Indian Philosophy (1990). 
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a hermeneutical enterprise right from its very inception (1984: 192). 
 
Many commentators from Murti to Katz have discussed BuddhaÕs dialogue with 
Vacchagotta in the Sa-yutta Nik!ya regarding his anatt! (no-self) doctrine. Upon seeing 
VacchagottaÕs confusion Buddha told him there is indeed a self, contrary to what he has 
taught elsewhere. #nanda (BuddhaÕs chief disciple) upon hearing this becomes 
understandably perplexed, to which Buddha explains that he gradates his teaching according 
to the needs and level of understanding of the hearer. Most commentators have traditionally 
read this as a demonstration of Buddha as a skilled physician, treating the philosophical 
malaise of those according to their needs. Katz makes a salient point here, arguing that while 
there is no uniformity of letter in what Buddha taught there is nevertheless uniformity of 
purpose, such that the conventions of language need not become the convictions of the 
speaker (1984: 193). Indeed, Buddha himself encouraged his followers to practise the 
doctrine in their own dialects other than Magadhi which is assumed to be BuddhaÕs native 
dialect. One may arguably say there is dissemination from the very inception of BuddhaÕs 
teachings. What this also implies is that inconsistency in method does not necessarily entail 
inconsistency of purpose. Similarly, a stringent interpretative method would inevitably end 
up becoming dogmatic, and it is here I disagree with KatzÕs claim that Òany act of 
interpretation is a reification (Skt. vikalpa), and it is precisely this tendency towards reifying 
which stands in need of analysis and therapyÓ (1984: 189). While I agree with Katz that the 
tendency towards reification is in need of therapy, it is not so much that every act of 
interpretation is in toto reificationist, but rather that any such interpretative acts remain 
necessarily at such risk. In fact, I will go further and argue that if there were no such risk 
whatsoever, one would then be ipso facto, dogmatic. Clearly, this caveat extends to BuddhaÕs 
teaching as well for he sought similarly to interpret and understand the conditioned nature of 
 ! 60 
the world. Katz would conceivably be unwilling to label the Buddha-word itself as a form of 
vikalpa, though that certainly does not prevent his followers from falling into that danger. 
Buddha himself was clearly aware of the exegetical and hermeneutical problems in his 
teaching as Katz claimed, in the way we make sense of the world according to linguistic 
conventions and becoming enamoured by them consequently. I suggest one could even 
possibly see the traditional debates between various factions within Buddhism over n"t!rtha 
and ney!rtha texts as being indeterminable precisely due to its implicitly reificationist 
programme and character Ð because if one takes N!g!rjuna seriously, both definitions (or any 
attempts at definition) are meant to be strictly provisional without clinging on to them. While 
this may be defended as desideratum, the question ultimately remains Ð for whom does this 
need really exist?  
 
With this we turn to LoyÕs appeal that Òit may not be necessary or even worth our 
while to devote time and energy expounding those particular metaphysical systems [between 
obscure Buddhist schools]; it may be more useful for us to turn immediately to that 
commonsense understanding and address its supposed aporia more directlyÓ (1999: 246-47). 
While I have much in sympathy with such a view it is just as important to ensure we 
understand, as far as possible, the kinds of questions N!g!rjuna was trying to answer, as well 
as Derrida, instead of simply making them answerable to our own and foisting upon them our 
own misgivings. N!g!rjuna makes this clear:  
  
 When you foist on us 
 All of your errors 
 You are like a man who has mounted his horse 
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 And has forgotten that very horse38. (MMK XXIV: 15)  
 
Katz would argue instead: Ò[U]nderstanding a claim or a text, then, entails understanding of 
the one who claims or the one to whom claims are addressedÓ (1984: 196). Such a view is 
inherently nave and problematic, because our understanding of oneÕs claims (and oneÕs 
purported intentions) along with the claimantÕs addressee depends more often than not on the 
interpretation of the text itself and how we project our own neuroses and assumptions onto it. 
This is further compounded when we recall LoyÕs earlier remark that the precise target of 
N!g!rjunaÕs criticisms often remain unclear. I believe it is this tendency both Buddha and 
N!g!rjuna were trying to guard against, and is evinced by the resistance found in their texts 
against any such linear form of reading that places unconditional faith in the fidelity of 
address. So long as we continue to cling onto the notion of a true Dharma (as a claim or 
address) taught by a Buddha (subject) to an addressee (or hearer) we continue to tacitly 
believe in certain metaphysical assumptions (predicating presence and existence) of linearity 
or continuum that serves as the foundation for our everyday understanding. It is also in this 
sense that Loy quotes Nietzsche: ÒI fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe 
in grammarÓ (qtd. in Loy, 1999: 245). It is in understanding oneÕs own claim as such, even if 
it is prima facie counter-intuitive, that leads to the pacification of objectification and illusion. 
 
I believe Loy raises a very good question for our purposes at this juncture: ÒDoes this 
mean that the M%lamadhyamakak!rik! is too foreign to our usual ways of understanding the 
world to be understood on its own terms?Ó (1999: 246). I argue instead that this raises the 
more insidious question whether we can hope to understand anything on its own terms at all 
according to N!g!rjuna, even though this is precisely the way we try to understand the world 
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in our everyday lives. While this may seem that I have contradicted myself above, this is 
altogether a different point. In arguing earlier that a hermeneutical approach to both thinkers 
needs to address them on their own terms as far as possible I am also stressing that we cannot 
simply divorce '%nyat! and diffrance from the conceptual systems they inhabit respectively 
for purposes of comparison. Loy refers to our common sense understanding of concepts 
(emptiness, causality, time, etc.) and how we believe they name an essence, an independently 
existent entity. Put simply, what would an understanding of '%nyat! on its own terms amount 
to, completely foreign and dissociated from prat$tya-samutp!da? I doubt it would make very 
much sense, and if so it would be  almost certainly nihilistic, though this has not stopped 
philosophers and critics from doing so. As a result, we ignore N!g!rjuna's warning that, ÒFor 
whomever emptiness is a view,/ That one will accomplish nothingÓ (MMK XIII: 8). I believe 
this would be similar to what Derrida called the lure of metaphysics. This extends the 
problematic of hermeneutics not only to comparative approaches, but also to Buddhist 
philosophers working within their own field. Therefore, it would be unfair to place the entire 
burden of justification on the yoke of cross-disciplinary approaches just as it would be 
impractical to demand consistency (in method) amongst the variant sub-schools of 
Buddhism. 
 
Loy has made several attempts thus far to bridge this cross-disciplinary divide, and  
the term ÒdeconstructionÓ first appears in the article, ÒThe Mahayana Deconstruction of 
TimeÓ (1986), two years after the publication of MagliolaÕs book in 1984. While the term 
was only mentioned in passing in that article, LoyÕs later contribution to CowardÕs book, 
ÒThe Deconstruction of BuddhismÓ (1992), saw him engage directly with some of the issues 
in Derrida. In that paper, Loy drew parallels between Derrida and N!g!rjuna through a 
discussion of diffrance and $%nyat! Ð which not surprisingly was MagliolaÕs strategy six 
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years earlier. Loy, however, acquitted himself better than Magliola in that paper, and this led 
to the publication of an article in the following year, titled ÒIndraÕs Postmodern NetÓ (1993). 
I believe this demonstrates not only the significance of MagliolaÕs work but also how quickly 
deconstruction has been adopted and taken into the fold of East-West comparative analysis. 
Is this because post-modern thought and culture have fallen so far off that it stands in dire 
need of Buddhist healing, or is it in the post-modern theories of Derrida that Buddhist studies 
may be revitalised? These are questions that may only be answered in hindsight, though the 
fecundity of DerridaÕs deconstructive practice has certainly not been lost on Buddhist 
philosophers. As mentioned earlier, the switch from oral to written culture in India had 
certainly played a significant role in the long history of Buddhism. It is not difficult to 
imagine, then, how theories of writing might affect it as well, because for Loy (as well as 
others) the philosophical non-site from which to question philosophy itself is diffrance and 
$%nyat!, along with the implications both might have for textuality (1992: 234). 
 
For instance, Loy takes the metaphor of IndraÕs Net from the Yog!c!rin Avata.saka 
S%tra which was later adopted by the Chinese Hua-Yen tradition as a trope for DerridaÕs 
Òunthinkable structureÓ of a structure without centre (1992: 236). The fundamental trope is 
that of the mise-en-abyme, represented by infinite jewels hung in an infinite net such that 
each jewel mirrors all the other jewels in its infinite relatedness stretching across the entire 
cosmos. LoyÕs immediate disclaimer was that N!g!rjuna himself would not have accepted 
such onto-theological trope (1992: 236) though he proceeds to read it as a form of textuality 
extending beyond language. He goes on to claim, however, that: 
 
 To emphasize N!g!rjunaÕs point, the metaphor of IndraÕs Net does not 
actually refer to our interdependence, for that would presuppose the existence 
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of separate things which are related together. Rather, just as every sign is a 
sign of a sign, so everywhere there are traces and those traces are traces of 
traces. (1992: 237) 
 
It is not clear to me exactly which point of N!g!rjunaÕs was Loy referring to, especially as he 
made it quite clear himself that N!g!rjuna would have disapproved of such a trope. In fact, I 
found it a rather strained argument altogether, as the Yog!c!rin text itself postdates 
N!g!rjuna and despite that is called on to support LoyÕs claim to cohere with DerridaÕs 
notion of textuality. This reading is in direct contradiction of N!g!rjunaÕs assertion that 
prat"tya-samutp!da is $%nyat!, because a textuality extending beyond language in this 
manner would undoubtedly entail some cement of the world that exists, regardless whether 
one chooses to call them traces or traces of traces. Also, I doubt very much that the mise-en-
abyme trope in itself is capable of drawing out the full implications of Derridean trace.  
 
Another instance that is exemplary of the comparative approaches to date take the 
following form: 
 
Sunyata, like differance, is permanently Ôunder erasureÕ, deployed for tactical 
reasons but denied any semantic or conceptual stability. It Ôpresupposes the 
everydayÕ because it is parasitic on the notion of things, which it refutes. (Loy, 
1992: 234) 
 
While it may be argued that both $%nyat! and diffrance operate sous rature in both systems 
the more significant implication is not drawn here Ð that for N!g!rjuna, all language and the 
views it makes possible must also be placed sous rature as well. Also, it would not be 
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entirely correct to say that $%nyat! is parasitic on the notion of things (or really, svabh!va), 
such that $%nyat! depends on the self-essence of things it then refutes Ð this would cast 
N!g!rjunaÕs refutations in the mould of a negative theology, which not coincidentally is the 
title of the book in which the chapter is found. Instead, N!g!rjuna would make the following 
point: it is because that all phenomena are $%nya that things present themselves in the 
conventional, dependent way that we have come to view them. 
 
Nevertheless, I believe Loy is right in pointing out that N!g!rjunaÕs Òreal target is that 
automatized, sedimented metaphysics disguised as the world we live inÓ (1992: 241), which 
he also calls Òthe repressed metaphysics of commonsenseÓ (1992: 234). Having said that, it is 
also my view that the current unsatisfactory state of comparative approaches lie precisely in 
seeking out parallels between the two thinkers. This is not to say that there is nothing in 
common between them Ð nothing could be further from the truth Ð but rather, there is a real 
rapprochement in their work that is potentially luring, such that whatever parallels we do find 
becomes (in LoyÕs own words) pyrrhic as such. Or, in other words, the need for a 
philosophical solution causes the problem, and that perhaps is the secret of the secret. It is not 
so much that reason allows itself to be discovered, according to LoyÕs brief account of the 
Greek discovery of reason (1992: 245), but rather that all discoveries are possible precisely 
because of reason and we do not stumble upon it one fine day in the way we stumble upon 
innocuous occurrences and facts Ð parallels included. We simply find correspondences where 
we look out for them, though whether this adequately addresses the rapprochement between 
both thinkers remains a different question. This also highlights the need for an alternative 
methodological framework that is conceptually consistent, which I will develop in the 
following chapter. 
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§ Resistance to Comparative Analysis 
 
In considering both Derrida and N!g!rjuna, the problematic of method presents itself 
in the form of a double-bind: How to do justice to both thinkers without (at the same time) 
necessarily homogenising their thought into a common horizon? This double-bind is quite 
literally for me pas de mthode Ð it entails at once no adequate method, given their radical 
differences, to impose a common basis for comparison, and yet also a step. This is especially 
true if one considers that the problems raised by both thinkers are such that philosophy is 
unable to dismiss, but is also unable to affirm. I will go into further detail regarding the 
nature of this problem and the Òstep beyond philosophyÓ that it involves. In claiming that the 
method is the argument, I argue then that a study of these two thinkers cannot be divorced 
from the methodological assumptions that such a study may presuppose a priori. If we 
understand Derrida and N!g!rjuna as opening up a non-philosophical site Ð whether we 
choose to give it the name of $%nyat!, kh/ra, or even the mythic ÔbetweenÕ Ð then such a site 
that utterly eludes the Òlogic of the logosÓ (Derrida, 1998a: 231) is de jure inadequate to 
serve as basis for comparison, or indeed any form of ratiocination. To present the problem in 
a shorthand manner: How should one proceed to delimit between two overlapping forms of 
emptiness? Or draw a distinction between two methods that argue precisely against the 
principle of identity, because if no such identity may be established, how can the necessary 
difference be drawn to make such a distinction? 
 
These questions cannot be easily dismissed in advance, either through the setting up 
of a discursive framework, or the hegemonic imposition of method. It remains, thoroughly, a 
question of method, and at the level of its discourse in working through Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna we take the beginnings of such a step outside philosophy. In this manner I also 
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acknowledge a certain deconstructive stance, though for reasons that will be made clear later, 
this ÒstanceÓ or ÒattitudeÓ in question can never become a ÒpositionÓ, for there is nothing to 
occupy, and nothing to defend. Before I go any further I will first consider some of the usual 
ways that such a study may take, and how they destine us to detours and cul-de-sacs: 
 
1. Comparative analysis Ð preliminary sorties into the field of comparative 
analysis looking at Derrida and N!g!rjuna (e.g. Magliola and Loy) have been 
far from satisfactory, because it inevitably focuses upon imposing similarities 
while smoothing over differences between them. If similarities are significant 
then more so the differences, for it is in their differences that one may locate 
the value of their respective discourse. Furthermore, from a cultural-
intellectual perspective there are marked differences which should be 
maintained and not effaced simply for sake of economy, especially if one 
considers that Derrida is a secular thinker whilst N!g!rjuna is religious.  
 
2. A corollary of the above takes the form of an imposition, and the issue of 
the relevant application of either theory is problematic as it consists in 
mapping one theory (or its key term) onto the other in a mode of 
commensurability. Furthermore, the questions we ask determine in advance 
the answers we obtain. Gadamer calls this the hermeneutic priority of the 
question, arguing that: Ò[A] question has been put wrongly when it does not 
reach the state of openness but precludes reaching it by retaining false 
presuppositions. It pretends to have an openness and susceptibility to decision 
that it does not haveÓ (1989: 364). The mapping of a theory onto another 
would fail in this regard to respect the specificity of its terrain. Derrida himself 
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writes: ÒThe opening of the question, the departure from the closure of a self-
evidence, the putting into doubt of a system of oppositions, all these 
movements necessarily have the form of empiricism and errancyÓ (1997: 162). 
It is my view that approaches claiming to deconstruct emptiness are, for this 
reason, subject to foreclosure in methodically setting up its conceptual 
framework.  While this involves a hermeneutic circularity that perhaps cannot 
be entirely avoided, the horizon of the question should not be restricted in 
such a way that it results in the foreclosure, rather than disclosure, of 
knowledge. For this reason, approaches that claim to Ôdeconstruct emptinessÕ 
or Ôemptying deconstructionÕ are, in my view, a priori untenable.  
 
3. The second point may be supported by the fact that key concepts of 
diffrance and $%nyat! resist definition. That being the case, it would be 
conceptually inconsistent to proceed upon some common basis (to either 
compare or apply) for the simple reason that there is no such ground available. 
This also vitiates any attempt at analysis, by reducing the features of their 
work to a simple origin or element capable of answering ÔWhat isÉ?Õ that is 
also the instituting question of philosophy (see also Derrida, 1997: 19). In 
other words, we do not ever arrive at some essence designated by the nominal 
terms so as to submit them under analysis. This does not mean, however, that 
it is therefore impossible to adopt an argumentative style addressing how these 
concepts may be deployed, so long as we do not depart from the theoretical 
context of its deployment. 
 
Given the above, I argue there is no philosophically neutral register wherein we may 
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objectively conduct with impunity the critique of our own (philosophical) methods, as the 
very concepts of method and analysis are problematised by both thinkers. It would then be 
conceptually inconsistent for me to proceed as if I were able to rigorously distinguish 
between what the thesis is about at the discursive level, from what it actually does at the 
performative level.  
 
This is especially so when we consider that both thinkers take on their respective 
philosophical traditions through a keen critical awareness and rigour toward their own 
methodological practices, by working through in a self-reflexive manner the sedimented 
metaphors that constitute philosophy. This is the first positive claim I make regarding the 
modus operandi of both Derrida and N!g!rjuna, that both undertake an immanent critique of 
philosophy without claiming an absolute point of departure nor a transcendental position: 
 
The step Òoutside philosophyÓ is much more difficult to conceive than is 
generally imagined by those who think they made it long ago with cavalier 
ease, and who in general are swallowed up in metaphysics in the entire body 
of discourse which they claim to have disengaged from it. (Derrida, 1978: 
359) 
 
In placing this Òstep outside philosophyÓ within scare-quotes philosophy is unable to delimit 
the metaphorical drift in which it finds itself, nor does this thereby absolves us of the 
responsibility demanded by such a step. Gasch makes this clear: ÒTo exceed the discourse of 
philosophy cannot possibly mean to step outside the closure, because the outside belongs to 
the categories of the insideÓ (1986: 169). If so, then the possibility of such a step becomes 
highly problematised, as it is always reappropriated into the fold of metaphysical discourse. 
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Derrida claims in ÒWhite MythologyÓ that Òphilosophy [is] a self-eliminating process of 
generating metaphorÓ (1974: 9). I argue this Òself-eliminating processÓ identified by Derrida 
to be the fundamental anxiety of philosophy, to which he is also prone: Ò[I]f no one can 
escape this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsible for giving in to it, however little 
he may do so, this does not mean that all the ways of giving in to it are of equal pertinenceÓ 
(1978: 356, emphasis mine).  
 
One of the reasons why a comparative analysis approach is unsatisfactory to me lies 
in drawing parallels (which is yet another metaphor) in an attempt at self-justification. I am, 
however, more concerned with the value of considering both these thinkers together rather 
than what they might mean, because if one were to take them seriously, we never quite arrive 
at some notion of ÒtruthÓ which Derrida demystifies as:  
 
A mobile army of metaphors, metonymics, anthropomorphisms: in short, a 
sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, 
canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they 
are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the 
senses [...]. (1974: 15) 
 
In this way we begin to understand DerridaÕs rather contentious claim that: Òthis was the 
moment when language invaded the universal problematicÓ (1978: 354). Chapter Five on 
Derrida opens with a detailed discussion of this specific claim. What I am doing here is 
employing a Saussurean conceit of the linguistic system to extrapolate a way of determining 
the value (through differences) of both thinkers whose key concepts have no proper referents 
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(without positive terms). The notion of value here therefore emphasises the relative 
dependency of both thinkers under consideration without recuperating them into some reified 
meaning or truth. What I am doing here is similar to Derrida in that peculiar moment in Of 
Grammatology, when he deploys the theme of supplementarity in a self-reflexive fashion to 
demonstrate what it does: 
 
It happens that this theme [of supplementarity] describes the chain itself, the 
being-chain of a textual chain, the structure of substitution, the articulation of 
desire and of language, the logic of all conceptual oppositions [...].  (1997: 
163).  
 
It is appropriate, because Òit tells us in a text what a text isÓ (Derrida, 1997: 163), in the same 
way that I argue for the value of considering both thinkers by working through, in a section 
on methodology, how such notion of method is always en abyme, that it can never be made 
into a method proper, that it escapes all vectors of appropriation. Through engaging with both 
thinkers in this manner our own methodology is thus implicated, reiterating the inseparability 
of both discursive and performative axes (which for me is also another way of stating the 
interface between theory and practice). 
 
The significance of this particular deconstructive gesture leads me to my second 
positive claim about both Derrida and N!g!rjuna, that they both occupy a similar position of 
being in medias res. This implies that we find ourselves in the middle of things, in a 
conditioned existence of relative dependency, in the absence of a clear beginning or end39. 
                                                
39
 Derrida would argue that there is no escape from the metaphysical orb, urging that ÒWe must begin wherever 
we are and the thought of the trace, which cannot take the scent into account, has already taught us it was 
impossible to justify a point of departure absolutelyÓ (1997: 162). 
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Note that such notions of a clearly defined beginning or end belong to the logocentric, 
metaphysical discourse of pure reason. Derrida calls this Òphilosophy properÓ, to which he 
juxtaposes empiricism as another name for nonphilosophy in its attempt to depart from its 
metaphysical categories. This prima facie contradicts the first claim I made earlier, viz., that 
both undertake an immanent critique of philosophy. Significantly, however, Derrida focuses 
on the value of empiricism, which he locates in the opposition between philosophy and 
nonphilosophy itself. As Derrida argues, the departure from the metaphysical orb is radically 
empiricist. To depart from the metaphysical orb also means to get outside of its categories. If 
it were the case that such departure were made with relative ease then Derrida would be 
doing no more than merely setting up an antithesis to that of philosophy. Instead, he points 
out the value of this nonphilosophical site as consisting in the Òincapability to sustain on 
oneÕs own and to the limit the coherence of oneÕs own discourse, for being produced as truth 
at the moment when the value of truth is shattered [É]Ó (1997: 162). This means that we 
have to understand the departure in terms of getting outside the categories of philosophy. 
Except that the outside is constructed by the inside, and we remain firmly within the 
interiority of philosophical categories. On the other hand, the interiority of philosophy may 
only be defined in relation to its exteriority, and the valuable insight to be drawn here is that 
philosophical discourse is itself just as incapable of sustaining on its own. Furthermore, this 
value cannot be logically drawn solely from either position of inside or outside, but emerges 
from an exchange (or, if one prefers, passing through an interchange) between the two that is 
thoroughly economic. To insist upon meaning here would be to hypostatise what is 
indeterminate and fluid. I would have to reconcile this nonphilosophical site with that of 
philosophy proper, so that it does not entail a transcendental position that would be just as 
susceptible to the very charges of imposition or violence mentioned earlier: 
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The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. 
They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by 
inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one 
always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. (Derrida, 1997: 
24) 
  
One might say that this non-philosophical site is inscribed within the corpus of philosophy 
itself, if by such inscription we mean an irreducible reference to a radical alterity of the Other 
(Gasch, 1986: 158). Put in a different way, non-linearity interrupts the linearity of traditional 
philosophy, even as the latter depends upon the former and is conditioned by it. It has, 
however, recently become ÒvoguishÓÕ to celebrate non-linearity and alterity as a form of 
critical intervention, though I fail to see how this may be so on its own. In fact, this cannot be 
maintained Òon its ownÓ, being the flip side of the same coin, but depends upon the very 
linearity it is meant to interrupt. That being the case, to posit absolute alterity would be to 
secretly hanker after the dream of absolute presence. Also, how may we characterise this 
peculiar movement of deconstruction that inhabits the very structures it deconstructs? This 
will be discussed in the following section.  
 
A number of points may be made at this juncture: firstly, it establishes the proximity 
(and rapprochement) between the deconstructive approach of Derrida and the pr!sa#gika 
method of N!g!rjuna. Some scholars might consider N!g!rjuna a nihilist, just as others might 
consider Derrida as undertaking a negative theology. While such a reading may seem at times 
warranted given the ostensibly negative (or even apocalyptic) tone of both thinkers, I argue, 
however, that this fails to address the critical edge of both Derrida and N!g!rjuna in their 
capacity to serve as a form of corrective to our philosophising impulse: 
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The victorious ones have said 
That emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. 
For whomever emptiness is a view,  
That one will accomplish nothing. (MMK XIII: 8) 
 
I will gloss this quote for our present purposes here by saying that the human impulse to 
philosophise is so deeply entrenched that if we were told that emptiness leads us to 
relinquishing all views we would, to all intents and purposes, hold on to that as yet another 
(supplementary) view, gladly exchanging chains for fetters. From a Buddhist perspective, this 
attachment (or in a Òphilosophical registerÓ one might call reificationism) is a fundamental 
human condition, and one that leads to suffering. Secondly, we may understand with this 
notion of attachment the manner in which we Òinhabit in a certain wayÓ these mental 
constructs. It means that it is impossible to have a view from nowhere, and certainly not a 
transcendental one from whose vantage point we may objectively postulate (and examine) 
categories of being and time, when in fact they are more like objectifications instead. The 
corollary of this point is dependence and relation Ð if there is no structure, there can be no 
dismantling whatsoever, nor can there similarly be any notion of an ÒultimateÓ truth without 
the ÒconventionalÓ. N!g!rjuna makes this clear: ÒWithout a foundation in the conventional 
truth, / The significance of the ultimate cannot be taughtÓ (MMK XXIV: 10). I will only note 
here that this manner of Òinhabiting in a certain wayÓ is radically different from the 
Heideggerian notion of ÒdwellingÓ. Thirdly, it recalls my earlier claim that there is no 
philosophically neutral register in which such a critique may employ: 
 
There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to 
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shake metaphysics. We have no language Ð no syntax and no lexicon Ð which 
is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive 
proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the 
implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. (Derrida, 1978: 354) 
 
Finally, taking into consideration the foregoing points, this opens up a non-linear space 
within the corpus of philosophy itself: the non-philosophical site does not lie beyond the 
horizons of philosophy like some marginalia as such, but constitutes and calls into question 
that very dividing (and indeed, divisible) line between Òinside and outsideÓ, along with the 
entire host of oppositions held in its reserve. I have stressed in this section that a study of 
both Derrida and N!g!rjuna cannot be divorced from our own a priori methodological 
assumptions, because of this keen awareness towards their own methods. The step beyond 
philosophy does not simply mean exceeding the metaphysical orb, but the opening of a non-
philosophical site within the fabric of philosophy itself, such that any notion of method is 
always en abyme, unable to arrive at the ontico-analytical ground it presupposes. In the 
absence of such grounds I argued that it would be conceptually inconsistent to proceed by 
way of a comparative analysis, yet this neither dismisses nor absolves us of the responsibility 
of our own methodological step. In the following section I will consider the possibility of a 
deconstructive method, and how it informs our own methodology to engage fruitfully with 
both Derrida and N!g!rjuna. 
 ! 76 
§ Upāya and Bricolage 
 
The previous section established the resistance to adopting a comparative analysis 
approach through the figure of a double-bind, which I argued also presented itself as a step. 
Before venturing further, a possible criticism might be that I have, in spite of my own 
caveats, applied a deconstructive method in the process. The aim of this section is to defend 
against such a charge, along with understanding what such a step entails, and where it might 
possibly lead. I claimed earlier that it is DerridaÕs anxiety that provides us the necessary 
critical resources here in thinking through and addressing the various methodological issues 
at stake. Two points need to be made: firstly, the attribution of such anxiety to Derrida does 
not constitute a negative judgement in any way. Secondly, DerridaÕs keen awareness of this 
anxiety is manifest in his extensive writings on the status of writing and language, allowing 
him to articulate a methodological rigour that is at once de trop, and yet, necessary. I would 
hazard the provocative claim here by saying that if Derrida allows for such methodological 
rigour, it is because there is not one for him in the first place:  
 
All the same, and in spite of appearances, deconstruction is neither an analysis 
nor a critique and its translation would have to take that into consideration. It 
is not an analysis in particular because the dismantling of a structure is not a 
regression toward a simple element, toward an indissoluble origin. These 
values, like that of analysis, are themselves philosophemes subject to 
deconstruction [É] I would say the same about method. Deconstruction is not 
a method and cannot be transformed into one. (1991b: 273) 
 
This recalls my third point in the previous section regarding the possibility of a 
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deconstructive analysis and how it is not motivated by a reductive methodology. The method 
of the method is there is no method (pas de mthode), though this does not prevent one from 
being methodical. This claim should not be dismissed as being merely disingenuous, and I 
shall demonstrate here the implications of such an assertion. 
 
How do we make sense of this rather contradictory claim then, especially if this 
question of method is also an exorbitant one for him? In saying there is not one method for 
Derrida in the first place, I am also calling to attention his belief that there can be no singular 
method Ð either as a set rule, or one capable of systematisation Ð that may be uniformly 
applied to every possible context, nor is it formalisable in advance: ÒI have no simple and 
formalizable response to this question [ÔWhat is DeconstructionÕ]. All my essays are attempts 
to have it out with this formidable questionÓ (Derrida, 1991b: 274). The choice of diction 
here is significant: in referring to all his essays (which has the etymological implications of 
trial and attempt) rather than a magnum opus (despite his considerable output) Derrida 
implies there is no sense of formal closure nor completion. He remains insistent upon this 
throughout his writings, and a quick glance suffices to demonstrate this: 
 
The supplement is always unfolding, but it can never attain the status of a 
complement. The field is never saturated. (Derrida, 1974: 18) 
 
Stating it in the most summary manner possible, I shall try to demonstrate why 
a context is never absolutely determinable, or rather, why its determination 
can never be entirely certain or saturated. (Derrida, 1988a: 3) 
 
[The tower of Babel] exhibits an incompletion, the impossibility of finishing, 
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of totalizing, of saturating, of completing something on the order of 
edification, architectural construction, system and architectonics. What the 
multiplicity of idioms actually limits is not only a ÔtrueÕ translation, a 
transparent and adequate interexpression, it is also a structural order, a 
coherence of construct. There is then (let us translate) something like an 
internal limit to formalization, an incompleteness of the construct.  
(Derrida, 2002: 104) 
 
What Derrida foregrounds here for us is the formidable process of struggling, Òto have it outÓ 
with what he sees as his response and responsibility all at once, in attempting to resist 
reappropriation and domestication by the logos. This anxiety, or how to respond when called 
to account by the other, cannot be anticipated in advance, but rather is dependent upon the 
various contexts that present themselves. It is thus symptomatic that much of DerridaÕs 
writings are in response to colloquiums, lectures, or even correspondences (e.g., ÒLetter to a 
Japanese FriendÓ). The theoretical implication to be gleaned here, is that if there is no 
possibility of completion or saturation of the field, then it is also fair to say that there is no 
adequate method, and along with this, the ancillary assumptions of adaequatio, 
commensurability, and truth.  
 
It also raises a hermeneutical problem which is central here Ð the impossibility of a 
singular true translation. What may we understand by this? The dream of a singular true 
translation would have to be identical with what it seeks to communicate (an idea, concept, or 
signified), in a relationship of total commensurability. The antinomy is that such a 
translation, were it possible, would ipso facto cease to be one, as it no longer stands in a 
secondary order to the primary intention it was meant to translate in the first place. It would 
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become properly idiomatic. Indeed, this problem of hermeneutics (which includes 
interpretation as well as translation) is arguably a defining feature of both Deconstruction and 
Buddhism. I will recall here KatzÕs earlier remark that while there is no uniformity of letter in 
the BuddhaÕs teaching there is nevertheless a uniformity of purpose. This is significant, as it 
coheres with the Òmethod without methodÓ approach that I am urging here. I argue that this 
allows Buddha, along with N!g!rjuna, to assert contrary claims at times depending upon 
context. This ability to gradate the level of discourse by taking into consideration the 
addresseeÕs level of competency or disposition (Skt. !$aya) attests to their skill-in-means 
(Skt. up!ya-kau$alya). The Sanskrit term up!ya translates into Òexpedient meansÓ, whilst 
up!ya-kau$alya refers to the skill of the Buddha in adopting appropriate and varied means in 
their choice of method (Murti, 1955: 350). I should like to spend some time looking at this 
seemingly innocuous concept, which implies more than sheer virtuosity, and which I also 
believe is significant to a critical appreciation of the modus operandi of both N!g!rjuna and 
Derrida.  
 
Recalling my first positive claim regarding Derrida and N!g!rjuna Ð viz., that both 
undertake an immanent critique of philosophy Ð I shall here further qualify this by adding 
that its efficacy is augmented as a result of up!ya-kau$alya. Schroeder claims:  ÒUp!ya 
rejects the idea that metaphysics precedes praxis or that liberation requires theoretical 
speculation. It is therefore profoundly philosophical and represents a critical, self-reflective 
moment in the Buddhist traditionÓ (2000: 560). What we may infer from this is that theory 
and praxis are not separable, and further, that such praxis is not formalisable a priori, but is 
to a certain degree a form of corrective to metaphysical speculation. In what way does this 
vouchsafe such praxis to be ÒcriticalÓ and Òself-reflectiveÓ then Ð especially if by praxis we 
also mean method Ð within the context of an immanent critique that is purportedly common 
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to both Derrida and N!g!rjuna? I argue that for such method to be possible it would have to 
turn in upon itself, as, according to Derrida, method is itself a philosopheme that is subject to 
deconstruction (1991b: 273). To demonstrate this I will look at the various metaphors 
concerning method, and trace how the philosopheme loses itself in the drift of the various 
mythemes that constitute it. 
 
What is of interest here is that the term up!ya with the root i has connotations of Òto 
goÓ or Òto bring one up to somethingÓ, not unlike a step on the ladder. This is significant to 
what we are trying to establish here, as to how we might conceive of such a step outside of 
philosophy, sans method. It also finds its expression par excellence in the metaphor of the 
raft in the Majjhima-Nik!ya where Buddha describes his teachings as rafts to cross over to 
the other shore, but is meant to be left behind upon oneÕs arrival and not held onto. The other 
famous example is of Buddha as an exemplary physician administering the correct medicine 
to those seeking a cure to their malaise. This quality is never separate from praj! (trans. 
wisdom), and is listed as one of the ten p!ramit!s (trans. perfection) in Mah!y!na Buddhism, 
reiterating the inseparability of theory and praxis. Further, this concept of up!ya is most 
commonly demonstrated (rather than defined) through Buddhist parables, and famously in 
Zen koans as absurd non sequiturs leading to enlightenment. This also suggests an attitude of 
openness (and resistance to formalisation) owing to its fundamental incompatibility with 
reification, just as in a similar manner there is no singular panacea for universal ills. DerridaÕs 
reworking of PlatoÕs pharmakon comes to mind here. In fact, the very same medicine, far 
from being therapeutic, can be lethal: 
 
By a misperception of emptiness 
A person of little intelligence is destroyed.  
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Like a snake incorrectly seized 
Or like a spell incorrectly cast. (MMK XXIV: 11) 
 
It is for this reason that N!g!rjuna refuses characterising emptiness as a view (Skt. d+()i), 
though it is capable of calling into question and exhausting all others: ÒFor whomever 
emptiness is a view,/ That one will accomplish nothingÓ (MMK XIII: 8). Therefore, I argue 
that N!g!rjuna deploys emptiness as a strategic move, not unlike Òa discourse which borrows 
from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself. [For 
reasons] of economy and strategyÓ (Derrida, 1978: 35). In claiming that emptiness is thus 
deployed as a strategic move we also situate its usage within, and dependence upon, the 
specific contexts that arise. 
 
Schroeder points out that, Òthe most significant feature of up!ya, however, is that the 
ability to respond compassionately or achieve liberation does not depend on a metaphysical 
analysis of the worldÓ (Schroeder, 2000: 562, emphasis mine). DerridaÕs anxiety consists in 
the fact that we cannot respond in advance by seeking refuge in some predetermined method 
that always points to the truth in a mode of al0theia. To see why method and deconstruction 
will never do for Derrida we would have to look at the term deconstruction itself, and trace 
its borrowing from Heidegger, who in turn had borrowed the idea creatively from Husserl. 
Heidegger names phenomenology as the method for doing philosophy, following HusserlÕs 
tripartite division of this method into reduction, construction and destruction. Heidegger 
argues that construction in philosophy entails destruction (destruktion) as a critical process in 
which traditional concepts are necessarily employed as oneÕs heritage, before de-constructing 
(abbau) them to the sources from which they are drawn. This is necessary for Heidegger, as 
he argues:  
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The store of basic philosophical concepts derived from the philosophical 
tradition is still so influential today that this effect of tradition can hardly be 
overestimated. It is for this reason that all philosophical discussion, even the 
most radical attempt to begin all over again, is pervaded by traditional 
concepts and thus by traditional horizons and traditional angles of approach, 
which we cannot assume with unquestionable certainty to have arisen 
originally and genuinely from the domain of being and the constitution of 
being they claim to comprehend. (1975: 22) 
 
In other words, the destruction of traditional concepts require the construction of new angles 
of approach. There is certainly a lexical proximity between abbau (trans. dismantling) and 
destruktion, as between destruction (analysis) and construction (synthesis). Recalling an 
earlier quote by Derrida, Òthe dismantling of a structure is not a regression toward a simple 
element, toward an indissoluble originÓ (1991b: 273). The term deconstruction must therefore 
differ from itself before coming into DerridaÕs employ, as for him (unlike Heidegger) there is 
not some ontological ground of Being that may serve as an originary source. Furthermore, to 
the extent that method entails analysis, the notion of a deconstructive method thus becomes, 
strictly speaking, an oxymoron. 
 
In place of method, it might make more sense to speak of technique and techn 
instead, and it is not surprising that Lvi-StraussÕs notion of bricolage is given due emphasis 
by Derrida: ÒIf one calls bricolage the necessity of borrowing oneÕs concepts from the text of 
a heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is 
bricoleurÓ (Derrida, 1978: 360). This is in contrast to the engineer who questions the 
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universe, capable of constructing the totality of his discourse ex nihilo and becoming its 
absolute origin. From a deconstructive point of view such a step beyond philosophy is 
untenable, even if it orients. Interestingly enough, the bricoleur according to Lvi-Strauss is 
also a characteristic of medicine-men and story-tellers, and that it is mythopoetic. Without 
going into further detail here, I would like to hint at this rapprochement between bricolage 
and up!ya, as it is fruitful in demystifying for our purposes here any concept of method.  
 
Returning to the fold of Mah!y!na Buddhism, N!g!rjuna is credited by myth with 
retrieving the Praj!p!ramit! (trans. Perfection of Wisdom) s%tras from the realm of the 
n!gas (serpent-kings) beneath the ocean for dissemination, whence his namesake is thus 
derived. This myth is properly apocryphal (Gk. 12345678, Ôhidden awayÕ), and the teachings 
are terma (trans. hidden treasure), to be kept hidden and guarded in reserve till such 
propitious time in future when conditions are right and people are ready to receive them. Due 
to his skill in explicating BuddhaÕs teachings N!g!rjuna is also widely considered to be the 
Òsecond BuddhaÓ that was prophesied by the Buddha himself in re-turning the Wheel of 
Dharma: 
 
In Vedal$, in the southern part, a Bhikshu most illustrious and distinguished 
[will be born]; his name is N!g!hyvaya, he is the destroyer of the one-sided 
views based on being and non-being. 
He will declare my Vehicle, the unsurpassed Mah!y!na, to the world; 
attaining the stage of Joy he will go to the Land of Bliss. (La&k!vat!ra S%tra; 
Sag!thakam: 165-166) 
 
Legends abound regarding his exploits as an alchemist enjoying unnatural long life only to be 
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ended by a single blade of kusha grass, all of which contributed to his mythic stature in 
Buddhist philosophical history. Most biographical accounts (and there are many competing 
versions) regarding N!g!rjuna attempt to underscore his significance within Buddhist history, 
either as a way of introducing the recondite thinker to a Western readership, or situating him 
within a particular lineage (such as the Mah!y!na-Hinayana debate). There is, however, an 
allegorical significance which has not been addressed thus far to my knowledge. If Lvi-
Strauss is correct in opining that myths are anonymous by nature, this raises all sorts of 
conceptual difficulties along with the practical reality of attributing authorship to N!g!rjuna. 
Lindtner (1982) attributes fourteen texts as written by N!g!rjuna while the traditional 
estimate is higher, with some texts dating as late as the eighth or ninth century. These 
difficulties were highlighted in MabbettÕs detailed survey of the various sources relating to 
the historical N!g!rjuna, and he was forced to conclude that, ÒWe must give proper weight to 
the default hypothesis that the association of the name N!g!rjuna with a profusion of tantric 
and quasi-scientific texts is a demonstration of the absorptive power of the legend originating 
in a single historical N!g!rjuna, the author of MadhyamakaÓ (Mabbett, 1998: 346). The sole 
unanimous agreement amongst scholars regarding N!g!rjunaÕs definitive authorship is the 
MMK, though as Òthe author of M!dhyamakaÓ, the proper name itself also designates a 
discourse of the middle path (Skt. madhyam!-pratipad). 
 
I am here interested in the allegorical elements of this myth and its symbolism, which 
is compelling for me in understanding the Òmethod without methodÓ that I am forwarding. As 
mentioned earlier, up!ya is listed as one of the ten p!ramit!s in Mah!y!na Buddhism and is 
never separate from praj! Ð in fact, wisdom is always presented in conjunction with practice 
within Buddhist iconography. It is therefore significant and not simply fortuitous to me that 
an anonymous figure (we do not know his actual name) is credited with salvaging the secret 
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teachings. One might well argue that the proper name Ð ÒN!g!rjunaÓ Ð  emerges only as a 
result of this performative act, thus fulfilling the prophecy. The n!gas themselves are an 
interesting hybrid of both human and serpent-like attributes, and they recall the traditional 
symbolism of the snake in terms of wisdom and renewal, both of which are crucial for the 
dissemination of the hidden texts. The name is appropriate, for it not only designates the 
provenance (from the n!gas) of the otherwise apocryphal texts, but also marks its dependency 
as a nominal term Ð we never quite arrive at the identity it is supposed to demarcate. The 
underwater realm is an ideal place for the hidden texts, as the Dharma itself is often 
characterised as an ocean of boundless wisdom.  
 
What is boundless is also non-differentiated, and in salvaging the texts N!g!rjuna 
visits the underwater dwelling of the nagas but significantly he does not dwell, coursing 
instead back and forth. This mode of coursing in perfect consummation of both wisdom and 
practice escapes the binary logic of either/or, and the merit of N!g!rjunaÕs MMK is that it 
attempts to communicate its insights (or praj!) Ð which are otherwise only attainable 
through meditative practice (Skt. dhy!na) Ð through philosophical knowledge (Skt. j!na). 
As a result, N!g!rjuna is able to respect the law of non-contradiction as well as the excluded 
middle, deploying them in the tetralemma (Skt. catu(ko)i) against his opponentÕs arguments 
and yet without becoming attached to them. His underwater sojourn (as the realm of non-
differentiated wisdom) and subsequent return to dry land (as the realm of the quotidian and 
binary logic) is allegorical of this coursing between two forms of discourse (conventional and 
ultimate), which is succinctly expressed in his doctrine of Two-Truths. N!g!rjuna 
demonstrates this in an exemplary fashion in the MMK where he disarticulates the very same 
tools he employs by pushing them to their logical conclusion (Skt. pr!sa#ga), where the 
binary distinctions themselves collapse in order to communicate an experience (of 
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enlightenment) that is, by definition, ineffable.  
 
The rapprochement between N!g!rjuna and Derrida is uncanny, and perhaps we 
might be in a better position now to appraise what some other scholars have said about both 
thinkers. Mabbett claims: Ò[P]eople like Jacques Derrida and people like N!g!rjuna are 
seeking to give form Ð a self-referring and self-canceling form Ð to the same vision [É] that 
can, perhaps, be shared by widely different culturesÓ (1995: 204). MabbettÕs approach was to 
identify similar themes and issues in both N!g!rjuna and Derrida to see how their respective 
approaches mirrored each other, though if he is correct it does raise conceptual difficulties in 
the possibility of mirroring a form that is at once Òself-referring and self-cancelingÓ. Note 
that while I am in general agreement with Mabbett, what I wish to draw attention to here is 
the difficulty in imposing a methodological framework that is conceptually consistent in what 
it purportedly sets out to do. Loy gives us a more explicit account:  
 
N!g!rjunaÕs more rigorous deconstruction is a classic example of how the 
second strategy devours the first: head swallows tail, and nothing remains Ð no 
nirvana, no Buddha, no teaching at all. One result of this was Zen, whose 
practice negated any theory, even though it was a particular theory that 
justified that practice and made it possible. Only meditative practice can 
actually end prapaca and open up a new mode of experience. (1988: 256) 
 
LoyÕs assertion that only meditative practice can end prapaca (trans. conceptual 
proliferation) recalls what we have just mentioned in the preceding paragraph. If praj! 
(trans. wisdom) leads to the annihilation of conceptual proliferation then the challenge would 
be to communicate that wisdom within a discourse that does not add to the sum total of 
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prevailing concepts. Or, at the very least, the articulation of such praj! must involve the 
disarticulation of the very discourse intended to make it accessible to others. The 
philosophical ingenuity of N!g!rjuna lies in his skilful deployment of $%nyat! as a non-
concept to challenge and refute sedimented concepts (such as causation and time) within the 
sphere of j!na but yet outstripping its horizons. If I maintain here that $%nyat! is a non-
concept, it is only in contradistinction to others like causation where it is assumed there is an 
identifiable essence. On the other hand, my general disagreement with MagliolaÕs 
characterisation of what he deems to be N!g!rjunaÕs method is that it places too much 
emphasis on the catu(ko)i itself (i.e., relying solely on jana) without sufficient consideration 
of the Two-Truths doctrine and its relation to $%nyat!. While a careful consideration of the 
catu(ko)i in N!g!rjuna is desideratum towards understanding his philosophical method, this 
nevertheless has to be situated within the context of its deployment; a purely logical approach 
to N!g!rjuna ultimately fails to address the very limits of that logic itself, as its remit does 
not extend beyond conventional truth (Skt. sa.v+ti-satya) where it is then held in suspense.  
 
What emerges from these separate accounts, however, is a peculiar form which I will 
relate to yet another myth: 
 
For it had no need of eyes, as there remained nothing visible outside of it, nor 
of hearing, as there remained nothing audible; there was no surrounding air 
which it needed to breathe in, nor was it in need of any organ by which to take 
food into itself and discharge it later after digestion. Nothing was taken from it 
or added to it, for there was nothing that could be; for it was designed to 
supply its own nourishment from its own decay and to comprise and cause all 
processes, as its creator thought that it was better for it to be self-sufficient 
 ! 88 
than dependent on anything else. He did not think there was any purpose in 
providing it with hands as it had no need to grasp anything or defend itself, 
nor with feet or any other means of support. For the seven physical motions he 
allotted to it the one which most properly belongs to intelligence and reason, 
and made it more with a uniform circular motion on the same spot; any 
deviation into movement of the other six kinds he entirely precluded. And 
because for its revolution it needed no feet he created it without feet or legs. 
(Plato, 1965: 45-46)  
 
The Ouroboros was the first living creature created according to Plato, and as the symbol of 
wholeness and infinity, was considered an archetype by Jung. It is a recurrent image found 
across different cultures, and, within the Hindu tradition, the coiled Adishesha is one of the 
primal beings of creation and king of all nagas. As well as symbolising eternal return and 
self-reflexivity, the ouroboros is also a purifying sigil in alchemy because of its 
transformative nature. Being Òmade to move in the same manner and on the same spot, within 
his own limits revolving in a circleÓ, it moves without moving Ð it would be more accurate to 
characterise this movement as coursing within itself, between the clash of binary opposites. 
The cyclical course it holds runs counter to linearity and eschatology, as there is neither 
beginning nor end that may be rigorously determined. I view this tail-devouring serpent to be 
the figure par excellence of what various scholars have characterised as N!g!rjunaÕs Òself-
referring and self-cancelingÓ method: Ò[N!g!rjunaÕs] dialectic is an ÔuroboricÕ or self-
destroying path: first it wipes out conceptual proliferations (Skt. prapaca, Grk. typhos), the 
habit of projecting linguistic distinctions ontologically, then it erases itself tooÓ (McEvilley, 
1982: 12). As $%nyat! has no ontic status whatsoever, this supports my earlier claim that it 
should be considered as a non-concept instead. It also clarifies the method without method 
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approach that I have been urging here.  
 
In what way does this recall the movement of deconstruction and its process of 
dismantling, if it does not move from without to within, nor within to without? Its efficacy 
lies in the parasitic virulence coursing within the very structures to be deconstructed, 
inhabiting it Òin a certain wayÓ (Derrida, 1997: 24) without affiliation nor alienation. It also 
recalls DerridaÕs assertion, that Òphilosophy [is] a self-eliminating process of generating 
metaphorÓ (1974: 9) in coming to terms with its own discursive anxiety and need to establish 
a firm (and perhaps ontological) ground for doing so. A truly ex orbitas transgression would 
only reinforce those very limits to be purportedly breached, and it is not surprising that 
Derrida himself remarks: ÒAll these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped 
in a kind of circle. This circle is uniqueÓ (1978: 354). Such a circle, Gasch would claim, is 
not merely a Òcirculus vitiosusÓ, but Òis a circle into which one has to come in the right way 
if one wants to think at allÓ (1986: 164). I argue here that the ouroboros (as figure of self-
destroying path) is not merely tangential to aporia (as figure of unpassable path), and at its 
interstices beckons a step that is not pinned down by the twin legs of arche and telos. If I 
claim that legs are strictly not needed in taking the beginnings of such a step, it is only 
because we do not climb the tetralemmatic ladder in a linear fashion leading beyond the 
enchanted circle.  
 
I have attempted to present here a form of methodology that is conceptually consistent 
by coursing a path between both thinkers. In identifying a method without method to be the 
modus operandi of both thinkers as a methodical step I discussed the strategic significance of 
up!ya due to its openness, as a way of circumventing traditional notions of methodology and 
its a priori theoretical assumptions. In translating this skill as techn within a bricoleur 
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discourse we also established that a transcendental position of critique is unnecessary, as the 
coping strategies we adopt are contingent, and in turn dependent upon the various contexts 
that arise. This would account for N!g!rjunaÕs no-position view along with DerridaÕs 
insistence that Deconstruction is not, and cannot, be made into a method. The allegorical 
reading of the myth surrounding N!g!rjuna foregrounds his skill in coursing between two 
apparently divergent forms of discourse without contradiction, which I argue is manifest in 
his Two-Truths doctrine. It also highlights the peculiar self-referring and self-cancelling 
vision attributed to both thinkers, identified in the myth of Ouroboros, coursing between 
binary oppositions and crossing them out at the same time. In doing so I argue that with both 
Derrida and N!g!rjuna any notion of methodology has to be reinscribed as a conceptual game 
of snakes and ladders, thus shifting its emphasis from the programmatic to the problematic. 
Where there is a step there is also slippage, insofar as any notion of destination also 
necessarily includes, amongst its various postulates, what Derrida would call ÒdestinerrancyÓ. 
Such a discursive step cannot be posited without the necessary twin legs of arche and telos, 
i.e., without first founding the inviolable grounds upon which to build a fabulous construct 
(or kalpana of towering proportions) leading beyond the enchanted circle. The programmatic 
ultimately becomes problematic, however, as we do not simply transgress towards the other 
shore of our discourse, one step after another, clinging all the time onto this necessary 
guardrail of hermeneutical method. I therefore agree with Derrida that this methodical crutch 
has only protected without ever having opened a reading, though in dispensing with it 
altogether we would also find ourselves cast into differential drift without so much a pole of 
reference. 
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§ Causality and Conditionality 
 
This chapter focuses on causality and conditionality found in MMK I to defend a 
pr!sa#gika reading of prat"tya-samutp!da, by taking into consideration GarfieldÕs (1994) 
proposed distinction between causes (Skt: hetu, Tib: rgyu) and conditions (Skt: pratyaya, 
Tib: rkyen). In doing so I shall consider some of the objections raised by Chinn (2001) 
against Garfield, and demonstrate how ChinnÕs objections are unfounded. I will also evaluate 
the significance of N!g!rjunaÕs refutation of causation (viz., that causation is empty) such that 
it does not entail nihilism with recourse to moderate skepticism. I argue N!g!rjunaÕs 
emptiness of emptiness should be considered a sceptical rather than an ontological thesis, 
which allows us to recover our common sense understanding of causality without meanwhile 
denying the utility of our explanatory practices. This does not, however, deny that the 
sceptical thrust of N!g!rjunaÕs analyses do not have any ontological consequences 
whatsoever, though a conflation between the two inevitably leads to nihilism. The purpose of 
this chapter is to establish a clear understanding of the pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika dialectic as 
positively anti-metaphysical despite its paradoxical double-bind, which has led Garfield to 
describe it as a Òlogical tightrope act at the very limits of language and metaphysicsÓ (1995: 
102). I have also included a dialectical structure of the chapter for purposes of clarity. This 
may be found in Appendix A (see Fig. 2: Dialectical Structure of MMK 1). 
 
In what respect should N!g!rjuna be considered anti-metaphysical, and further, what 
would be the positive value in his refutation of causation (and indeed, of all views)? In 
relinquishing all views (Skt. d+()i) including causation does N!g!rjuna not hold on to yet 
another view? This question raises a host of issues that I will not go into further detail at this 
point. It suffices to indicate that if N!g!rjuna does not hold a view supplementary to those he 
 ! 92 
has refuted, then the M!dhyamika dialectic suspends judgment by purging both thesis and 
antithesis that share and assume a common metaphysical ground presupposing their 
respective positions. Garfield makes this clear: 
 
To suspend judgment in this sense [i.e. in a constructive manner] is to refuse 
to assent to a position, while refusing to assert its negation, since either 
assertion would commit one to a false or misleading metaphysical 
presupposition. To suspend judgment is hence to refuse to enter into a 
misguided discourse. (1990: 290-91) 
 
This suspension of judgement becomes a form of therapy curing us of the philosophical 
malaise that consists in giving, clearing, and establishing the grounds for epistemological 
claims to truth-hood. These grounds themselves are assumed capable of providing an 
explanatory bedrock in terms of existence and essence. To say N!g!rjuna is anti-
metaphysical would be to reject the essentialism of these ontological foundations underlying 
our reified epistemological claims and/or beliefs by suspending them altogether. This 
sceptical rejection, however, does not simply deny that anything exists, which would become 
a nihilist (and hence ontological) thesis. In fact N!g!rjuna himself warns against this 
conflation of skepticism and nihilism, because it answers still to a metaphysical demand for 
grounding even if it stands diametrically opposed to what is rejected.  
 
The paradoxical double-bind of M!dhyamaka consists in Òthe tension between the 
desire to characterise the ultimate nature of things and the recognition that all characterization 
is conventionalÓ (Garfield, 1995: 102). It is also an enabling constraint, however, and the 
pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika method of reductio ad absurdum draws upon the resources of 
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language and metaphysics to expose its very limits via media, as its middle path (Skt. 
madhyam!-pratipad). To say that all Òcharacterization is conventionalÓ would imply a 
philosophy of language that does not place faith in the law of correspondence such that signs 
always point and correspond to their referents. The alternative would be to remain silent and 
silenced by grammatical injunctions acting in metaphysical complicity. It is therefore 
significant to note what N!g!rjuna says must be understood in a provisional sense, and with 
this proviso in hand we are better equipped to approach the apparent paradoxes found in the 
MMK. 
 
N!g!rjuna begins the MMK with a chapter devoted to causation, and the central 
concept addressed is prat"tya-samutp!da (trans. dependent co-origination). It is formally 
expressed in the Nik!yas as such below, along with the twelve limbs of dependent 
origination: 
 
When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. 
When this is absent, that does not come to be, on the cessation of this, that 
ceases. (Samyutta Nik!ya 2.28) 
 
It is worth our while to consider why N!g!rjuna began specifically with causation. After all it 
seems the most obvious place to begin, though it is not always clear why this should be the 
case. In pointing out the obvious I refer also to our common sense understanding of causality: 
viz., causes produce effects (relation) or effects follow from their causes (temporality) such 
that there is uniformity in the world. While causation remains one of the most fundamental 
(and debated) questions of philosophy, we nevertheless subscribe to a general principle of 
causality in our daily discourse in order to explain and make sense of the world. In fact we 
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take it for granted, though what is simultaneously given and withdrawn in the process are 
certain metaphysical implications. It is hardly surprising many scholars assume N!g!rjuna 
felt it incumbent upon him to begin with BuddhaÕs doctrine of prat"tya-samutp!da in 
presenting a Buddhist world-view. This assumption fails to do N!g!rjuna justice, however, 
and in fact it remains a matter of contention as to what precisely N!g!rjuna was trying to do 
in this first chapter, for reasons I will adumbrate below. 
 
Kalupahana (1986) believes this establishes N!g!rjunaÕs aim of defending BuddhaÕs 
doctrine of prat"tya-samutp!da as a grand commentator without attempting to reject it. In 
reading N!g!rjuna as an Òempiricist par excellenceÓ Kalupahana stresses the continuity of 
Buddhist intellectual history from its earlier stage of pragmatic realism (1986: 81). He draws 
support from N!g!rjunaÕs dedicatory verses as referring to Òa positive core of the BuddhaÕs 
teachings,Ó claiming that Òsuch an interpretation would leave dependent arising as the 
position from which the Buddha rejected the metaphysical or absolute viewsÓ (1986: 103). 
This is a contentious claim by Kalupahana, which would effectively align N!g!rjuna with the 
sv!tantrika instead of the pr!sa#gika tradition, and is furthermore not a widely held view in 
both ancient and modern scholarship. Kalupahana further notes (and summarily dismisses) 
that Candrak$rti (700 C.E) devoted more than one tenth of the Prasannapad! commenting on 
MMK I:1 within a pr!sa#gika framework, in which he severely criticises Bh!vaviveka (500 
C.E) for holding that a M!dhyamika could forward autonomous (Skt. sv!tantra) arguments as 
counter-theses to his opponents. 
 
GarfieldÕs reading of the MMK, on the other hand, coheres with Candrak$rtiÕs 
pr!sa#gika reading of N!g!rjuna in attributing the emptiness of emptiness as a no-position 
view to N!g!rjuna. Garfield (1994) is committed to demonstrating the philosophical climax 
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of N!g!rjunaÕs argument at MMK XXIV:18 is already anticipated from the very beginning. 
In fact, Garfield suggests re-reading MMK I (and indeed, the remaining chapters) with the 
insights of MMK XXIV:18 as an interpretative fulcrum. This he claims will demonstrate 
exactly how MMK XXIV:18 is to be understood, along with a right view regarding causality 
in Buddhist philosophy. It is of interest to note that both Garfield and Kalupahana claim their 
approaches lend coherence to the structure of the MMK Ð with the former identifying MMK 
I:10 as the central verse of the first chapter while the latter MMK I:3 Ð even if their readings 
diverge on mutually exclusive grounds. Garfield further notes: Òdivergences in interpretation 
of the MMK often determine the splits between major philosophical schoolsÓ (Garfield, 
1994: 219). This is certainly true, and we shall see how this takes on a huge significance in 
Chapter Six, when Loy takes MMK XXV to be the key chapter of the MMK instead. 
  
While this may be taken to underscore the equivocal nature of the MMK (whether 
through N!g!rjunaÕs apparent lack of coherence or not), I argue that this demonstrates how 
exegeses remain subordinate to a philosophy of reading (and its demand for coherence and 
grounding) such that we are not any more free of the problems we purport to highlight and 
address which are already anticipated by the text itself. In light of this, a critical awareness 
towards the methodological problems of Buddhist hermeneutics is therefore necessary in 
order to acknowledge the reasons for our hermeneutical choices. Also, if we believe that the 
propositions in the MMK are to be understood in a conventional manner, it would take an 
unwarranted leap of faith to claim some paradigmatic reading that is capable of establishing 
some absolute truth from them. In what follows I will consider GarfieldÕs proposed reading 
of MMK I in his paper. As ChinnÕs objections to Garfield favour KalupahanaÕs translation of 
MMK I, I will evaluate his translation and commentary where possible for mutual 
illumination. Both versions of the MMK may be found in Appendix B.   
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§ Cause and Condition: A Hermeneutic Distinction  
 
GarfieldÕs aim in his paper is to argue for the emptiness of emptiness in N!g!rjunaÕs 
MMK, where every phenomenon is subjected to analysis in terms of emptiness, including 
emptiness itself. Garfield locates the climax of N!g!rjunaÕs argument at MMK XXIV:18, 
where the emptiness of emptiness is asserted along with the unity of two truths. He proceeds 
to re-read the first chapter of the MMK in light of this doctrine, claiming it is already 
anticipated from the beginning, thereby shifting the analysis from the emptiness of causation 
to the emptiness of emptiness. Garfield argues that doing so demonstrates exactly how MMK 
XXIV:18 should be read and why a proper understanding of causality is central to Buddhist 
philosophy from the very beginning (1994: 222). GarfieldÕs aim in doing so is not merely 
pedagogical, but to attach a positively non-nihilist tone to N!g!rjuna. This is because an 
understanding of the emptiness of causation risks nevertheless becoming nihilistic, such that 
one might assert emptiness in place of causation. As will be demonstrated in this section, this 
would amount to a reification of emptiness itself (i.e., treating emptiness as non-empty). This 
is untenable according to N!g!rjuna, and he consequently submits it to a thorough-going 
analysis to demonstrate how emptiness is itself empty. Therefore a great deal of interpretative 
stake rests upon GarfieldÕs application of the doctrine in reading MMK I, and specifically, his 
proposed distinction between causality and conditionality. I will first address the controversy 
surrounding GarfieldÕs distinction Ð which lies in the ambiguity of the Sanskrit term kriy! Ð 
before moving on to GarfieldÕs deployment of this distinction to make sense of MMK I. 
 
Garfield begins by claiming that N!g!rjuna distinguishes between two possible views 
of dependent origination in MMK I: Òone according to which causes bring about their effects 
in virtue of causal powers and one according to which causal relations simply amount to 
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explanatorily useful regularitiesÓ (1994: 222). The former view of dependent origination 
refers to a realist understanding of causality, whilst the latter refers to what Garfield calls a 
conventional understanding of conditionality. What I will note here is that our common sense 
understanding subscribes to the causal realist view as a matter of custom or habit, and the 
emptiness of causation reinscribes not only this causal realist view but more importantly, 
what we understand by the term ÒconventionÓ. Garfield defends the latter view as 
N!g!rjunaÕs doctrine of the emptiness of causation, and proposes a hermeneutic distinction 
between causes (Skt: hetu, Tib: rgyu) and conditions (Skt: pratyaya, Tib: rkyen):  
 
When N!g!rjuna uses the word ÔcauseÕ (hetu [rGyu]), he has in mind an event 
or state that has in it a power (kriy! [Bya Ba]) to bring about its effect, and has 
that power as part of its essence or nature (svabh!va [Rang bZhin]). When he 
uses the term Ôcondition,Õ on the other hand (pratyaya [rKyen]), he has in 
mind an event, state, or process that can be appealed to in explaining another 
event, state, or process, without any metaphysical commitment to any occult 
connection between explanandum and explanans. (1994: 222) 
 
It should be pointed out there is an immediate shift from ontology (the substantial property of 
a cause in its essence) to epistemology (the functional property of a condition in explanation). 
This Òventuresome claimÓ (1999: 91) is admitted to be controversial even by Garfield 
himself. The point of contention here is the Sanskrit term Ôkriy!,Õ which is usually translated 
as ÔactivityÕ or Ôaction,Õ whereas ÔpowerÕ is reserved for Ôb!laÕ or ÔshaktiÕ in Sanskrit and 
ÔstobÕ in Tibetan. In translating kriy! as ÔpowerÕ instead of ÔactionÕ Garfield defends his 
proposed distinction on hermeneutical grounds, arguing it Òmakes the best philosophical 
sense of the textÓ (1995: 104, fn. 16). 
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Kalupahana on the other hand chooses to translate kriy! as ÔactivityÕ in MMK I: 4 
where the term appears for the first time: 
 
  KalupahanaÕs translation reads: 
Activity is not constituted of conditions nor is it not non-constituted of 
conditions. Conditions are neither constituted nor non-constituted of activity. 
(1986: 108) 
 
  While GarfieldÕs translation reads: 
Power to act does not have conditions.  
There is no power to act without conditions.  
There are no conditions without power to act. 
Nor do any have the power to act. (1994: 3) 
 
KalupahanaÕs gloss on MMK I: 4 discusses the term kriy!, which can convey two meanings: 
ÒFirst, it can refer to an inherent activity, a power or potentiality ($akti) in something to 
produce an effect (artha). Activity would then be an embodiment of a condition (kriy! 
pratyayavat") or a condition would be an embodiment of activity (pratyay! kriy!vanta')Ó 
(1986: 108). This substantive interpretation of kriy! corresponds to GarfieldÕs proposed 
interpretation of hetu (trans. cause), which inherently possesses this power as part of its self-
nature (either as an embodiment or being constituted by it). N!g!rjuna explicitly rejects this, 
and is maintained in GarfieldÕs translation. Kalupahana points out a second meaning Òthat 
can be attributed to both kriy! and pratyaya, namely, the pragmatic view which defines both 
in terms of the effect (artha)Ó (1986: 109).  
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In other words, a condition is so-called by virtue of its dependence upon the effect, 
and it is inappropriate otherwise to maintain either condition or effect remain as such on its 
own. For conditionality (Skt. pratyaya) to be asserted it must depend upon its effect. This 
functional sense is maintained in the second and third lines of GarfieldÕs translation, where 
Ôpower to actÕ here is to be read in its functional capacity. The precise form of dependence 
does not lie in some efficacious power thought to inhere in conditions as part of their nature, 
and the substantive sense of this putative Ôpower to actÕ (what it can do, as its ability) is 
maintained in the first and fourth lines of GarfieldÕs translation. In other words, KalupahanaÕs 
translation captures only the substantive aspect of kriy!, while GarfieldÕs translation allows 
for a more nuanced understanding of kriy! in both its functional (second and third line) and 
substantive (first and fourth line) aspects. 
 
We might be committed to a view that causal powers do have conditions, though we 
would have to account for how these conditions in turn have the power to cause the initial 
causal powers posited, on pain of an infinite regress. Or, according to the proponent of causal 
powers, such Òpower to actÓ does not have conditions (the claim made in the first line), 
because on the causal realistÕs account it is by definition independent as an essence. This, 
however, renders it de facto incapable of dependent arising within a causal history. GarfieldÕs 
proposed distinction clarifies the discussion, in considering whether conditions should be 
understood in the ontological or epistemological register in respect of dependent arising. In 
other words, kriy! could be understood in terms of causality with its ontological implications 
or conditionality with its epistemological focus set out above, though both interpretations are 
in fact mutually exclusive. Such conflation is deeply problematic, as it threatens to 
completely misconstrue the meaning of dependent origination as taught by the Buddha. 
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Furthermore, in translating kriy! into ÔactivityÕ or ÔactionÕ as commonly understood in our 
daily language, we would have already imposed our reading of it as a form of embodiment, 
by conflating both causality (as essence) and conditionality in giving rise to things. 
 
KalupahanaÕs interpretative choice is therefore prima facie faithful to N!g!rjunaÕs 
text while GarfieldÕs proposed distinction is deemed controversial as an aberration from 
canonical texts. We may, however, trace the reasons for this difference to MMK I: 1. 
KalupahanaÕs translation reads: 
 
No existents whatsoever are evident anywhere that are arisen from themselves, 
from another, from both, or from a non-cause. (1986: 105) 
 
Kalupahana believes the four types of causal events referred here are comparable to those 
mentioned by the Buddha at Samyutta Nik!ya 2.19-20 (1986: 105). Juxtaposing N!g!rjunaÕs 
usage of utpanna (trans. arisen) in the MMK and the BuddhaÕs usage of kata (Skt. k+ta 
translated as done) in the Nik!ya, Kalupahana claims the Upani(ads served as a background 
to the BuddhaÕs teaching, where Òthe substantial self (!tman) was looked upon more as a 
Ôpersonal agent,Õ than as a substantial principle (svabh!va, prak+ti, etc.)Ó (1986: 105). If so, it 
would then make sense to translate kriy! as activity (as Kalupahana has done) with this 
notion of agency in mind in relation to dependent arising. It is debatable, however, whether 
Buddha himself would have accepted such an imputation, especially because he forwarded a 
no-self (an!tman) doctrine in opposition to the Upani(adic tradition.  
 
N!g!rjuna would most certainly not, and Garfield provides further justification for his 
proposed distinction in his footnote to MMK I: 1: 
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N!g!rjuna explicitly rejects the existence of efficacy and pointedly uses the 
word Ôcause.Õ He denies that there are such things. Nowhere in Chapter I is 
there a parallel denial of the existence of conditions. On the contrary, in I: 2 he 
positively asserts that there are four kinds of them. To be sure, this could be 
read as mere partitioning of the class of effects that are described in Buddhist 
literature. But there are two reasons not to read it thus: First, N!g!rjuna does 
not couch the assertion in one of his Ôit might be saidÕ locutions. Second, he 
never takes it back. (1995: fn. 16, 104) 
 
This is in fact corroborated by Kalupahana himself, who notes with regard to MMK I: 2 that 
Òwhile the four causal theories mentioned in I.1 are categorically denied by N!g!rjuna, no 
such denial is made of the four theories of conditions (pratyaya)Ó (1986: 107). If the term 
kriy! is equivocal such that N!g!rjuna denies it in a significant (i.e. ontological) sense while 
endorsing it in a pragmatic (or epistemological) sense then GarfieldÕs proposed distinction 
would be philosophically sound even if it comes at the cost of philological fidelity. To be 
sure, Garfield himself made it clear from the outset that his translation was not philological in 
intent, even though his reading in general is philosophically more faithful to N!g!rjuna than 
KalupahanaÕs, a significant point which is attested by various scholars in the field. As a 
preliminary note here I shall point out ChinnÕs objections to GarfieldÕs distinction overlook 
this equivocal significance of kriy!, and is never contested by him. I hope this brief excursus 
makes a case for GarfieldÕs proposed distinction by addressing the controversy surrounding 
the proper translation of kriy! in N!g!rjuna. 
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§ Regulative Theory of Dependent-Origination 
 
In this section I will employ GarfieldÕs distinction between causality and 
conditionality as an interpretative fulcrum to N!g!rjunaÕs MMK, discussing the emptiness of 
causation and the regulative theory of dependent origination. While I am not convinced that 
ChinnÕs objections are tenable due to a fundamental misrepresentation of GarfieldÕs position, 
it is also unclear what he was trying to establish in forwarding an alternative two-sided 
approach (scientific and semantic) to prat"tya-samutp!da. What is highlighted as problematic 
in the course of ChinnÕs objections, however, is the notion of convention, along with the 
Buddhist doctrine of Two-Truths. This is critical to our purposes here, for N!g!rjunaÕs 
refutation of causation lies in understanding the emptiness of emptiness as an epistemological 
thesis rather than an ontological position. I believe GarfieldÕs proposed distinction between 
causality and conditionality to be particularly useful in this regard, as it makes clear the 
significant differences between refuting causation on grounds of scepticism from those of 
nihilism. A truly sceptical refutation would suspend altogether the ontological debate mired 
in realist and anti-realist positions.  
 
What does it mean to say causation is empty, for surely it makes more sense to 
believe that such things as causal powers exist? After all it seems to be the most obvious 
principle governing our phenomenal world. One only needs to point to the flicking of 
switches and the sprouting of seeds in our daily lives for support, which may also be 
expressed by the general formula: ÒX causes YÓ. This, however, immediately presupposes a 
number of assumptions, that: 1) X and Y occupy different time-slices in a temporal sequence; 
2) X and Y are distinct if and only if they are different in a substantial sense, which means 
they exist inherently allowing us to differentiate them. A corollary of this argues for self-
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causation (in the case of the sprouting seed) by inserting X and X
1 instead, though this would 
mean that both X and X
1 are at least similar if not identical; and 3) the intermediary causal 
link somehow relates both X and Y. It is critical to point out here the Buddhist doctrine of 
prat"tya-samutp!da does not simply refer to a phenomenology where every existent is 
inextricably connected in some cosmic causal network, but rather arising in dependence upon 
others. A great deal hinges upon the nature of this dependence, and while it is alluring to 
conceive of it as a form of causal link N!g!rjuna will argue nothing can be further from the 
truth.  
 
How is an emptiness of causation view preferable over our common sense accounts in 
explaining daily phenomena? When N!g!rjuna says causation is empty he says, inter alia, 
that it is empty of inherent existence and lacking in essence. This lacking in essence does not, 
however, entail non-existence (or nihilism), because on N!g!rjunaÕs account this would mean 
the existence of a nonexistent entity; and a nonexistent entity (through its possessing an 
essence, even if characterised negatively) cannot arise dependently. A belief in the existence 
of causal links serving as some cement-of-the-universe is prima facie appealing till we find 
that nowhere in nature do such purported causal nexuses emerge by cleaving at its joints 
(Garfield, 1994: 223). This is in fact a metaphysical lure rooted in ontology: if things do exist 
(in a substantive realist sense) then the causal relations between them must ipso facto exist. 
N!g!rjuna argues this is untenable on at least two counts: Firstly, if such entities exist 
through possessing an identifiable essence they would therefore be independent and no such 
causal relation may obtain. Secondly, as pointed out earlier, if such causal powers did exist 
we would have to posit a further relation relating the cause to its effect on pain of regress, 
else we would be committed to positing an uncaused cause in contravention of prat"tya-
samutp!da. Garfield makes this clear: 
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If one views phenomena as having and as emerging from causal powers, one 
views them as having essences and as being connected to the essences of other 
phenomena. [É] This forces one at the same time to assert the inherent 
existence of these things, in virtue of their essential identity, and to assert their 
dependence and productive character, in virtue of their causal history and 
power. But such dependence and relational character is incompatible with 
their inherent existence. (1994: 224) 
 
Garfield argues according to N!g!rjuna that: Òby showing causation to be empty, we show all 
things to be empty, even emptiness itselfÓ (1994: 238). It is here that GarfieldÕs distinction 
becomes significant in highlighting the respective connections between Òa causal-power view 
of causation [with an] essentialist view of phenomena on the one hand, and between a 
condition view of dependent arising [with a] conventional view of phenomena on the otherÓ 
(1994: 224). 
 
Having denied four views of causation N!g!rjuna positively asserts four kinds of 
conditions in MMK I: 2 Ð efficient, percept-object, immediate and dominant conditions. 
Flicking a switch to turn on a light would constitute an efficient condition, and there is 
nothing about my desire to see in an otherwise dark room that exerts an occult force directly 
responsible for the occurrence of light. It would merely be a dominant condition as the 
purpose or end for which the action is undertaken, whilst the actual occurrence of light lies in 
the emission of photons as a chain of immediate conditions. None of these conditions need 
appeal to a notion of causal power that is inherently existent, and each is just as valid in 
answering the question ÒWhy?Ó. Conditions therefore amount to useful explanans of effects 
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(explanandum), though in doing so we do not ascribe them any causal power but rather 
depend upon our explanatory interests instead. Once conditionality is understood in this 
manner, regularities instead of quasi-causal links account for the relation between certain 
event pairs over others. Garfield adds: ÒExplanation relies on regularities. Regularities are 
explained by reference to further regularities. Adding active forces or potentials adds nothing 
of explanatory utility to the pictureÓ (1994: 224). To ask how regularities are possible on 
such a view would be incoherent according to Garfield: they are what make explanation 
possible in the first place and not something in themselves that can be explained (1994: 248, 
fn. 7).  
 
This does not mean, however, that we are able to maintain a rigorous distinction 
between explanans and explanandum with the former containing potentially what the latter 
has actually:  
 
 The essence of entities 
 Is not present in the conditions, etc. É 
 If there is no essence, 
 There can be no otherness-essence. (MMK I: 3)  
 
The first two lines of the stanza support the claim made earlier. In the next two lines that 
follow, if there are no individual essences there cannot be substantial differences by means of 
which we may characterise phenomena (explanandum) independently from their conditions 
(explanans), nor can we rigorously claim the relation between conditions (explanans) and 
phenomena (explanandum) to be located in some notion of otherness-essence (Skt. 
parabh!va), as being distinct (such as the essence of a table to depend upon its parts). The 
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point is a subtle one, as given the lack of essential difference things are interdependent, yet 
due to this very interdependence there can be no otherness-essence (which is presumably the 
criterion for dependence in the first place in case of the table and its parts).  
 
Put simply, just as essences do not exist independently, otherness-essence cannot exist 
as well because if it did, its very existence would imply in turn the existence of essence, 
therefore vitiating any notion of dependence. The admission of such an otherness-essence 
relies on that other having an intrinsic connection to the phenomenon in question, a 
connection that is assumed realised in the causal efficacy of that other. Now, to dismiss 
conditions under a regularity view to be mere cosmic coincidence (see also MMK I: 12) 
would be begging the question, as the implied criterion of necessity already presupposes a 
real causal link sufficiently robust to link real phenomena. For N!g!rjuna, the absence of 
such a link is due to the absence of such phenomena in the first place.  
 
Therefore in exploiting conditionality as explanans under a regularity view we merely 
demonstrate how they answer pragmatically to our explanatory interests rather than having 
some ontological basis (or correspondence). This is the hidden relation between human praxis 
and reality that we otherwise fail to grasp in our insistence upon necessity and linearity, by 
demanding some special connection linking consequents to their proper antecedents. 
Conditionality as such is incompatible with linearity, else we would be committed to a view 
foisted by the causal realist that non-empty effects may be somehow produced ex nihilo, from 
empty conditions. Once we admit the possibility of such non-empty effects, however, they 
would in turn become non-empty conditions themselves. That being the case dependent 
origination would become impossible, because if things do possess essences they cannot then 
be dependent. This violates our common sense view because we experience these things 
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precisely as being dependent.  
 
The irony is that the causal realist in fact violates the common sense view he 
purportedly upholds by arguing for the existence of real causal links, whilst the prima facie 
counter-intuitive emptiness view of causation justifies our common sense practice within the 
pragmatic sphere of daily discourse. Garfield argues that dependent origination is a midpoint 
between the extremes of reificationism and nihilism, Òachieved by taking conventions as the 
foundation of ontology, hence rejecting the very enterprise of a philosophical search for the 
ontological foundation of conventionÓ(1994: 226). This notion of convention reinscribes the 
hidden relation between praxis and reality, such that philosophy is no longer capable of 
providing the explanatory bedrock for our beliefs and/or claims. This, however, does not 
mean we are simply replacing one form of analysis with another and, as we shall see in the 
following section, understanding the role of convention is critical to a correct appraisal of 
emptiness along with dependent origination. 
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§ Two-Truths and the Emptiness of Causation 
 
While it may seem upon first sight that in arguing for the emptiness of causation we 
merely reverse the relationship between convention and ontology, this reversal contains a 
reinscription of what we understand by convention such that it is not simply a textualist or 
anti-realist position. This section will consider the role of convention within the doctrine of 
Two-Truths to understand the emptiness of causation such that it avoids the charge of 
nihilism. This is significant, for if the philosophical enterprise consisted in the search for the 
ontological foundation of convention it would seem that this reversal installs emptiness (in a 
nihilist or anti-realist sense) instead in the form of a negative dialectic. If, however, the anti-
metaphysical thrust of the M!dhyamika dialectic is able to reject ontology without falling 
into nihilism it would have left the ontological framework altogether as an alternative middle 
path between the extremes of essentialism and nihilism. It is here that N!g!rjunaÕs doctrine of 
Two-Truths becomes critical. We shall also consider the nature of emptiness and the 
emptiness of emptiness to fully appreciate this significance of convention before addressing 
ChinnÕs objections to Garfield in the following section. 
 
N!g!rjunaÕs doctrine of Two-Truths and $%nyat! formed his two major contributions 
in the history of Buddhist philosophy. While they were radical shifts, they were not entirely 
divorced from tradition. The Two-Truths doctrine was found in embryo in the 
Kacc!y!nagotta-s%tra where a distinction was also made between n"t!rtha (clear) and 
ney!rtha (obscure) meanings. This distinction highlights the methodological issues 
concerning Buddhist hermeneutics, though what is of particular interest to us at this juncture 
is that the Buddha mentions a middle path between the extremes of essentialism and nihilism 
when asked about Ôright-viewÕ by K!cc!yana: 
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ÔEverything exists,ÕÑ this, Kaccayana, is one extreme. ÔEverything does not 
exist,ÕÑ this, Kaccayana, is the second extreme. Kaccayana, without 
approaching either extreme, the Tathagata teaches you a doctrine by the 
middle. (Kacc!y!nagotta-s%tra) 
 
We may draw from this a preliminary support Ð to a certain degree Ð for N!g!rjuna against 
the putative charge of nihilism. It is also here that N!g!rjunaÕs notion of convention as the 
middle ground between both ontological extremes becomes useful in our understanding of 
$%nyat!. McCagney (1997) claims that N!g!rjunaÕs use of $%nyat! was inspired by the 
metaphor of space in the A()as!hasrik! Praj!p!ramit! due to its fundamental indeterminacy 
(and hence its emptiness). We shall also consider some aspects of McCagneyÕs discussion on 
$%nyat! where possible for mutual illumination with Garfield. 
 
While all this seem straightforward enough, N!g!rjuna does nevertheless make a 
series of perplexing claims in the MMK. He first claims that there are two truths, and he later 
identifies them as one. He argues that the phenomenal world upon analysis is found to be 
empty, and goes on to claim that emptiness is itself empty, though it leaves the question 
begging: empty of what precisely? The claim regarding the two truths is first made explicit in 
Chapter 24 of the MMK: 
 
 The BuddhaÕs teaching of the Dharma 
 Is based on two truths: 
 A truth of worldly convention 
 And an ultimate truth. 
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Those who do not understand 
The distinction drawn between these two truths 
Do not understand 
The BuddhaÕs profound truth. (MMK XXIV: 8-9) 
 
The two truths are presented here as clearly distinct, in the form of an ultimate truth (Skt. 
param!rtha-satya) and a conventional one (Skt. sa.v+ti-satya). This distinction is later 
collapsed in MMK XXIV: 18, and N!g!rjuna is either inconsistent or remaining purposefully 
indirect here. Recalling the Kacc!y!nagotta-s%tra, where a corresponding distinction is made 
between n"t!rtha (plain and clear meaning) and ney!rtha (indirect meaning requiring further 
explanation), I argue that this bivalence attests to the up!ya (trans. skill-in-means) of the 
BuddhaÕs teaching in accordance to the aptitude of his listener. What needs to be stressed 
here is that the ultimate truth is not a form of absolutism such that it disparages and falsifies 
the conventional. In fact, the emphasis is on understanding the distinction itself and not 
simply that there are two truths that allow us to understand the teaching of the Buddha. The 
ultimate truth is certainly not transcendental in any sense, as we established in the preceding 
section that such radical difference is not possible due to parabh!va, but instead immanent 
insofar as it depends upon the conventional truth to emerge. Each is just as valid as the other, 
and if we consider the ultimate truth as being ney!rtha and the conventional as n"t!rtha, I 
argue that the BuddhaÕs ability (up!ya) to freely switch between both modes of discourse is 
possible precisely due to the indeterminacy of $%nyat!. 
 
Garfield fails to point this out, and the charge of inconsistency would certainly apply 
if we simply read N!g!rjuna at face value. In other words we would have to subscribe to a 
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hermeneutics that takes the conventional to be more than merely conventional, searching for 
some essence behind what is represented. Similarly, the Òright-viewÓ to take with regards to 
the MMK does not lie in the promulgation of an absolute truth (of emptiness), as what is 
asserted in language can be nothing more than conventional (and hence provisional) Ð even 
when it asserts the ultimate nature of things. The point is a subtle one, though it is what 
prevents us from lapsing into hermeneutical correspondence. Up!ya demonstrates therefore a 
critical awareness of the methodological problems in our very tools of analytic discourse. 
Garfield provides, however, a useful gloss on conventional truth, which may be rendered in 
Sanskrit as either sa.v+ti-satya or vyavah!ra-satya. Drawing upon Candrak$rtiÕs 
commentary, Garfield presents three distinct etymologies Ð the term sa.v+ti may mean 
transactional, which is neatly captured by vyavah!ra; it may also mean conventional in the 
everyday sense of the word, such as common sense. It may also mean nominal, or established 
by linguistic convention. There is another significant sense to sa.v+ti, which means 
concealing or occluding. Garfield claims: Òthe conventional, in occluding its conventional 
character, covers up its own emptinessÓ (1995: 297-8, fn. 109). In other words, the 
conventional truth masks the fact that it is merely conventional in the senses adumbrated 
above, and this characteristic of conventional truth is precisely what the ultimate truth 
demystifies.  
 
That being the case, in what sense is the ultimate truth considered ultimate? We turn 
here to the philosophical heart of the MMK where N!g!rjuna asserts a three-way relation 
between emptiness, dependent origination and convention: 
 
Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
That is explained to be emptiness. 
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That, being a dependent designation, 
Is itself the middle way. (MMK XXIV: 18) 
 
Here N!g!rjuna asserts the emptiness of prat"tya-samutp!da (dependent origination), such 
that emptiness and the phenomenal world are not two distinct (and indeed, diametrically 
opposing) things but different characterisations of the same thing. Whatever is dependently 
co-arisen is established by verbal convention, and as a dependent designation it is nothing 
more than the referent of a word. What we call the identity of a thing is in fact due to 
conventions of individuation, as Òan arbitrary slice of an indefinite spatiotemporal and causal 
manifoldÓ (Garfield, 1994: 229). This leads Garfield to claim: ÒTo say of a thing that its 
identity is a merely verbal fact about it is to say that it is empty. To view emptiness in this 
way is to see it neither as an entity nor as unreal Ð it is to see it as conventionally realÓ (1994: 
229). ÒEmptinessÓ is thus asserted to be a dependent designation, and its referent is itself 
dependent and nominal, which also means it is Òconventionally existent but ultimately 
emptyÓ (Garfield, 1994: 229). Therefore emptiness is itself empty. Garfield further points out 
that given the ambiguity of the pronoun ÔthatÕ (skt. De Ni) in the third line, not only are 
Òdependent arisingÓ and ÒemptinessÓ asserted to be dependent designations and thus nominal, 
but the very relation between them is asserted to be dependent and thus empty as well (1994: 
229). Convention, dependent arising and emptiness are all equally dependent upon each other 
and ipso facto all three are claimed to be empty because we do not arrive at some essence 
whatsoever. A significant point to note here is that if convention, emptiness, and dependent 
arising were ultimately empty it would not make sense strictly speaking to say that N!g!rjuna 
identifies them, as there is no such determinable basis upon which to do so. The fact that 
$%nyat! has no corresponding referent denies any such move (to identify them) in the first 
place: ÒThat nirv!&a and sa.s!ra are both $%nya does not make them the same. The term 
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Ô$%nyat!Õ has no referent or correspondent within ordinary discourse by which the two could 
be compared for samenessÓ (McCagney, 1997: 95). I therefore agree with McCagney when 
she urges: Òthe term Ô$%nyat!Õ is a caveat ÔaboutÕ the truth of sa.v+ti and has no meaning, no 
use, no function, within conventional discourse or truthÓ (1997: 96). The relation that holds is 
one of logical equivalence (in terms of mutual entailment) but not logical equality (in being 
identified). For a detailed analysis of this relationship please refer to McCagney (1997: pp. 
95-97). 
 
 With this in hand, we can return to the problem of two truths and N!g!rjunaÕs 
purported inconsistency when he later claims there is no difference between sa.s!ra and 
nirv!&a: 
 
There is not the slightest difference 
  Between cyclic existence and nirv!&a. 
  There is not the slightest difference 
  Between nirv!&a and cyclic existence. 
 
  Whatever is the limit of nirv!&a, 
  That is the limit of cyclic existence. 
  There is not even the slightest difference between them, 
  Or even the subtlest thing. (MMK XXV: 19-20) 
 
While it is the ultimate truth that there is not the slightest difference between sa.s!ra and 
nirv!&a, this does not falsify the conventional truth that teaches nirv!&a as the cessation of 
sa.s!ra and is thereby distinct from it. If that were not so, then cultivation of the Middle 
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Path would not be possible and no liberation from suffering would be achieved, thereby 
violating conventional sense. If it were maintained (in the ultimate or absolute sense), 
however, that the truth of nirv!&a is different from the truth of sa.s!ra, then a starkly dualist 
perspective emerges and the Two-Truths remain two in every sense so as to be completely 
independent of (and hence transcendent to) each other. Suffering would be unceasing and 
there would be liberation without anyone attaining it, violating both ultimate and 
conventional sense. N!g!rjuna therefore makes it clear: 
 
Without a foundation in the conventional truth, 
The significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. 
Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, 
Liberation is not achieved. (MMK XXIV: 10) 
 
As they depend upon each other in order to emerge, it follows they are both empty. 
Therefore, N!g!rjunaÕs notion of two truths is only nominal, as it must be, presented within 
the language of conventional discourse. The charge of inconsistency therefore fails.  
 
To understand how emptiness is itself empty we have to determine what kind of 
existence it pertains to in order to avoid falling into nihilism. Recalling what was mentioned 
earlier in this section about convention being the middle ground between ontological 
extremes of essentialism and nihilism, we will now consider a brief taxonomy of the types of 
existence employing this understanding of two truths just established. I argue that 
conventional existence (insofar as it is dependently originated) is the middle path between 
inherent existence and inherent non-existence. N!g!rjuna claims: 
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Something that is not dependently arisen 
Such a thing does not exist. 
Therefore a nonempty thing 
Does not exist. (MMK XXIV: 19) 
  
Here N!g!rjuna claims that everything, including emptiness, is dependently arisen and hence 
lacking inherent existence: Ònothing lacks the three coextensive properties of emptiness, 
dependent-origination, and conventional identityÓ (Garfield, 1994: 230). It also makes clear 
what type of existence N!g!rjuna has in mind when analysing phenomenal objects Ð they 
occupy a mode of conventional existence: ÒN!g!rjuna defends the conventional existence of 
phenomena, he will urge that none of them ultimately exist Ð that none of them exist 
independently of convention with identities and natures that they possess in themselvesÓ 
(Garfield, 1995: 101). Within the scope of Two-Truths we may then view phenomenal 
objects in terms of their conventional or ultimate character. The conventional character of 
conventional phenomena is to view them as having inherent existence, or indeed the corollary 
of inherent non-existence. We also ascribe categories of reality or unreality to things 
according to a binary logic (ÔisÕ or Ôis notÕ), such that we may make claims that there are 
indeed tables in this room or not. In doing so, however, we commit a descriptive fallacy, 
because to view things in this way is to see them as being more than merely conventional. If 
whatever is conventional is dependently arisen it is then also non-inherently existent, and the 
descriptive fallacy consists in assuming a priori that linguistic characterisations we make are 
conditioned by its inherent existence or inherent non-existence Ð the essence or Òtable-nessÓ 
of the thing at hand was never in question, but merely verified or refuted. The ultimate 
character of conventional phenomena is to see them as simply nothing more than being 
conventional in the ways we have noted, without falling into either error of essentialism or 
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nihilism. Garfield claims: Òthe standpoint of emptiness [as the ultimate truth] is not at odds 
with the conventional standpoint, only with a particular philosophical understanding of it Ð 
that which takes the conventional to be more than merely conventionalÓ (1994: 230). This is 
the metaphysical lure in the way we view the world which, according to Buddhist 
perspective, is a falling to attachment and hence, the cause of suffering (Skt. du'kha). 
 
To understand the emptiness of emptiness Garfield suggests we consider what it 
means to be non-empty: ÒFor a thing to be nonempty would be for it to have an essence 
discoverable upon analysis; for it to be a substance independent of its attributes, or a bearer of 
parts; for its identity to be self-determined by its essence. A nonempty entity can be fully 
characterized nonrelationallyÓ (1994: 231). Through its lack of inherent existence, it would 
seem emptiness fails on that count at least to be empty. If all phenomena were viewed to be 
empty then emptiness itself would be nonempty Ð eternal and independent, underlying the 
multitudinous appearance of conventional phenomena. The two truths would then be 
radically different at an ontological level. Instead, Garfield suggests analysing a conventional 
entity such as a table to demonstrate its emptiness, that there is no table apart from its parts, 
nor are we able to identify any such thing as the essence or Òtable-nessÓ in question. Having 
concluded the emptiness of the table due to this lack of an identifiable essence, we turn to 
that very emptiness itself Ð the putative emptiness of the table Ð only to find nothing other 
than the very tableÕs lack of inherent existence. It turns out that emptiness itself is dependent 
upon the table, and cannot be posited non-relationally in its absence. Garfield therefore 
concludes: 
 
Emptiness [as the ultimate reality] is hence not different from conventional 
reality Ð it is the fact that conventional reality is conventional. Therefore it 
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must be dependently arisen, since it depends upon the existence of empty 
phenomena. Hence emptiness is itself empty. (1994: 232) 
 
In this way the emptiness of emptiness is critical to the deep identity of the two truths, and 
the difference between the conventional and the ultimate lies in the difference between how 
phenomena are perceived Ð which is an epistemological rather than ontological difference. 
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§ The Charge of Anti-Realism 
 
We have established in the preceding section the critical role of convention within the 
doctrine of Two-Truths and how it relates to the emptiness of emptiness as an 
epistemological rather than an ontological position. We will consider in this section some of 
ChinnÕs objections to Garfield, specifically the controversy surrounding MMK I: 10 and the 
charge of anti-realism against Garfield. While there are numerous inconsistencies in ChinnÕs 
objections such that they do not constitute in my view a real challenge to Garfield, they 
nevertheless demonstrate for our purposes a number of things which we are trying to 
establish in this chapter: 1) GarfieldÕs proposed distinction between conditionality and 
causality allows for a more rigorous analysis of prat"tya-samutp!da, without confusing 
dependent-arising and causation; 2) the significance of convention becomes clearer as we 
consider some of the points Chinn raises, and I believe the confusion in his account is due to 
a fundamental failure to understand what Garfield means by convention; and 3) ChinnÕs 
misreading of N!g!rjuna is symptomatic of a reificationist tendency that might lead to 
emptiness itself becoming a view.  
 
Chinn objects to GarfieldÕs account of prat"tya-samutp!da on the basis that emptiness 
of causation entails anti-realism by the latterÕs position, and emptiness as a view itself is 
alleged to be untenable by Chinn due to the paradox of self-refutation. This objection is 
premised upon ChinnÕs belief that the true doctrine referred to in the final verse of the MMK 
is not $%nyat! but prat"tya-samutp!da instead Ð a specious distinction in my view Ð such that 
the truth of dependent-arising is capable of silencing all philosophical speculation (2001: 54). 
ChinnÕs strategy therefore is to shoe-horn Garfield into an anti-realist position by arguing that 
N!g!rjuna in MMK I was committed to demonstrating the futility of speculation regarding 
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the true nature of causation, such that we should renounce any theories of causation 
whatsoever (2001: 63). Garfield, however, warns against adopting such anti-realist views in a 
later paper, which is given here: 
 
I will not use the pejorative term Ôantirealist,Õ for, in the context of Madhyamaka, that 
begs important questions both about the appropriate sense of ÔrealityÕ and about what 
kinds of phenomena we might identify about which to be realists. Moreover, for a 
pr!sa"gika-M!dhyamika like N!g!rjuna, there is an additional problem: how do we 
identify the common object necessary to generate a realist/antirealist debate? (2001: 
521) 
 
ChinnÕs solution to this was to deflect the discussion of MMK I to that of dharma-like 
entities, and whilst he mentions at length ÒrealÓ objects and phenomena it is unclear what 
status he accords to them within the structure of Two-Truths. In asking questions such as 
ÒWhat is the real meaning of one thing causing another?Ó, the question that goes begging is 
what should count as real in the first place, and that is necessarily predetermined by oneÕs 
own philosophical orientation. Notably, ChinnÕs analysis completely avoids any discussion of 
the Two-Truths doctrine, which would otherwise present a serious impediment to him 
according categories of reality/unreality within a conventional/ultimate framework. 
 
The first part of ChinnÕs paper focuses upon the controversy found in MMK I: 10, 
reworking GarfieldÕs translation of that verse through a series of premises to demonstrate 
how the conclusion (viz., that causation is empty) does not follow, favouring KalupahanaÕs 
version instead and finally arguing (rather inconsistently, in my view) that MMK I was really 
talking about dharmas rather than phenomenal objects. The second part focuses more on 
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language and how we might make sense of the term ÒcausationÓ along with Òcause and 
effectÓ through a quasi-Wittgensteinian analysis, proposing an alternative two-sided principle 
of prat"tya-samutp!da that does not seriously detract from (nor indeed vitiate) GarfieldÕs 
account which he took such meticulous pains to controvert.  
 
If I claim that ChinnÕs misreading is symptomatic of a reificationist tendency, this is 
betrayed by his own perplexing anxiety when he repeatedly asks why is it not legitimate to 
talk about causation (see Chinn, 2001: pp. 56, 59, 60, 66) without offering any answer to his 
own rhetorical questions. Ironically, this tendency finds expression in his disingenuous 
attempt at distancing himself from such a tradition: 
 
Philosophers, of course, have no interest in such mundane ÒfactualÓ problems 
as the particular cause of someoneÕs mental condition. Their concern is with 
serious questions about the foundations of things, believing that we cannot 
take even the most familiar of things for granted or at their face value. In this 
case, they would be concerned with the very idea of causation or cause and 
effect, with the general question of Òwhat makes anything the cause of 
something.Ó They would worry about the possibility that there is really no 
such thing as a cause-and-effect relationship, no objective fact of the matter 
behind our causal discourse. (2001: 64) 
 
ChinnÕs objection to GarfieldÕs regularity theory of prat"tya-samutp!da really lies in his 
belief that Òcausation, in short, cannot just mean regularity, the constant connection or 
succession of eventsÓ (2001: 56); it is the very idea and need for grounding that drives him to 
postulate erroneously that what is at stake in MMK I are not phenomenal objects but 
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dharmas; the latter were considered ultimately real in an earlier (Abhidharma) phase of 
Buddhist philosophy that constitutes our experiential world (2001: 62). This claim is, 
however, untenable, and will be discussed along with others below. Also, I object to ChinnÕs 
usage of the term ÒcausationÓ when discussing prat"tya-samutp!da Ð this leads to undue 
confusion because the former in daily discourse is loaded with metaphysical assumptions and 
as such I will only consider its usage valid within the realm of conventional truth. To employ 
the two terms synonymously is to conflate two mutually exclusive meanings without due 
justification. Furthermore, as noted above, N!g!rjuna explicitly talks about conditions with 
regard to prat"tya-samutp!da in MMK I rather than causation per se. The criterion of 
necessity that we demand of causality does not apply to dependent arising, nor to 
conditionality for that matter. 
 
Given that the point of controversy surrounds verse MMK I: 10, the respective 
translations of this verse by Garfield and Kalupahana are presented below: 
 
If things did not exist  
Without essence,  
The phrase, ÒWhen this exists so this will be,Ó  
Would not be acceptable (Garfield, 1995: 4) 
 
Since the existence of existents devoid of self-nature is not evident, the 
statement: ÒWhen that exists, this comes to be,Ó will not be appropriate. 
(Kalupahana, 1986: 113) 
 
For sake of brevity, the formula ÒWhen this exists so this will beÓ will be read as expressing 
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the truth of dependent arising or prat"tya-samutp!da. GarfieldÕs translation states that if 
things do exist with essence then prat"tya-samutp!da is not acceptable. This criticism from 
the perspective of ultimate truth is ascribed to N!g!rjuna as an attack on the causal realist that 
continues to the end of the chapter. KalupahanaÕs translation states, however, that because 
things without self-nature (or essence) are not empirically given in experience therefore 
prat"tya-samutp!da is not acceptable; or conversely, that prat"tya-samutp!da is acceptable 
only because things do appear to have essence. This is diametrically opposed to GarfieldÕs 
translation, and as noted by Chinn sounds more like a causal realistÕs objection to regularity 
theory from verses 11 to 13, concluding with verse 14 that neither causal realist nor regularity 
approaches are satisfactory (2001: 60, 61). It is of interest to note that though this is the 
ostensible strategy adopted by Chinn to reject Garfield, he later abandons this approach to 
postulate a different reading. According to Chinn, this would amount to a rather 
inconsequential argument in the first chapter of the MMK; and he prefers KalupahanaÕs 
translation as the expression, Ònot evidentÓ (na vidyate), is taken to mean, Ònot found in our 
experienceÓ (Chinn, 2001: 61).  
 
The general line of argument Chinn takes is deeply convoluted. He first rejects 
GarfieldÕs translation of verse 10 with a series of premises and appeals to Kalupahana, 
bemoaning the weak conclusion to the chapter entailed by the purported causal realist 
objection Ð even though Kalupahana himself agrees that the verse constitutes a Nagarjuna-
like criticism (1986: 114). Chinn then rehabilitates the latterÕs translation to refer to dharmas 
(theoretical, metaphysical entities) even though his initial appeal is premised upon 
KalupahanaÕs rendering of that verse as referring precisely to phenomenal objects. 
Inconsistency notwithstanding, it is not clear to me precisely what is ChinnÕs objection to 
Garfield in the first place.  
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I will now return to ChinnÕs initial rejection of GarfieldÕs translation by adumbrating 
below the premises he develops from verse 10: 
 
a) Causation exists only because the things in the phenomenal world lack an 
essence (or are not independent substances). (2001: 57) 
b) Causation exists only because phenomenal things (the things we 
experience) exist only by convention and are not things in themselves. (2001: 
59) 
 
Recalling the earlier caveat regarding the term ÔcausationÕ it is should be pointed out that 
Chinn does not refer to dependent arising nor prat"tya-samutp!da in his premises, and whilst 
both translations of verse 10 concern themselves with the acceptability or appropriateness of 
the formula asserting the truth of dependent arising, Chinn prefers to talk about whether 
causation exists or not. This is not mere pedantic nitpicking, but rather, it also reflects his 
philosophical orientation. Premise a) forms the rejoinder to the causal realist, denying what 
he is insisting upon, viz., that causation is a relationship between independent substances with 
essential natures (Chinn, 2001: 57). Chinn charges that premise a) is false and contrary to 
what N!g!rjuna would hold: ÒIn fact, he would hold, with the causal realist, the exact 
opposite. To see the things in the phenomenal world as causally dependent or dependently 
arising is to see them as things with an essenceÓ (2001: 57). This is where the conflation 
becomes misleading, because on the level of conventional truth this is indeed the case in our 
daily experience of the world. To be causally dependent in the sense significant for the causal 
realist is to establish relations between things that exist in an inherently existent manner, 
though dependent arising pertains to non-inherent existence. To claim that N!g!rjuna agrees 
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with the causal realist is unjustified even if he makes the point in a conventional sense. 
Furthermore, Chinn quotes Garfield out of context in order to support his argument: ÒWe 
typically perceive and conceive of external phenomena, ourselves, causal powers, moral 
truths, and so forth as independently existing, intrinsically identifiable and substantialÓ 
(Garfield qtd. in Chinn, 2001: 58). Chinn pointedly excludes what Garfield says immediately 
after this: ÒBut though this is, in one sense, the conventional character of conventional 
phenomena Ð the manner in which they are ordinarily experienced Ð to see them in this way 
is precisely not to see them as conventionalÓ (Garfield, 1994: 233). In setting up premise a) 
and arguing contrary to it with regards to causation Chinn has already taken the conventional 
to be more than merely conventional, while GarfieldÕs translation talks about the ultimate 
character of conventional phenomena. 
 
The development of premise b) follows upon a fundamental misreading of 
convention: Òif nothing in the phenomenal world inherently exists, if there are no things in 
themselves, this must mean that everything exists as a matter of conventionÓ (Chinn, 2001: 
58). What Chinn intends by his emphasis is to say that everything exists because of 
convention, so that he can go on to claim vis--vis Garfield: Ò[O]utside our conceptual and 
linguistic framework, these things are nothing. They simply do not existÓ (2001: 58). Besides 
the question begging as to how the causal realist might possibly establish the things-in-
themselves outside of a conceptual and linguistic framework, to say they simply do not exist 
also means they are inherently non-existent, whereas conventional existence refers to non-
inherent existence. It would be more correct to say that everything exists in a conventional 
manner; the shift from noun to adjective is significant here, as the former establishes 
convention as the absolute ground for existence (hence entailing anti-realism) while the latter 
suspends existence by referring to it in a provisional sense. 
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In the second part of his paper Chinn offers a two-sided principle to prat"tya-
samutp!da: a scientific and regulative principle along with what he calls a semantic principle. 
The former states that Òprat"tyasamutp!da can be taken, on the simplest, most rudimentary 
level, to refer to this universally accepted practice and belief that everything has a cause, that 
every phenomenon is dependently arisenÓ (Chinn, 2001: 64). This affords us no new insight 
whatsoever, nor is it clear how ChinnÕs proposed taxonomy challenges GarfieldÕs distinction 
between causality and conditionality in any way. The semantic principle is basically Òthe 
doctrine of the mutual dependency of concepts and beliefs in both the systematic and 
historically contingent senseÓ, which argues that the very meaning of the term ÒcausationÓ is 
Òconstituted by its place in a web of other concepts and beliefsÓ (Chinn, 2001: 65). This is 
opposed to what Chinn calls a denotative or essentialist theory of meaning such that Òwe 
want to know the essential nature (svabh!va) of causation, the ÔthingÕ denoted by that termÓ 
(2001: 66). While the semantic principle offers greater promise, Chinn fails to address the 
concept of convention and Two-Truths in relation to language. 
 
Finally, Chinn commits a fatal error in his reading of Garfield and MMK XXIV: 18, 
when he alleges of Garfield that: ÒHe takes the statement in 24: 18, Ôthat [the dependent 
arising], being a dependent designation is itself the middle way,Õ to mean, Ôexistence depends 
on designationÕ or verbal conventionÓ (2001: 68). Recalling what was established earlier 
regarding MMK XXIV: 18, the second ÒthatÓ in question refers to emptiness rather 
dependent arising, which Chinn has falsely assumed here. To foist the anti-realist charge 
upon Garfield on basis of this misreading that Òexistence depends on designationÓ 
oversimplifies what Garfield was trying to establish regarding convention in the broadest 
sense of the word. Our common sense views the world as being one in which everything is 
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inextricably connected by force of custom. This view of the world is possible only if the 
relations are empty in the first place, and the prima facie contradiction reinscribes whatever 
we understand about convention and language such that there is no philosophically neutral 
register for our daily discourse. However, I will point out here that an alternative is afforded 
by taking on the notion of convention within the structure of Two-Truths, which Garfield 
believes leads to the Òdemystification of this apparently mystical conclusionÓ (Garfield, 
1994: 229). 
 
 ! 127 
§ Language and the Universal Problematic 
 
This chapter on Derrida will consider how he engages with the problem of the Other 
through his linguistic interventions within philosophical discourse. To do so, I will first locate 
a key moment in which Derrida asserts the intrusion of the Other, manifesting itself as the 
absent centre of any structural ensemble. This moment is where Derrida claims that language 
invaded the universal problematic. Now, to the extent that all human discourses are 
constituted by language this has serious implications indeed with regard to its universal 
status40. It also means that the intended object of any discourse is never fully present as a 
result of this movement of signification, which Derrida names diffrance. Of course, this 
affects DerridaÕs own deconstructivist discourse as well, which in turn necessitates a 
concatenation of impossible names supplementing each other without saturating the field. As 
I have argued earlier, DerridaÕs refusal to identify with his discourse (and in particular 
diffrance) is the result of a keen methodological awareness. I will develop a narrative in this 
chapter tracing the conceptual development of this key moment as it unfolds throughout his 
work. It has been argued by many scholars (including Magliola and Loy, whom we shall 
consider next in Chapter Six) that Derrida was reacting against the principle of identity. Now, 
this may not be entirely wrong, but one could just as easily argue that Derrida was celebrating 
the alterity of the Other. Or perhaps that by taking on the traditional metaphysical concepts 
he is thus acknowledging his intellectual debts. My point is that, as a heterological discourse 
in itself, DerridaÕs writings do not easily lend themselves to systematisation. In fact, this has 
been roundly criticised by others as exhibiting an obscurantist streak. This may not be 
entirely unfounded, though it has to be placed in its proper context: this criticism is itself 
                                                
40
 This also recalls my initial characterisation of DerridaÕs work as a form of linguistic quantum mechanics, 
precisely because of its devastating universal scope. 
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premised upon a pair of conceptual opposites, see-sawing between the lucid and the ludic. As 
a result, the narrative I am after is necessarily bricoleur and contingent, ranging across 
several texts (whilst making detours around some and avoiding yet others). This is 
unavoidable, though in doing so I hope to restate the problematic in a much simpler manner: 
 
[I]t was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center 
could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no 
natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in 
which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was the 
moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, 
in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse Ð provided 
we can agree on this word Ð that is to say, a system in which the central 
signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present 
outside a system of differences. (Derrida, 1978: 353-4, emphasis mine) 
 
What does Derrida mean by claiming that language invaded the universal 
problematic? What precisely is this problematic to begin with, and in what way is it 
universal? I believe this passage contains, in embryo, the general orientation of DerridaÕs 
oeuvre, and is therefore worth attending to in articulating the nature of this universal 
problematic. Firstly, Derrida claims that the centre cannot be thought of as a Òpresent-beingÓ, 
this compound word highlighting both the (being) presence and (being) present on the basis 
of Es gibt. Secondly, this centre has no natural site, as i) it is always supplemented by an 
infinite number of sign-substitutions; and ii) it has no resting place where it may dwell in situ. 
The former accounts for the charade of impossible names that Derrida is so fond of Ð they are 
impossible precisely because they can never attain the identity to which they aspire; while the 
 ! 129 
latter emphasises the manner in which we may inhabit these structural ensembles, though 
significantly, we do not dwell. Derrida writes: ÒI therefore admit to a purity which is not very 
pure. Anything but purism. It is, at least, the only impure ÔpurityÕ for which I dare confess a 
tasteÓ (1998: 47). There is, according to Derrida, a logic of contamination that is always at 
work. These names are impossible as a result of a fundamental incommensurability between 
name and referent. Their identity is always defined only in relation to others, whence the 
impure purity. There is, therefore, no natural residence or address in which a concept may be 
fixed in its essential identity without this necessary reference to the other. 
 
The centre is also the mid-point equidistant from every point on the circumference, 
and as we have argued thus far, the middle is not a position and cannot be made into one. The 
mistake we make is to treat it as if it were a fixed point or an essence without due reference to 
the relata it distributes or gathers. To do so would be to treat the centre as non-empty, as a 
present-being that occupies a determinable locus or position: ÒThe concept of centered 
structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play constituted on 
the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the 
reach of playÓ (Derrida, 1978: 352). What does Derrida mean then, when he claims in the 
absence of this ground or centre that everything became discourse (L. discursus, running 
back and forth)? The absence of a transcendental signified obviates the ontological premise 
upon which the notion of play is traditionally predicated. It is not so much the ontological 
ground that precedes play, but rather the effects of play (within a system of differences) that 
stages the performativity of language and its fabulous copula, giving rise to the illusion of 
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Being41: ÒBeing must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of 
play and not the other way aroundÓ (Derrida, 1978: 369). Gadamer remarks: Òthe movement 
backward and forward is obviously so central to the definition of play that it makes no 
difference who or what performs this movementÓ (1989: 103). The implication of this along 
with DerridaÕs assertion that everything is discourse means that ÒweÓ are, in spite of 
ourselves, effects of play where Òall playing is a being-playedÓ, such that Òthe game masters 
the playerÓ (Gadamer, 1989: 106)42. This is, in every sense, ground-breaking. Not because of 
its novelty, but because it breaks open the question of Being as the universal problematic that 
was hitherto capable of underwriting the systematic play of differences. To which Gadamer 
adds, Òdiscourse that is intended to reveal something requires that that thing be broken open 
by the questionÓ (1989: 363). 
 
What does language have to do with this then? Derrida would claim that: ÒHowever 
the topic is considered, the problem of language has never been simply one problem among 
othersÓ (1997: 6). Language constructs (rather than reflects) the world for us, determining 
how we orient ourselves in our daily experiences. It is also the medium constituting all 
human discourses, and, ipso facto, the medium of the hermeneutic experience Ð hence its 
status as a universal problematic: ÒThe sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing 
itself, the present thing, ÔthingÕ here standing equally for meaning or referent. The sign 
represents the present in its absence [...] when the present cannot be presented, we signify, we 
go through the detour of the signÓ (Derrida, 1991a: 61). This does not mean, however, that 
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 This echoes GarfieldÕs rejection of the ontological extremes in establishing a middle position: ÒThat midpoint 
is achieved by taking conventions as the foundation of ontology, hence rejecting the very enterprise of a 
philosophical search for the ontological foundation of conventionÓ (1994: 226). However, it has to be pointed 
out that GarfieldÕs (along with N!g!rjunaÕs) deployment of the term ÒconventionÓ is more subtle than the 
everyday notion of consensus and agreement within a linguistic community. Convention or vyavah!ra-satya 
(trans. conventional truth) has to take into account the economic relations (in a Derridean sense) determining the 
state of play within a structural ensemble. 
42
 This is certainly pertinent when Derrida extends this to the question of personal identity and language in 
Monolingualism of the Other.. 
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everything can or should be reduced to structural linguistics, to which the charge of 
textualism would certainly be valid. Derrida makes this clear: ÒTo deconstruct was also a 
structuralist gesture or in any case a gesture that assumed a certain need for the structuralist 
problematic. But it was also an antistructuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this 
ambiguity. Structures were to be undone, decomposed, desedimented [...]Ó (1991b: 272). The 
discursive trajectory of this desedimentation aims at unsettling the founding metaphors that 
philosophy (as a discourse) has otherwise taken for granted, and is thus diametrically 
opposed to philosophical reductivism in seeking to establish an entitative identity: 
 
All sentences of the type Ôdeconstruction is XÕ or Ôdeconstruction is not XÕ a 
priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false. As you know, 
one of the principal things at stake in what is called in my texts 
ÔdeconstructionÕ is precisely the delimiting of ontology and above all of the 
third person present indicative: S is P. (Derrida, 1991b: 275) 
 
In claiming that everything became discourse, Derrida is not naively postulating that the 
world is text43. Rather, in working through the metaphors that constitute philosophical 
discourse Derrida calls the distinction (between world and text, literature and philosophy) 
into question. If reductivism is the metaphor for S is P, then metaphor itself is a metaphor (or 
name) for this fundamental lack of identity, which nonetheless invokes and is in turn 
dependent upon, the principle of identity itself. This dependency (or parasitism) is a key 
feature of all human discourses, to the extent that we never arrive at the intended object of 
oneÕs discourse. Precisely because it is constituted by language, standing in place of (and for) 
                                                
43
 Likewise, and perhaps more significantly, Derrida is not saying that the world is not text. Both assertions 
remain, for him, unsatisfactory within the purview of binary logic. In fact, I find the spirit in which this assertion 
is made to be not entirely dissimilar from that in the Kacc!y!nagotta-s%tra. 
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the thing itself. This also means that: ÒA precise and exact language should be absolutely 
univocal and literal [propre]: non-metaphorical. The language is written and pro-regresses, to 
the extent that it masters or effaces the figure in itselfÓ (Derrida, 1997: 271). This non-
metaphorical language is what passes off as ordinary language, as the language of 
philosophical discourse in an ontologically neutral register. This argument is specious, and if 
we were to follow it, au pied de la lettre, philosophers would be obliged to barter quid pro 
quo at the market place with as many words as there are things (or concepts), each with its 
proper name Ð defeating the very purpose of language in the first place. To which Literature 
has an elegant riposte: quid multa? Gadamer argues, however, that: ÒThe conceptual world in 
which philosophizing develops has already captivated us in the same way that the language in 
which we live conditions us. If thought is to be conscientious, it must become aware of these 
anterior influencesÓ (1989: xxv).  
 
The subtle difference between Gadamer and Derrida here is that, while the former 
rightly urges the vigilance of thought towards the effects of its conditioning, the latter would 
also argue that this self-reflexivity of consciousness is never complete, by coinciding with 
itself (thus becoming self-identical): ÒThe supplement is always unfolding, but it can never 
attain the status of a complement. The field is never saturatedÓ (Derrida, 1974: 18, emphasis 
mine).  DerridaÕs claim that everything is discourse clearly extends to his own 
deconstructivist discourse, Òfor [the] incapability to sustain on oneÕs own and to the limit the 
coherence of oneÕs own discourse, for being produced as truth at the moment when the value 
of truth is shattered, for escaping the internal contradictions of skepticism, etc.Ó (1997: 162, 
emphasis mine). GadamerÕs caveat above is insightful, though it does not, however, preempt 
nor absolve us from the very conditioning effects of our (arguably discursive or dependent) 
existence, which finds eloquent expression in Derrida: Òwherever we are: in a text where we 
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already believe ourselves to beÓ (1997: 162). Quite simply, we are unable to think outside of 
language, even if it furnishes us with all the very tools to speculate upon the (im)possibility 
of such a departure44. 
 
Derrida forces us to rethink what we understand by metaphor and language, along 
with its role in determining the character of our thoughts and the inability of the philosophical 
discourse to produce and sustain its transcendental signified (as truth). A possible criticism 
here is that Derrida has, in the process, elevated metaphor to the very status it contests, 
thereby supplanting metaphysics with metaphor. In fact, Derrida is acutely aware of this 
hazard, and demonstrates his theoretical acumen by pointing out that, Òwe can pronounce not 
a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and 
the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contestÓ (Derrida, 1978: 354). Two 
issues need to be highlighted here: Firstly, DerridaÕs admission of fallibility does not 
necessarily constitute an error in itself, nor is it simply a form of intellectual disclaimer. In 
fact, this is very much taken for granted by some philosophers who are otherwise blind to this 
process of re-appropriation on part of the logos. Secondly, the model of supplementarity 
forwarded by Derrida not only takes into account his own critical intervention and its 
insinuation into logocentric discourse, but also necessitates the charade of impossible names 
to avoid any particular metaphor/trope from becoming instituted as the governing one 
capable of saturating the field. I argue that the inner logic of DerridaÕs discourse demands 
this unceasing hermeneutical vigilance, ranging from one trope (or name) to another. In 
characterising this vigilance as unceasing rather than eternal I am also stressing the 
dynamism of this on-going struggle or engagement demanded as our response. What is 
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 One of MagliolaÕs criticisms of Derrida is that he remains mired in textual play and is therefore in need of 
Buddhist healing, though I fail to see how or from what privileged extra-linguistic position is this utterance 
made possible. 
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eternal for me remains fixed or given, reified through the passage of time and answers to no 
one, for the simple reason it cannot be questioned. 
 
This repetition is played out at the level of his discourse, though what repeats is the 
same but not identical45. Rather than dismissing such repetition as so much philosophical 
verbiage, it is perhaps more likely the case that a singular lack of identity leads to the ensuing 
performance of this interminable hermeneutical questioning at the level of its discourse, as 
this notion of identity is always inscribed within a space of differentiality that cannot be 
homogenised. These names Ð aporia, babel, diffrance, economy, kh/ra, pharmakon Ð are 
impossible, because, according to Derrida: ÒA name is a proper name when it has only one 
sense. Or rather, it is only in this case that it is properly a name. To be univocal is the 
essence, or rather the telos, of languageÓ (Derrida, 1974: 48). It is for this reason Derrida 
insists that, Ò[f]or us diffrance remains a metaphysical name, and all the names that it 
receives in our language are still, as names, metaphysicalÓ (1991a: 75). These names 
therefore have to be deployed in a strategic manner Ð in a continual engagement that 
nevertheless acknowledges their contingency as well Ð without reifying them in the process. 
Note I have referred to them as names or metaphors rather than concepts, though Gasch 
would argue (in what amounts to the same thing) that: 
 
Philosophical concepts would be entirely homogeneous if they possessed a 
nucleus of meaning that they owed exclusively to themselves Ð if they were, in 
other words, conceptual atoms. Yet since concepts are produced within a 
discursive network of differences, they not only are what they are by virtue of 
other concepts, but they also, in a fundamental way, inscribe that Otherness 
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 The same repetition is also found in N!g!rjunaÕs writing, which has led Sprung to omit, on this basis, certain 
chapters of the MMK in his translation. 
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within themselves. (Gasch, 1986: 128)  
 
If so, then Derrida has managed to split the conceptual atom in its ideal unity, by 
demonstrating the disjunction between name and referent. These names will continue to 
haunt his discourse, even though I would also agree that notions of spectrality are somewhat 
de trop. This is not intended as an indictment of DerridaÕs writing. In fact, N!g!rjuna 
regularly refers to apparitions and conjurers as a leitmotif in the MMK. What is unfortunate, 
however, is when the disturbance heralded by the revenant becomes a distraction in itself. 
While this might attest to its metaphorical fecundity (much like the term deconstruction 
itself), the result is that Deconstruction is everywhere and nowhere, from fashion to 
architecture to demolition companies from Sussex: ÒDeconstruction; Ôthe careful, controlled, 
removal or isolation of specific elements forming part of, or contained within, an existing 
structureÕÓ (Protech-Deconstruction Specialists). This definition is not necessarily wrong, but 
it is far from being correct. The point I am making is, more than any other concept, 
deconstruction has transgressed the usual genres of discourses into the collective 
consciousness in an unheralded manner. If it is the name for a universal problem, it has also 
become a ÒbrandÓ with universal appeal (through its application). Like quantum mechanics, 
the problem of language is never one among others. 
 
The shift to names or metaphors highlight the fissure within the purported unity of 
concepts in their lack of identity, leading Gasch to argue that Deconstruction Òborrows its 
notions, names or ÔconceptsÕ from philosophy in order to name what is unnamable within its 
closure [É] the borrowed concepts not only designate something entirely different from what 
they referred to before but also suffer a mutation of meaningÓ (1986: 167). As I have 
demonstrated above, deconstruction itself suffers a mutation of meaning through this process 
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of borrowing. The difference between a critical and a casual form of borrowing lies in 
explicitly acknowledging oneÕs debts, which deconstruction does. The former is called 
citation; the latter, plagiarism. This form of borrowing is economic, for it situates the 
otherwise utopian and atopic concepts within a discursive framework Òthat compounds with 
the forces that try to annul it while simultaneously unhinging themÓ (Gasch, 1986: 168-69). 
Derrida is not deluded by the fact that Òmetaphor remains in all its essential features a 
classical element of philosophy, a metaphysical conceptÓ (1974: 18). Far from being an 
instance of theoretical ineptitude, Derrida would argue this metaphorical supplementarity 
means that: Òconcept is a metaphor, foundation is a metaphor, theory is a metaphor; and there 
is not meta-metaphor for themÓ (1974: 23). In fact, any notion of a Òmeta-Ó position itself 
remains a metaphor. There is no absolute point of departure, and for good reason46. Derrida 
claims that these metaphorics Òcan only be perceived around a blind spot or a deaf pointÓ 
(1974: 28). The myth of a clear and transparent reason can only perpetuate its own discourse 
by trying to catch its shadow in a specular desire of self-invagination, turning itself inside 
out, even though Òthe outside belongs to the categories of the insideÓ (Gasch, 1986: 169)47. 
 
It is for this reason Derrida asserts: ÒI do not teach truth as such; I do not transform 
myself into a diaphanous mouthpiece of eternal pedagogyÓ (1988b: 4). This also explains in 
part DerridaÕs penchant for maddening chiasmic inversions such as: Òphilosophy, as a theory 
                                                
46
 I will recall here briefly GarfieldÕs regulative theory of dependent origination and how, while regularities 
allows for explanation, they are not themselves explainable. The optical metaphor (where to see is also to 
understand) Òwhich opens up under the sun every theoretical point of viewÓ (Derrida, 1974: 28) illustrates this 
point perfectly: the eye sees not itself. There is no vantage point from a position of absolute exteriority that 
affords panoptic vision over the field under consideration, and even if such a position were indeed possible, it 
would be blind to what allows it to see. 
47
 N!g!rjuna makes a similar point: 
 
That very seeing does not see 
Itself at all. 
How can something that cannot see itself 
See another? (MMK III:2). 
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of metaphor, will first have been a metaphor of theoryÓ (1974: 56). These chiasmic utterances 
are maddening, because they pivot around a fundamental blind spot of reason. Before we 
dismiss this intellectual posturing as being facile or disingenuous we shall have recourse to 
Gadamer: ÒAll questioning and desire to know presuppose a knowledge that one does not 
know; so much so, indeed, that a particular lack of knowledge leads to a particular questionÓ 
(1989: 366, emphasis mine). We know, only because we do not know; this is the enabling 
constraint of thought, where the conditions of possibility also become its conditions of 
impossibility: 
 
Yet we should not say that Reason is powerless to think this; it is constituted 
by that lack of power. It is the principle of identity. It is the thought of the self-
identity of the natural being. It cannot even determine the supplement as its 
other, as the irrational and non-natural, for the supplement comes naturally to 
put itself in NatureÕs place. (Derrida, 1997: 149) 
 
By claiming that everything became discourse in the absence of a transcendental signified 
Derrida removes the ontological ground for play within structural ensembles. This is similar 
to rejecting the philosophical search for the ontological foundation of convention in 
GarfieldÕs reading of N!g!rjuna. In doing so, Derrida also opens up philosophy as a discourse 
to its Other (in this case Literature), and argues how the notion of an ordinary language 
masquerades its fundamental lack of identity by standing in place for something else. What 
Derrida calls metaphor names this fundamental lack, which is in turn supplemented by a 
charade of impossible names in order to be conceptually consistent, as Òan identity is never 
given, received, or attained; only the interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of 
identification enduresÓ(Derrida, 1998: 28, emphasis mine). In doing so, Gasch argues: 
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ÒDeconstruction does not merely destroy metaphysical concepts; it shows how these concepts 
and themes draw their possibility from that which ultimately makes them impossibleÓ 
(Gasch, 1986: 175). Language (and specifically writing) inscribes the structural and 
economic relations to an Other constitutive of self-identity and essence. In the following 
section we will consider the effects of such inscription and argue how this notion of alterity 
cannot be absolute. Hence, while Derrida ranges through the various tropes or metaphors that 
constitute philosophical discourse, they necessarily take the form of detours as the concept 
under consideration is never fully present in a decisive manner: 
 
Our question is still identity. What is identity, this concept of which the 
transparent identity to itself is always dogmatically presupposed by so many 
debates on monoculturalism or multiculturalism, nationality, citizenship, and, 
in general, belonging? (Derrida, 1998b: 14, emphasis mine)  
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§ The (M)other of Heterological Discourse 
 
The previous section established the universal problematic posed by language, with 
the result that everything became discourse. What Derrida calls metaphor names a 
fundamental lack in the principle of identity, and I have argued that the inner logic of his 
heterological discourse necessitates no single name is capable of saturating the field. This 
section will consider the orientation towards the Other within a heterological discourse. This 
orientation is not simply moving towards (i.e., in terms of linear progression), but also 
coming from, the Other. An exemplary instance of this ambivalent, Òpro-regressingÓ 
orientation towards the Other is found at the moment of asserting oneÕs self-identity. It 
should be noted that when Derrida talks about identity, he does not only refer to self-identity, 
but also a process of identification48. These assertions can only take place within language, 
though the articulation of oneÕs self-possession results in dispossession by language, leading 
Derrida to claim: ÒWe are dispossessed of the longed-for presence in the gesture of language 
                                                
48
 From a M!dhyamika perspective, this reificationist tendency manifests itself through distinctions of Òis and is 
notÓ in language, leading to either false views of eternalism or nihilism respectively.The M!dhyamika adopts a 
certain attitude towards language, though I am hesitant to call it a Òphilosophy of languageÓ as such. 
N!g!rjunaÕs MMK may not explicitly address the problem of language, though it does deploy the catu(ko)i as 
the Four-Cornered Negation to negate and exhaust all logical possibilities of the copula to be. Language, for the 
M!dhyamika, fall within the spectrum of conventional truth (within the structure of Two-truths). This also 
means that it has only provisional status. N!g!rjuna is deeply aware, however, of the reificationist tendency that 
language supports in its bivalence, and is very specific about this:  
 
To say Òit isÓ is to grasp for permanence. 
To say Òit is notÓ is to adopt the view of nihilism. 
Therefore a wise person 
Does not say ÒexistsÓ or Òdoes not exist.Ó (MMK XV: 10) 
 
And, 
 
What language expresses is nonexistent. 
The sphere of thought is nonexistent. 
Unrisen and unceased, like nirv!(a 
Is the nature of things. (MMK XVIII: 7) 
 
I will not here speculate why N!g!rjuna does not present an explicit critique (or philosophy) of language in the 
MMK. See (Garfield, 1995: 280-82) for a discussion regarding ostensive language and its role within Two-
truths. 
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by which we attempt to seize itÓ (1997: 141). This maddening logic of dispossession raises a 
complex of questions: ÒBut who exactly possesses it? And whom does it possess? Is language 
in possession, ever a possessing or possessed possession? Possessed or possessing in 
exclusive possession, like a piece of personal property?Ó (Derrida, 1998b: 17). I will attend to 
this shortly, and the central paradox I hope to address here is this: the language one hears 
oneself speak is at once the most intimate, and intimidated, by the other. Derrida considers 
the possibility of such a private language, as belonging exclusively to oneself, and to which 
oneÕs unique identity belongs Ð this he calls monolingualism: ÒI am monolingual. My 
monolingualism dwells, and I call it my dwelling; it feels like one to me, and I remain in it 
and inhabit it. It inhabits meÓ (1998: 1). 
 
What lies at the very heart of the problem is the possibility of someone claiming: Òmy 
own languageÓ, or specifically: ÒI have only one language; [yet] it is not mineÓ (Derrida, 
1998b: 1). What does this really mean, and what is so problematic about it? DerridaÕs above 
remark on possession is deliberately cryptic, as it frustrates any straightforward attempt at 
deriving a univocal meaning Ð in this manner he is, arguably, playing for keeps. This style of 
writing has certainly not endeared Derrida to analytic philosophers believing in the sobriety 
of sound and valid argumentation. In rejecting their allegations of sophistry, however, I shall 
not sue for erudition either; rather, I am inclined to see it more as a form of percipience on 
DerridaÕs part. Once we consider that language is not a transparent tool, the manner (and 
style) in which one employs it becomes significant. DerridaÕs style is certainly exorbitant in 
this regard, and a surfeit of performativity overruns the constative element of his 
propositions, not necessarily, however, to the detriment of the point he is trying to 
demonstrate. In fact, Derrida argues: ÒOne cannot speak of a language except in that 
language. Even if to place it outside itselfÓ (1998: 22). This conflation of theoretical 
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understanding (i.e., language is never clear and straightforward as we think), along with its 
practical demonstration allows him to be conceptually consistent, frustrating or dispossessing 
our hermeneutical enterprise in the process. In doing so, Derrida consequently demonstrates 
how language bears the necessity of its own critique as the relation between performative and 
constative axes are pushed to their limits. 
 
 I have attempted to reinterpret the above statement by isolating the propositions as 
premises in a logical form; I have also considered redeploying it in the catu(ko)i form used 
by N!g!rjuna. The truth is, neither method yields satisfactory results; there is always some 
form of contradiction or equivocation that impedes a coherent reading. ÒIs language in 
possessionÓ, should this be taken to mean that language is in our possession, or that language 
is in possession of us? How does one decide, before moving on to its predicate, either as a 
Òpossessing possessionÓ or Òpossessed possessionÓ, when it is unclear what is to be 
predicated (L. praedicatum: prae [beforehand] + dicare [make known]), as its property? 
Furthermore, what does Òpossessing possessionÓ mean, as a possession that threatens to 
possess us (or language) just as we (or language) possess(es) it (or us)? This is even before 
we move to the 2nd order predicates of Òpossessed in exclusive possessionÓ or Òpossessing in 
exclusive possessionÓ. By this point, one is quite justified in asking, Òwho possesses whatÓ, 
or Òwhat possesses whomÓ? What is being staged here for us is the very conceptual 
inconsistency (or indeed, impossibility) of property and possession, along with corollary 
questions of belonging and identity; they are demonstrated to be undecideable, and one 
should not expect what is undecideable to fall neatly into truth-tables or logical form. It also 
points to the ambivalence that language supports in its bivalency, for which my remarks 
about DerridaÕs style above are pertinent towards understanding his conceptual scruples. 
Having said this, however, it is not entirely impossible to represent the ÒflawedÓ premises 
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using such logical methods, though it does not tell us decisively what the utterance is about. 
We end up becoming just as lost, because the premises branch off into completely other 
directions. It is precisely for the same reasons that I have my reservations about over-reading 
into the catu(ko)i as a means of understanding N!g!rjuna. While it is perfectly justifiable to 
demand that Derrida write unequivocally and Òget to the pointÓ, that, however, necessarily 
misses the very point of its performance. 
 
Now, it is one thing for Derrida to say Ð quite straight-forwardly Ð that language is 
never completely in our possession, while remaining in perfect control of his utterance (thus 
demonstrating the very opposite of what he is saying, like a Cretan liar); and quite another 
thing altogether to demonstrate it in the way that he has, viz.: 
 
A heterological enterprise that compounds with the forces that try to annul it 
while simultaneously unhinging them by inscribing or generalizing them 
differs from a contradictory discourse Ð that is, from one that, owing to 
theoretical weakness or to deliberation, accommodates contradictions in an 
otherwise homological discourse Ð in that it explicitly assumes a critical 
responsibility by unflaggingly problematizing its own status as a discourse 
borrowing from a heritage the very resources required for the deconstruction 
of that heritage itself. (Gasch, 1986: 168-9, emphasis mine) 
 
It is in this manner I understand DerridaÕs discourse as heterological, rather than a 
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contradictory one49. While it is one aspect of a heterological discourse to admit contradictions 
without necessarily reconciling them, the defining hallmark for me lies in its assumption of 
critical responsibility. Which is always owed to the other, as debts. This state of indebtedness 
circulates within the economy of the same, and this circulation (either as movement of 
signification in its discursive trajectory or orbit; or even as movement from conventional to 
ultimate truth in N!g!rjuna) may underscore the relatedness or dependency of concepts, but it 
this form of dependency is no longer underwritten by Being. 
 
Considering whatever has been said thus far, what we can agree upon is that the term 
possession (and property) proves more problematic than we otherwise think. What does 
possession name then, other than the relation negotiating between the self and the other 
within a closed economy? Is that relation possible? Yes, to the extent we may make 
intelligible utterances about it, as the proprietorship of an object by a subject. No, in the sense 
that this proprietorship is always en abyme, a self-vitiating relation. In other words, this 
relation of possession is predicated upon the possibility of there being no relation in the first 
place: ÒConsequently, anyone should be able to declare under oath: I have only one language 
and it is not mine; my ÔownÕ language is, for me, a language that cannot be assimilated. My 
language, the only one I hear myself speak and agree to speak, is the language of the otherÓ 
                                                
49
 For reasons that should be clear by now, N!g!rjunaÕs discourse is certainly not a contradictory one, in that he 
does not forward any autonomous (Skt. sv!tantra) arguments against his opponents: 
 
When an analysis is made through emptiness, 
If someone were to offer a reply, 
That reply will fail, since it will presuppose 
Exactly what is to be proven. 
 
When an explanation is made through emptiness, 
Whoever would find fault with it 
Will find no fault, since the criticism will presuppose 
Exactly what is to be proven. (MMK IV: 8-9) 
 
This also demonstrates the rapprochement between the pr!sa#gika and deconstructivist methods as being 
heterological, i.e., by Òborrowing from a heritage the very resources required for the deconstruction of that 
heritage itselfÓ. 
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(Derrida, 1998b: 25). What does Derrida intend with this monolingualism, and in what 
capacity does he sue for it, considering that he also speaks (or writes) more than one 
language? Derrida marks this with a double postulation: 
 
1. We only ever speak one language Ð or rather one idiom only. 
2. We never speak only one language Ð or rather there is no pure idiom. 
(1998: 8) 
 
What is intended as monolanguage is the possibility of the idiomatic (Gk. idi/ma: private 
property, peculiar phraseology; from idiousthai: to make oneÕs own, or private). Now, one 
could either dismiss DerridaÕs claim as pure disingenuousness on his part; or one is obliged to 
engage with what is expressly a private problem of belonging or possession. Before going 
further, it has to be noted that this monolanguage (or the pure idiom) does not preclude the 
possibility that one might be effectively bilingual, or even trilingual: 
 
One can, of course, speak several languages. There are speakers who are 
competent in more than one language. Some even write several languages at a 
time (prostheses, grafts, translation, transposition). But do they not always do 
it with a view to an absolute idiom? and [sic] in the promise of a still unheard-
of language? (Derrida, 1998b: 67) 
 
What does this entail then? If this monolanguage does not preclude, but indeed necessarily 
includes, by holding in reserve, the possibility of different languages then it is clear that this 
monolanguage is anything but monological. But there is also another sense in which this 
monolingualism is an absolute idiom, belonging resolutely to oneself, as the core of our 
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linguistic being from which our various utterances originate; and always with a view towards 
this absolute idiom, as its key or master language.  
 
This particular notion of monolanguage is closely affiliated with what we commonly 
call a mother tongue, this affiliation (L. affiliat- adopted as a son) raising at once issues of 
filiation and inheritance: 
 
If (as we are saying along with others, and after them) there is no such thing as 
the language, if there is no such thing as absolute monolingualism, one still 
has to define what a mother tongue is in its active division, and what is 
transplanted between this language and the one called foreign. What is 
transplanted and lost there, belonging neither to the one nor the other: the 
incommunicable. (Derrida, 1998b: 7- 8)  
 
The language called maternal is never purely natural, nor proper, nor 
inhabitable. To inhabit: this is a value that is quite disconcerting and 
equivocal; one never inhabits what one is in the habit of calling inhabiting. 
There is no possible habitat without the difference of this exile and this 
nostalgia. (Derrida, 1998b: 58) 
 
Derrida here challenges what we understand by a mother tongue, and how we commonly 
distinguish it from what is thus considered foreign. In this regard one may also call it the 
native tongue, though this cannot be divorced from issues of nativity and origin. Speaking of 
his own identity as a French-Algerian, Derrida writes: ÒWhen I said that the only language I 
speak is not mine, I did not say it was foreign to me. There is a difference. It is not entirely 
 ! 146 
the same thing, we shall come to itÓ (Derrida, 1998b: 5). This presents a paradox: surely 
something that is Ònot mineÓ has to be considered ÒforeignÓ or ÒalienÓ, and in what way is the 
French language both DerridaÕs mother tongue without belonging to him at the same time? 
We need to attend closely to the conceptual fecundity of this mother tongue and its relation to 
what Derrida is urging as monolingualism.  
 
Derrida has first raised the difficulty in asserting oneÕs self-identity, and I have argued 
that this assertion necessarily takes place within language, making it present, by presenting 
what is absent through the detours of language as a discourse of the (absent) self: ÒThe sign, 
in this sense, is deferred presenceÓ (1991a: 61). We are, however, dispossessed in the very 
attempt of claiming this self-possession through the medium of language, leading Derrida to 
claim: ÒThe speculary dispossession which at the same time institutes and deconstitutes me is 
also a law of language (1997: 141). This bid for self-possession is compounded when we 
realise that the very tools we employ do not belong to us. This is counter-intuitive, as the 
common understanding of language is that it mirrors faithfully what we intend, whence the 
speculary dispossession that Derrida wrote of. To make this more explicit, Derrida talks 
about monolingualism and the pure idiom as the core of our linguistic being, going through 
the detour of the mother tongue; in doing so Derrida returns the discourse to a more familiar 
territory (in every sense of the oikos and domestic scene), if only to aggravate the subsequent 
sense of de-familiarisation. Clearly, we conceive of our mother tongue as our most intimate 
possession, one that is necessarily given, as our linguistic inheritance, the language in which 
we think, silently allying unspoken speech with our notion of selfhood in an ideal unity. In 
this respect it belongs naturally to us, for we recognise ourselves in its immediacy without 
interval nor second. Perhaps it would be more precise to say second-ary, not in a derivative 
sense, however, as this manner of linguistic-existential recognition is necessarily specular. 
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What we also call narcissism names this doubling act of anamnesis and amnesia: the former a 
pair of doppelgngers, recollecting each other in mimicry; the latter a mutual forgetting of the 
mirror, resulting in singular calamity. The fecundity of this mother tongue lies in its 
nativeness (local vs. foreign, rootedness vs. transplantation) and nativity (birthright, origin), 
though they also serve as a double interdict annulling each other: 
 
Certainly, everything that has, say, interested me for a long time Ð on account 
of writing, the trace, the deconstruction of phallogocentrism and ÔtheÕ Western 
metaphysics (which I have never identified, regardless of whatever has been 
repeated about it ad nauseum, as a single homogeneous thing watched over by 
its definite article in the singular; I have so often and so explicitly said the 
opposite!) Ð all of that could not not proceed from the strange reference to an 
ÔelsewhereÕ of which the place and the language were unknown and prohibited 
even to myself, as if I were trying to translate into the only language and the 
only French Western culture that I have at my disposal, the culture into which 
I was thrown at birth, a possibility that is inaccessible to myself, as if I were 
trying to translate a speech I did not yet know into my Ômonolanguage,Õ as if I 
were still weaving some veil from the wrong side [...]. (Derrida, 1998b: 70) 
 
This Franco-Algerian identity, this Òonly language and the only French Western cultureÓ at 
DerridaÕs disposal is necessarily contingent Ð what we call our inheritance is more properly a 
form of adoption, and there is nothing necessary about this facticity of ÒthrownnessÓ. Worse, 
in DerridaÕs case the monolanguage foisted upon him is in fact the argot of the coloniser, by 
definition a foreign tongue, into whose tapestry he is now weaving, always Òfrom the wrong 
sideÓ. Its nativity lies in its status as an originary language according to which others are 
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translated, and Òalways with a view to this absolute idiomÓ. Gasch argues that: 
 
An origin has no meaning whatsoever without such a possible space that it 
engenders and orients. It follows from this that an origin is necessarily an 
inscribed origin. In order to be a selfsame origin, it must irreducibly relate to 
an Other in general, and in order to be the origin of something, it must harbor 
the possibility of becoming other. (1986: 159)  
 
This originary mother tongue thus inscribes the strange reference to an ÒelsewhereÓ, its 
maternal harbour at once shelter and harbinger of this possibility of becoming other. It is, 
without a doubt, the most spectacular form of invagination. Consequently, we do not dwell 
within this differential space except by inhabiting it, fastened by the twin moorings of exile 
and nostalgia, suspended in Òa sort of relationship without relationshipÓ like a half-severed 
umbilical cord (Derrida, 1998b: 71). For these various reasons it would be more consistent to 
view the mother tongue as Òthe monolanguage of the other. The of signifies not so much 
property as provenance: language is for the other, coming from the other, the coming of the 
otherÓ(Derrida, 1998b: 68). In the hyphenated French-Algerian identity the mother tongue is 
a mbius mot without interval, its hyphenated disjunction ensconced in a powerful 
ventriloquism, silencing twin crests of displacement and alienation within the horizon of its 
parenthesis, viz., what I am now obliged to call the (M)other tongue:  
 
The silence of that hyphen does not pacify or appease anything, not a single 
torment, not a single torture. It will never silence their memory. It could even 
worsen the terror, the lesions, and the wounds. A hyphen is never enough to 
conceal protests, cries of anger or suffering, the noise of weapons, airplanes, 
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and bombs. (Derrida, 1998b: 11) 
 
If I have chosen to capitalise this M within parenthesis, it is not to confer upon it any 
legitimacy nor transcendency, despite its collusion with either the dominant language of the 
master, or its status as a meta-language; both these breaches do not take place in the absence 
of a context, and its limits (ironically, the very same ones put in place to silence dissent 
above) are reaffirmed by the burgeoning parenthesis it seeks to transgress: 
 
Now, since a transgression must, in order to affirm itself as transgression, 
conserve and confirm in one way or another that which it exceeds, insofar as it 
is only with respect to the limit it crosses, it can only consist of a sort of 
displacement of the limits and closure of the discourse. To exceed the 
discourse of philosophy [or any other form of discourse for that matter] cannot 
possibly mean to step outside the closure, because the outside belongs to the 
categories of the inside. (Gasch, 1986: 169) 
 
This is a subtle point, and one that is highly significant in DerridaÕs approach. Just as the self 
is dispossessed by the language of the other, this notion of otherness itself cannot be absolute, 
but must depend upon that which it surpasses, exactly like a sort of relationship without 
relationship. To the extent that the (M)other tongue is impossible as an absolutely Other 
language, it also marks the possibility of a differential space within heterological discourse50: 
 
One is but the other different and deferred, one differing and deferring the 
other. One is the other in diffrance, one is the diffrance of the other 
                                                
50
 I am inclined to view N!g!rjunaÕs assertion that the limits of sa.s!ra are the limits of nirv!&a as such an 
utterance within a differential space. 
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(Derrida, 1991a: 71) 
 
Compare this with N!g!rjuna, 
 
A different thing depends on a different thing for its difference. 
Without a different thing, a different thing wouldnÕt be different.  
It is not tenable for that which depends on something else  
To be different from it.  
 
If a different thing were different from a different thing, 
Without a different thing, a different thing could exist. 
But without that different thing, that different thing does not exist. 
It follows that it doesnÕt exist. 
 
Difference is not in a different thing. 
Nor is it in a nondifferent thing. 
If difference does not exist, 
Neither difference nor identical things exist. (MMK XIV: 5-7, emphasis mine) 
 
To understand the effects of this inscription we shall have to take a detour to understand this 
movement or displacement of signification. It will also demonstrate how this monolingualism 
is incapable of becoming a meta-language in its own right. 
 
We have thus far established the originary status of the mother tongue, that is, to the 
extent that we may understand it as Òthe obliterated origin of absence and presenceÓ that is in 
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diffrance (Derrida, 1997: 143). I will not here rehearse its differing and deferring 
movements, except to point out that this necessarily takes place within a certain economy: 
 
The same, precisely, is diffrance (with an a) as the displaced and equivocal 
passage of one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to 
the other. Thus one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which 
philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see 
opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must 
appear as the diffrance of the other, as the other different and deferred in the 
economy of the same [...]. (Derrida, 1991a: 70)  
 
This notion of economy takes into consideration the differential relationship between 
concepts within a structural ensemble, as Òthe displaced and equivocal passage of one 
different thing to anotherÓ. As I will argue here and in the following section, we may give 
this equivocal passage the name of translation, though it also inevitably marks its 
impossibility. Two points need to be made at this juncture: Firstly, this notion of economy 
takes on a completely different dimension within N!g!rjunaÕs notion of Two-Truths, as 
vyavah!ra-satya (trans. conventional truth); in exploring its infrastructural possibilities 
through Derrida we not only understand why this otherness is never absolute, but we also 
address how the notion of parabh!va (trans. otherness-essence) is strictly untenable within 
prat"tya-samutp!da, just as N!g!rjuna has argued above that: ÒIt is not tenable for that which 
depends on something else/ To be different from itÓ. Secondly, I will reiterate DerridaÕs point 
here that the purpose of doing so is not simply to see the opposition erase itself51, though 
whatever conceptual efficacy they possess is ultimately annulled or suspended, on the basis 
                                                
51
 This is central to my disagreement with MagliolaÕs and LoyÕs reading of Derrida, in their wanton application 
of sous rature like some magical eraser. 
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of this inscription that marks their impossible property or essence: ÒA concept is thus 
constituted by an interval, by its difference from another concept. But this interval brings the 
concept into its own by simultaneously dividing it. The property of a concept depends 
entirely on its difference from the excluded conceptÓ (Gasch, 1986: 129, emphasis mine). 
This is the sense in which these various concepts or names are considered impossible, insofar 
as they continue to be conceived upon a fundamental lack, especially when it is the lack of an 
impossible attribute (essence)52. Having said that, however, it is not necessarily wrong to 
claim such a lack exists; just as Derrida has borrowed the notion of a mother tongue, if only 
to invalidate it subsequently Ð it is quite a different thing altogether to insist upon this lack as 
being somehow essential: ÒThis abiding ÔalienationÕ [alination  demeure] appears, like 
Ôlack,Õ to be constitutive. But it is neither a lack nor an alienation; it lacks nothing that 
precedes or follows it, it alienates no ipseity, no property, and no self that has ever been able 
to represent its watchful eyeÓ (Derrida, 1998b: 25). These are two related moments of the 
same movement, and if we cannot even make such utterances with relative impunity then the 
technical precision of our philosophical speculation only serves to make absurdists of us all53.  
 
I will turn to Gasch here for his incisive characterisation of inscription: 
                                                
52
 I shall marshal GarfieldÕs reading of N!g!rjuna to lend further support here: ÒThe lack of inherent existence 
that is asserted is not the lack of a property possessed by some entities but not by others, or a property that an 
entity could be imagined to have, but rather the lack of an impossible attributeÓ (Garfield, 1994: 235). What is 
intended by inherent existence (svabh!va) here cannot be divorced from its concomitant attributes of essence 
and independence, or being self-identical. In this way we also establish both their relatedness and dependency, 
but this dependency is no longer grounded in Being. 
53
 In the same way N!g!rjuna urges that: 
 
Those who do not understand 
The distinction drawn between these two truths 
Do not understand 
The BuddhaÕs profound truth. 
 
Without a foundation in the conventional truth, 
The significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. 
Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, 
Liberation is not achieved. (MMK 24:9-10, emphasis mine) 
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Position here translates the Hegelian concept of Setzung, the determination of 
one with regard to an Other, or to something in contrast with it. Position is 
thus a form of constitution by means of which something becomes what it is 
through its relation to something other. Inscription, however, does not signify 
such a relation; on the contrary, it is the determination of positional 
constitution, of the relation of the same and the Other, for it demonstrates that 
this position refers to something that cannot in any case be posited Ð the 
alterity of the Other Ð since this alterity is itself the ground of possibility of a 
positing self. Inscription in this sense refers to an irreducible reference to 
Other, anterior to an already constituted subject that presupposes this reference 
as well as that which such a subject constitutes through positioning. (1986: 
158) 
 
What is clear from this is that inscription differs from position, in that it is not a dialectical 
(op)position, viz.,Òa form of constitution by means of which something becomes what it is 
through its relation to something otherÓ. This relationship remains fairly straightforward, 
falling within the purview of binary logic. What is revealed, however, is that this otherness 
cannot be maintained on its own, either as absolute alterity or parabh!va, and the notion of 
relation itself becomes suspended in a differential impasse, Òproduc[ing] what it forbids, 
makes possible the very thing that it makes impossibleÓ (Derrida, 1997: 143). To paraphrase 
N!g!rjuna quoted in italics above, if the absolute other does not exist, neither can any notion 
of difference, and therefore neither different nor identical things exist as a result (MMK XIV: 
7). Gasch calls this an instance of intermediary discourse, Òconcerned with a middle in 
which the differends are suspended and preserved, but which is not simply a dialectical 
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middleÓ (1986: 151, emphasis mine). 
 
With this in hand, we can now return our discussion to the originary mother tongue, 
along with GaschÕs notion of inscription: ÒThe alterity in general to which inscription refers 
is the possibility of sameness. For that very reason it is also the possibility of becoming 
different, other; and indeed, such a possibility must affect all self-present and selfsame origin 
if it is to be the origin of somethingÓ (1986: 158). There is no unbroached origin that could 
serve as the master language like some rosetta stone in orienting our varied utterances:  
 
But what remains insurmountable in it [monolingualism of the other], 
whatever the necessity of legitimacy of all the emancipations, is quite simply 
the Ôthere is language,Õ a Ôthere is language which does not exist,Õ namely that 
there is not metalanguage, and that a language shall always be called upon to 
speak about the language Ð because the latter does not exist. (Derrida, 1998b: 
69) 
 
The absence of this meta-language (as absolutely and resolutely Other) means that the 
definite article remains, to all intents and purposes, lost at sea; meanwhile, we are thrown into 
absolute translation in our monolingual obstinacy without a source language: 
 
He [the monolingual] is thrown into absolute translation, a translation without 
a pole of reference, without an originary language, and without a source 
language [langue de dpart]. For him, there are only target languages [langues 
dÕarrive], if you will, the remarkable experience being, however, that these 
languages just cannot manage to reach themselves because they no longer 
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know where they are coming from, what they are speaking from and what the 
sense of their journey is. (Derrida, 1998b: 61) 
 
As one might appreciate, the problematic trajectory of this equivocal passage is also a 
question of translation. What I have established here is how the other in heterological 
discourse cannot be absolute, even as it impinges upon our sense of identity. This other is 
simultaneously grounds and ungrounds, and the inscribed relation is no longer that of a 
dialectical middle, but always in a sort of relationship without relationship. In looking at the 
mother tongue and its conceptual fecundity I have managed to address the paradox of how 
the language we speak is at once the most intimate and intimidated by the other, marking 
both its disjunction and ventriloquism. I also established that there is no natural property of 
language as its essence, just as the pure idiom remains an ideal dream of translation, in that it 
is incapable of serving as the meta-language because it is never resolutely Other. 
Consequently, I argue that we find ourselves lost in translation, because of this equivocal 
passage from one to another. In the next section I will trace the possibility of this translation 
along with the economics surrounding its discourse. In doing so, I will also situate it within 
its proper domestic tableau, with God the Father now laying down the double interdict as 
YHWH and Babel Ð the former an untranslatable name, the latter an idiom of confusion. 
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§ The Economics of Translation  
 
I opened this chapter on Derrida with the structuralist problematic of the centred 
structure; specifically, at the moment where Ð as a result of its absence Ð Derrida claims that 
language invaded the universal problematic. For Derrida, this meant that everything became 
discourse, and as the centre can no longer be thought of as a present-being this also removed 
the ontological grounds for the Òplay of signifying references that institute languageÓ 
(Derrida, 1997: 7), based upon Òa fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitudeÓ 
(Derrida, 1978: 352, emphasis mine). This loss of fundamental immobility (or fixity) is 
highly significant to this section on translation, and it also meant that any notion of entitative 
identity is thus impossible and henceforth only named by metaphor through the detours of 
language. Derrida calls this white mythology, naming the incapability of metaphysics to 
sustain on its own Ò[a] sign signifying a signifier itself signifying an eternal verity, eternally 
thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logosÓ (1997: 15). According to Derrida, 
philosophy is characterised by this self-eliminating process of generating metaphor. I wish to 
argue this non-fixity is a key aspect of DerridaÕs work, and that the movement of play, 
diffrance, Òis thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of 
a conceptual process and system in generalÓ (Derrida, 1991a: 63). This is equally fascinating 
as it is frustrating. It is fascinating because of this equivocal passage between a charade of 
proper names, each presupposing and implicating the other. It is frustrating, because every 
single one of them are consequently demonstrated to be impossible. The possibility of their 
dependency is therefore predicated upon the impossibility of their independence. For a 
concept to possess an essence in its univocity means it is necessarily autonomous and 
independent; and if Derrida claims diffrance to be the possibility of conceptuality through 
the very movement of play, he is not simply reacting against the principle of identity. More 
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importantly, I believe he is affirming their relative dependency. 
 
This is where my reading of Derrida differs from Magliola and Loy, in their shared 
focus on DerridaÕs reaction against the principle of identity. As I have maintained throughout, 
this is not necessarily wrong, though in opposing diffrance against any stable notion of 
identity they inevitably perform the same reification that Derrida took pains to avoid. This 
gives them licence to lament that, while Derrida has deconstructed logocentrism he remained 
nonetheless mired in signs, without attending in detail to what the deconstruction consisted 
in. I believe this lament to be symptomatic of such economic misreading. To put things into 
perspective, it would not be acceptable to say Ð certainly not for Magliola and Loy Ð that 
while N!g!rjuna has systematically emptied the fundamental categories of the phenomenal 
world he is left with nothing but emptiness (i.e., nihilism). Certainly, this is a view forwarded 
by some readers of N!g!rjuna Ð while I maintain that this is incorrect I will also, nonetheless, 
stress its necessary possibility Ð  though the concept of $%nyat! (assuming for sake of 
argument it is one) cannot be divorced from its context of prat"tya-samutp!da, which would 
otherwise invalidate such a view. Similarly, DerridaÕs deconstruction of any entitative 
identity cannot be understood outside of this context of play. In fact, Derrida insists upon 
this, quite (in)famously in the dictum, Òil nÕya pas de hors-texteÓ (1997: 158), even though 
this is marshalled against him to demonstrate ad nauseam the very opposite of what he is 
saying. To which an adequate rejoinder may be found just moments prior to that assertion, 
where Derrida urges that critical production needs to recognise and respect the classical 
exigencies and be clear, or else it would authorise itself to say almost anything.  
 
I have chosen to highlight this dependency in my exegesis of Derrida, by attending to 
the filial ties between domesticated (Gk. oikos, household) concepts circulating within an 
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economy (Gk. oikonomia, oikos + nomos) of signs. This thought of economy cannot be 
separated from the law (Gk. nomos), for the economic is implied within the nomic itself: Òas 
soon as there is law, there is partition: as soon as there is nomy, there is economyÓ (Derrida, 
1992: 6). The suffix -nomy is related to the Greek term nomos (trans. law), as well as nemein 
(trans. distribute). It makes sense then to ask what does economy describe, and what is its 
relation to translation? It describes an originary scene Ð the Tower of Babel54 Ð where God 
the Father institutes this economy by laying down the law. There is, at that very moment, 
partition (L. partiri, divide into parts) and parturition (L. parturire, be in labour). Before 
going further, I have mentioned previously that the trajectory of this equivocal passage from 
one term to another is fundamentally a question of translation. Consequently, we find 
ourselves lost in translation, because there is nothing necessary about an equivocal passage: 
there are always different routes, meandering paths. Derrida claims: ÒIn a sense, nothing is 
untranslatable; but in another sense, everything is untranslatable; translation is another name 
for the impossibleÓ (Derrida, 1998b: 56-7). In attending to DerridaÕs account of the Tower of 
Babel I hope to demonstrate this economic nature of translation, tracing its circulation as both 
gift and debt within the context of the family household, according to the law as translation. 
To understand translation as an equivocal passage is to understand this duplicitous 
movement: coming and going, at once gift and debt, sent and returned, tendered and 
rendered, annulled and acquitted.  
 
The Tower of Babel traces the origin of languages and the birth of nations. What is 
exemplary about this account and its relation to translation? According to Derrida: 
 
                                                
54
 ÒDes Tours de Babel.Ó The title can be read in various ways. Des means ÒsomeÓ; but it also means Òof the,Ó 
or Òabout the.Ó Tours could be towers, twists, tricks, turns, or tropes, as in a ÒturnÓ of phrase. Taken together, 
des and tours have the same sound as dtour, the word for detour. To mark that economy in language the title 
has not been changed. (TranslatorÕs Note, Derrida, 2002: 134) 
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This story recounts, among other things, the origin of the confusion of 
tongues, the irreducible multiplicity of idioms, the necessary and impossible 
task of translation, its necessity as impossibility. Now, in general one pays 
little attention to this fact: it is in translation that we most often read this 
narrative. And in this translation, the proper name retains a singular destiny, 
since it is not translated in its appearance as proper name. (2002: 109) 
 
There is, on the one hand, the origin of languages through the multiplication of tongues 
which is thus condemned to translation, at once necessary and impossible. Yet, on the other 
hand, we necessarily read this story in translation, except for the proper name Babel Ð which 
is always rendered as Confusion Ð though in doing so it is no longer a proper name but a 
common noun: Ò[Babel] is not only a proper name, the reference of a pure signifier to a 
single being Ð and for this reason untranslatable Ð but a common noun related to the 
generality of a meaningÓ (Derrida, 2002: 105). For this reason, Derrida maintains that by 
rendering the proper name Babel as Bavel (confusion) we are not actually translating it: ÒIt 
comments, explains, paraphrases, but does not translateÓ (Derrida, 2002: 109). What exactly 
is DerridaÕs point, for we clearly understand what Babel means55?  
 
The etymology of Babel as confusion is, in fact, apocryphal. By pointing out that we 
read this story in translation I believe Derrida highlights its necessarily post-Babelian nature, 
i.e., after the confusion of our tongues. I would argue here it is therefore immaterial whether 
                                                
55
 To make things simpler, take for example the proper name ÒDerridaÓ, regularly used in the question to 
students: ÒHave you brought your Derrida today?Ó The proper name designates the French-Algerian thinker as a 
person just as it is used metonymically to stand for the discourse that he made famous. There is a certain 
circularity to the proper name Babel, for it not only designates the  confused discourse that mistranslates it 
(whence its impossibility), it is also the name of a necessary but impossible translation given by God. 
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we read this biblical narrative in English, Latin, or French, or any of our received tongues56. 
Nevertheless, what is named henceforth by this proper name Ð Babel Ð is universally 
translated (or at least ostensibly so) as ÒconfusionÓ, with a certain monolingual obstinacy, Òby 
a kind of associative confusion that a unique tongue rendered possible, one thought it 
translated in that very tongue, by a common noun signifying what we translate as confusionÓ 
(Derrida, 2002: 104-5, emphasis mine). This is inherently problematic. A proper name is, by 
definition, untranslatable. GodÕs name, YHWH, resists translation; indeed we are condemned 
to translation precisely in his name, Babel, after the interdict confounding all tongues. Babel 
therefore names this interdict given by God to the city and its tower: 
 
And therefore the name thereof was called Babel, because there the language 
of the whole earth was confounded: and from thence the Lord scattered them 
abroad upon the face of all countries. (Gen. 11.9, emphasis mine) 
 
Scholars believe the city is NimrodÕs Babylon, though it is never explicitly named as such, 
and it is clear that Babel names the city and tower (not simply the confusion) from which 
God banished the Semites. I will point out here with Derrida that the proper name Babel is 
kept in the original Ð even in our translated versions of the narrative Ð and we have 
confusedly translated it in our post-Babelian tongues as such. That we can all agree upon, no 
matter what language we speak, by maintaining the proper name in the original so that it 
speaks the universal idiom of confusion, even as it confuses all idioms. In this way I argue 
that we are still trying Òto make a name for ourselvesÓ with this very name Babel, Òin a 
universal tongue which would also be an idiom, and gathering a filiationÓ (Derrida, 2002: 
107); even if it means we are unified only in our collective confusion. Derrida continues: 
                                                
56
 In this way, I also view the mother tongues into which we are born as our linguistic inheritance, taking the 
form of a gift. 
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Ò[...] at the very moment when pronouncing ÔBabelÕ we sense the impossibility of deciding 
whether this name belongs, properly and simply, to one tongue. And it matters that this 
undecidability is at work in a struggle for the proper name within a scene of genealogical 
indebtednessÓ (2002: 111). I will say that Babel belongs to all tongues (in their generality) 
and to none (on its own), condemning us to the singular destiny of this equivocal passage 
between translation and its impossibility:  
 
He destines them to translation, he subjects them to the law of a translation 
both necessary and impossible; in a stroke with his translatable-untranslatable 
name he delivers a universal reason (it will no longer be subject to the rule of 
a particular nation), but he simultaneously limits its very universality: 
forbidden transparency, impossible univocity. (Derrida, 2002: 111) 
 
The nature of this equivocal passage cannot be divorced from its economic circulation, and 
we find at the moment of its institution a domestic scene of partition and parturition. The 
former because of the exile imposed upon the Semites, by dividing them into tribes and 
scattering (distributing) them. The latter because stemming from this division (between 
native and foreign, father and mother) is also the inauguration Òof the multiplicity of idioms, 
of what in other words are usually called mother tonguesÓ (Derrida, 2002: 105, emphasis 
mine).  
 
Recalling what I have established in the previous section regarding the conceptual 
fecundity of this mother tongue: Òthe monolingualism of the other would be that sovereignty, 
that law originating from elsewhere, certainly, but also primarily the very language of the 
Law. And the Law as LanguageÓ (Derrida, 1998b: 39). This law from elsewhere is God: ÒIn 
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giving his name, a name of his choice, in giving all names, the father would be at the origin 
of language, and that power would belong by right to God the father. And the name of God 
the father would be the name of that origin of tonguesÓ (Derrida, 2002: 105). Now, in the 
post-diluvian age of Babylon there was one common language to all: 
 
And the earth was of one tongue, and of the same speech. And when they 
removed from the east, they found a plain in the land of Sennaar, and dwelt in 
it. (Gen. 11.1-2, emphasis mine) 
 
As I have argued before, there can be no form of dwelling without this necessary sense of 
rootedness in monolingual idiom. This is critical to my reading of DerridaÕs Babel: in order 
to dwell the Semites built a city, and more importantly a tower, if they were to survive a 
second deluge living in the plain, just as in the same way we wish to dwell in our mother 
tongue as a maternal harbour. In fact, I am tempted to read the deluge as a flux of non-
differentiation, in its capacity for washing away the conceptual dualisms inherent in our 
language. It is appropriate that the Semites dwell in the plain, because their common idiom 
also meant that there was no concept of foreignness which would otherwise require 
translation Ð a conflation of topos and topic. The flux presented by the deluge, therefore, I 
argue, is directly opposed to this fixed form of dwelling, as it threatens to engulf everything 
in its path. I will also here recall the underwater sojourn of N!g!rjuna, and the distinction 
between dry land (as the realm of binary logic) and the sea (as the realm of non-
differentiation). Perhaps we might one day better understand this intimate relation between 
our bipedal mode of existence and our need for what is called a ground or support, along with 
its twin dialectical oppositions. It comes as no wonder to me, therefore, that Derrida is 
preoccupied with the pas (step), the dmarche, the gait and twin legs of Socrates and Plato, in 
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his attempt to articulate this relationship and its errancy. The problem with this towering 
construction as I see it, however, is not that the tower may reach heaven itself, but Òto make a 
name for themselvesÓ in the process of doing so. To make a name is also to construct a 
paradigm in which to dwell57. This directly contravenes GodÕs sovereign right, and amounts 
to nothing less than a declaration of independence from God. Derrida claims: ÒTranslation, 
the desire for translation, is not thinkable without this correspondence with a thought of GodÓ 
(2002: 116). Without this notion of correspondence, which is also a form of dependence that 
underwrites the meaning of our utterances, there would be linguistic catastrophe. Which, 
arguably, is what the Tower of Babel is about.  
 
Derrida had chosen to read in this biblical story a narrative of colonial violence by the 
Semites, universalising their idiom in the desire of bringing reason to the world. I argue that 
this linguistic imperialism proclaims itself by gathering its people and erecting a tower at its 
centre, saying come. What I will point out here, which Derrida does not, is there is a two-fold 
nature to this imperative that is doubled in the narrative: it is mentioned twice by the builders 
and twice in relation to God, and in it we may trace the countervailing movements of this 
(dialectical) confrontation between the Council of Man and the Council of God. The first 
mention by the builders expresses a unifying, centripetal orientation and their desire to dwell, 
calling them to gather brick and mortar. The second mention by the builders expresses their 
aspiration, to raise upwards a tower that may reach the heavens. In doing both the builders 
make a name for themselves, dwelling in its fixity. In this regard I view the tower as a 
logocentric structure devised by its builders, in their desire to assimilate and totalise. God 
comes down to view the construction and is understandably displeased, though I should also 
point out there is no logical necessity for God to come down just to view what is happening Ð 
                                                
57
 And in this respect I would also maintain that this biblical story is arguably the most vivid and exemplary 
account of kalpana (Skt. thought-construction) we have in language. 
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he is, after all, by definition, omniscient. This coming down from on high opposes the 
vaunting aspiration of the builders to reach upwards. Unfortunately, however, there is no 
compromise, no middle ground in this narrative. God exhorts the heavenly host to follow 
him: ÒCome ye, therefore, let us go down, and there confound their tongues, that they may 
not understand one anotherÕs speechÓ (Gen. 11.7). In this instance, GodÕs exhortation, come, 
expresses disunity and centrifugal (dis)orientation that he imposes upon the builders, 
scattering them and multiplying their tongues. Come is at once incitement and exhortation, 
coming from below and above respectively. While one may choose to read in this nothing 
more than linguistic ambivalence, what I am committed to arguing, however, is that this 
ambivalence also stresses for me the equivocal passages leading to and coming from the 
other, such that we never decisively  attain the other shore of our discourse. It also stresses 
that any conception of diffrance cannot be understood in terms of uni-directionality if it is 
also to be the possibility of conceptuality in general. To use a term employed by Derrida 
earlier, it Òpro-regressesÓ; and I argue we cannot fully understand the significance of this 
narrative without taking into consideration these countervailing movements. In doing so, 
however, I am not simply stressing the structural symmetry of these movements, instead, they 
cancel each other out, coming together and coming undone all at once.  
 
All of this happens at Babel, not as the seat of confusion that we previously thought, 
but at the gate of God, derived from the Babylonian bab-ilu (bab - gate and ilu or el - God). It 
is at the gate of God where YHWH anointed all languages and imposed their necessary 
translation. How should we make sense of this then? I believe this gate to be exemplary in its 
own right58, as it inaugurates fall and exile. At the structural level of the narrative, the gate of 
God also locates the undecideable point mediating the dialectical opposition between Man 
                                                
58
 I also believe that a reading of this gate in conjunction with the gateless gate (mumonkan) of Zen Buddhism 
would be fruitful, though this would also take me beyond the scope of N!g!rjuna in the MMK. 
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and God. I argue that we cannot think of this gate without the necessary thought of its 
opening and closing, as entrance and exit, to keep out and let in. In other words, this gate 
necessitates passages of translation, and in passing through the gates (or not) it determines 
whether we are admitted in communion with God or banished by excommunication: ÒThat is 
what is named from here on Babel: the law imposed by the name of God who in one stroke 
commands and forbids you to translate by showing and hiding from you the limitÓ (Derrida, 
2002: 132-3). The opening and closing of a gate captures both this limit and its oscillation. It 
is therefore appropriate that God anoints all languages at this gate, because to anoint is also to 
name, to christen. I will argue this leads us inexorably to yet another gateway Ð Jesus Christ. 
The title ÒChristÓ (Gk. khristos - anointed, from khriein - anoint; translating the Hebrew term 
m!9"a', the Messiah as anointed one) is significant here, as it is also only through him that 
we approach God. Further, the baptismal water recalls for me the water of the deluge, in their 
common cleansing properties. Both have a specifically purgative effect with regard to sin, 
regardless of its punitive (deluge) or redemptive (baptism) capacities. And if I have chosen to 
read in these waters the flux of non-differentiation59, I will support such a reading by 
extending and tracing this concept of sin to the moment of its inception, to Adam and Eve, 
when both ate the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. The sin (or error) then, 
on such a reading, consists in making binary distinctions within dualist knowledge. I argue 
that this belongs to the remit of God, as demonstrated in the divine act of Creation, where 
God not only calls light and darkness into existence, but more significantly, does so by 
dividing one from the other. In this case then, I argue that it would seem dualist knowledge is 
redeemed by, and possibly predicated upon, the possibility of non-differentiation as its other.  
 
                                                
59
 This flux of non-differentiation, here as before, in both the biblical story and the legend surrounding 
N!g!rjuna, is understood in terms of advaya rather than advaita. The reason for this distinction will be made 
apparent in the following chapter. 
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What, exactly, then is the threat presented by this deluge that compels the Semites to 
build? If I am correct in reading it as a flux of non-differentiation, the deluge not only engulfs 
everything in its path, but more importantly, in doing so, it over-runs all forms of constructed 
limits and perimeters Ð entire walls, bridges, and ramparts: 
 
What has happened, if it has happened, is a sort of overrun [dbordement] that 
spoils all these boundaries and divisions and forces us to extend the accredited 
concept, the dominant notion of a Ôtext,Õ of what I still call a Ôtext,Õ for 
strategic reasons, in part Ð a ÔtextÕ that is henceforth no longer a finished 
corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a 
differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other 
than itself, to other differential traces. (Derrida, 1991: 256-57) 
 
Does this then mean that the deluge is like a text? By no means. The amorphous flux 
presented by the deluge is also the space of differentiality60, and for it to have meaning it 
requires Babel, the proper name, as a context to delimit and control its borders. I believe we 
cannot make sense of a text without this necessary reference to a context, even as it always 
threatens to encroach upon and over-run its banks. I will turn to Aporias for an understanding 
of this limit: 
 
No context can determine meaning to the point of exhaustiveness. Therefore 
the context neither produces nor guarantees impassable borders, thresholds 
that no step could pass [trespasser], trespass [in English in the original], as 
                                                
60
 What is the difference between non-differentiation and differentiality? The answer is same difference, though 
this does not mean they are therefore identical, which they are not. We may also understand it as the economy of 
the same, where there is a difference in this notion of the same, not necessarily from itself, but also within itself. 
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our anglophone friends would say. (Derrida, 1993: 9) 
 
It is clear in this way why a context is incapable of exhausting the reserve (and reservoir) of a 
text, nor the meanings it might engender, no matter how rigorously we might try to delimit it. 
According to a law of economy, where there is partition there is also parturition. The 
dynamic relationship between a text and its context is always locked in an interminable state 
of contestation. What is exemplary about Babel in this regard is that it names both diaspora 
and dissemination, and therefore, quite literally, the very opening of linguistic flood-gates. To 
make the same point in a different manner, I would draw an analogy between Babel and the 
founding of a city by drawing a circle in the sand. Babel, the absolutely self-proper name, 
becomes a circle coinciding with itself. We may represent this graphically with the letter O. 
Its perimeters or walls keep out the flux, by attempting to dwell in what is otherwise un-
inhabitable. Indeed, dwelling is possible only by fixing and reifying these perimeters, in an 
attempt to control its infrastructural trajectories and/or lines of flight. What I call passages of 
translation names these extra-orbital crossings and nomadic wanderings, always trespassing a 
certain threshold or doorway. This inevitably results in catastrophe (Gk. katastroph0, 
overturning, sudden turn. stroph0 - turning), an overturning that transfigures (or better yet, 
translates) the O of the circle to become the O of a tunnel, undermining the sedimented 
infrastructural desire for totalisation. It is by no coincidence this overturning takes the form 
of a flipping over, always the flip side of the same coin, though what we mean by the same is 
no longer identity nor even identical to itself. It is in this way I understand DerridaÕs claim: 
ÒThis border of translation does not pass among various languages. It separates translation 
from itself, it separates translatability within one and the same languageÓ (1993: 10). 
 
All of this forces us to rethink what we understand by text and the passages of 
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translation to which it destines us, passing through gates, borders, and customs. According to 
Derrida, in giving the name Babel, God himself enters a relation of indebtedness: ÒAt the 
moment when he imposes and opposes his law to that of the tribe, he is also a petitioner for 
translation. He is also indebted. He has not finished pleading for the translation of his name 
even though he forbids it. For Babel is untranslatableÓ (2002: 118). In tendering a name of 
his choice God also institutes an economy of translation in which Ò[t]he translator is indebted, 
he appears to himself as translator in a situation of debt; and his task is to render, to render 
that which must have been givenÓ (Derrida, 2002: 112, emphasis mine). To render is also to 
give back, to perform a restitution of meaning that is commensurable to the original. Derrida 
claims: ÒThis motif of circulation can lead one to think that the law of economy is the Ð 
circular Ð return to the point of departure, to the origin, also to the homeÓ (1992: 7). It would 
seem a matter of good economic policy to keep the circle squared in the name of reciprocity, 
though this, however, also points to the impossibility of the pure gift as such: 
 
From the moment the gift would appear as gift, as such, as what it is, in its 
phenomenon, its sense and essence, it would be engaged in a symbolic, 
sacrificial, or economic structure that would annul the gift in the ritual circle 
of the debt. (Derrida, 1992, #30120@ 23) 
 
This also means the economic nature of the gift takes the form of an annulled gift caught in 
an elliptical circle. Consequently, we cannot separate this notion of indebtedness from a 
notion of foreign exchange. Benjamin claims: Ò[É] all translation is only a somewhat 
provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of languagesÓ (1992: 75, emphasis 
mine).  
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How do we begin to do so, this coming to terms with the other, and more importantly, 
on whose terms? In giving the name Babel along with its irreducible multiplicity of tongues, 
we are also called to account, to present or render an account that sends this gift back whence 
it came. Derrida points out the difficulty in doing so: ÒFrom the origin of the original to be 
translated there is fall and exile. The translator must redeem (erlsen), absolve, resolve, in 
trying to absolve himself of his own debt, which is at bottom the same Ð and bottomlessÓ 
(2002: 121). What is the task of the translator then, Òto redeem in his own tongue that pure 
language exiled in the foreign tongueÓ (Derrida, 2002: 121), when this redemption is also a 
form self-acquittance, despite the fact that we are implicated within the structure of an 
annulled gift? How do we begin to redeem ourselves when there is no originary tongue, when 
all our tongues are precisely foreign as well, in a state of exile, always trying to come home? 
The undecideability of this dilemma may be presented thus: 
 
On the one hand, 
 
[I]t will never be mine, this language, the only one I am thus destined to 
speak, so long as speech is possible for me in life and in death; you see, never 
will this language be mine. And, truth to tell, it never was. (Derrida, 1998b: 2)  
 
And on the other, 
 
Translation thus ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the central 
reciprocal relationship between languages [...] languages are not strangers to 
one another, but are, a priori and apart from all historical relationships, 
interrelated in what they want to express. (Benjamin, 1992: 73, emphasis 
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mine)  
 
Such that,  
 
The intention of the poet is spontaneous, primary, graphic; that of the 
translator is derivative, ultimate, ideational. For the great motif of integrating 
many tongues into one true language is at work. (Benjamin, 1992: 77, 
emphasis mine) 
 
The problem, such as it is, is always a matter of reconciliation, which is also to say, a coming 
to terms with the other. This reconciliation can not occur in the absence of an 
acknowledgement, or indeed acceptance, of this foreignness: ÒOne can take it as a certain 
experience of hospitality, as the crossing of the threshold by the guest who must be at once 
called, desired, and expected, but also always free to come or not to comeÓ (Derrida, 1993: 
10-11). If the passages of translation necessitate a certain movement, we can no longer 
understand this movement on the basis of a legal tender61, changing from one hand to another. 
Similarly, we do not simply decide to arrest or halt, with one hand or the other, at a particular 
moment or another, the originary effects of something to determine the cause of another 
(either as target or source), without also necessarily slipping into regress: ÒBabelization does 
not therefore wait for the multiplicity of languages. The identity of a language can only 
affirm itself as identity to itself by opening itself to the hospitality of a difference from itself 
or of a difference with itselfÓ (Derrida, 1993: 10). This hospitality is what allows a language 
Òto summon the heterological opening that permits it to speak of something and to address 
itself to the otherÓ(Derrida, 1998b: 69). The foreignness heralded by this heterological 
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 This would also mean there is a kernel of meaning that may be identified or made commensurable according 
to a fixed correspondence or exchange rate. This would also imply its possible return or restitution. 
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opening (Babel) ultimately bears the necessity of its dissolution, as we stand before its gate, 
with outstretched arms, saying, Come.  
 
What I have attempted to do in this chapter is to present and trace the development of 
DerridaÕs thought as a heterological discourse. In doing so, I have stressed throughout the 
significance of the movements that necessarily obtain within such a discourse, whether we 
choose to understand them in terms of slippage or diffrance. Beginning with the absent 
centre, I demonstrated how Derrida has split the conceptual atom, or more properly, the 
atomisation of concepts through the detours of metaphor, according to the principle of 
identity. Subsequently, we also understand that there can be no pure (or independent) notion 
of identity, which is always threatened or contaminated by the notion of an Other. Perhaps 
the source of oneÕs identity may be located within the principle of alterity instead then, with 
this notion of an absolute Other. We find, however, that at the moment of self-assertion we 
are dispossessed by a monolingualism of the other. The possibility of this monolanguage is 
also known as the mother tongue, though it also contains the irreducible effects of inscription. 
Far from belonging to us (or to a simple Other), this mother tongue also marks the possibility 
of a differential space, such that we are thrown into absolute translation without any source 
language. Finally, in this section, the discussion on translation takes into consideration the 
economic principles governing its passage or circulation, through forwarding my own 
translation of a text that stresses both its necessity and its impossibility. I also argued that we 
cannot arrest or halt at any point the differential movement in which a concept may be found, 
without also necessarily attending to it, by carefully unhinging it from its conceptual chain. 
Without doing so, I believe we risk reifying the very concepts under consideration, and in 
borrowing them we also adopt them provisionally, employing them as critical leverage to 
summon the heterological opening of language. In doing so, we also stretch the limits of what 
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we still call a text, though this notion of textuality can no longer be separated from the 
dependency and errancy it necessarily presupposes. 
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§ A Tao of two Halves 
 
Having considered both N!g!rjuna and Derrida separately, my focus now turns to 
Magliola and Loy in this chapter. Before doing so I shall explain the reasons for this chapter 
and the structural framework it provides towards the thesis. This chapter attains a certain 
closure in itself, and concludes the discursive trajectory that I began with the literature review 
in Chapter Two. This does not, however, mean it is conclusive in any strict sense. If the 
literature review formed a conceptual springboard for me to engage with the various issues I 
have addressed thus far; then this chapter fulfils the function of revisiting and consolidating 
insights that have remained latent during the course of my engagement. If I have left these 
gaps hitherto open, it is because I did not wish to impose any over-arching discursive 
trajectory that might otherwise threaten to stifle the clarity of DerridaÕs and N!g!rjunaÕs 
thought in their own right. The problem for me with MagliolaÕs and LoyÕs engagement with 
both thinkers is that they have imposed a teleological unfolding in their treatment of the key 
concepts. This means that both have decided in advance what Derrida and N!g!rjuna are 
about from the very beginning, along with the ends to which they are consequently subjected 
and deployed as mere logical way-points. I will support this claim by pointing out how both 
critics seem to extract key passages or concepts without necessarily respecting the contexts in 
which they are situated, only to part ways at one point or another, hastening towards what 
they saw as its logical conclusion. The conclusions both critics arrive at are, in fact, 
incompatible with either Derrida or N!g!rjuna. I believe this to be the inevitable result of a 
hegemonic imposition of hermeneutical method, which necessarily takes place from a plane 
of exteriority with respect to the text(s) under consideration. However, as I have pointed out 
in the chapter on methodology, such attempts at ex orbitas transgression can only serve to 
reinforce those very limits to be breached, or reinstate them in a subtler form than before. In 
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terms of their general structural framework, MagliolaÕs strategy is to identify a four-fold 
argument in Derrida that is in turn mirrored by the tetralemma (recast as four-fold negation) 
in N!g!rjuna. Loy, on the other hand, identifies three forms of nonduality, each leading to the 
other, in order to extract a core theory of nonduality using both Derrida and N!g!rjuna. I will 
point out here that despite the avowed intentions of both critics to Ògo beyondÓ philosophy 
they continue nonetheless to subscribe to a linear methodological framework. This for me is 
conceptually inconsistent at the level of their hermeneutical discourse. 
 
Of course, I am well aware there are necessarily discursive movements and 
trajectories that cannot be avoided. In the same way, this chapter performs a backward-
looking movement as counterpoint to the forward-looking orientation provided by the 
literature review. I intend for my discourse on Derrida and N!g!rjuna to perform its own 
invagination here, turning in upon itself, as its dmarche. As I have maintained throughout, I 
understand the path-based hermeneutics as adopting a middle path between Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna, though I have yet to identify thus far what precisely this middle path consists of. I 
shall demonstrate, with Magliola and Loy, that the middle path I have chosen to take is 
between the drift of differentialism (Magliola) and the stasis of nondualism (Loy). What is 
exemplary for me about these two critics is that they exhibit the very indecision of a 
consistent discourse on Derrida and N!g!rjuna Ð just as I have argued earlier in the Tower of 
Babel Ð in the countervailing centrifugal disorientation that is characterised by differential 
drift in Magliola, and the centripetal reappropriation characterised by nondualist stasis in 
Loy. The centre, as we well know, cannot hold. It is therefore for this reason that it would be 
conceptually untenable for me to characterise my own middle path in any other identifiable 
manner. One may rightly allege therefore that this path-based hermeneutics is thus parasitic 
or bricoleur. 
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Having said that, this chapter will open with Magliola, to be followed by Loy. This is 
not simply for reasons of chronology, but because, in a significant way, Loy takes over where 
Magliola left off. This section on Magliola traces the differential movements that he sees in 
both Derrida and N!g!rjuna. The following section focuses on LoyÕs metaphor of IndraÕs Net 
as its central organising principle, and I will range across a number of LoyÕs texts as he 
attempts to subsume Buddhism, Ved!nta, and Taoism into a core doctrine of nonduality. To 
the extent that both are fascinated by DerridaÕs affirmation of a new form of knowing through 
the deconstruction of language, they are also inclined to view this necessarily in terms of a 
non-linguistic and non-conceptual knowledge, as the Other of philosophy. Such a line of 
inquiry may only go one of two ways: either one is obliged to shift into mystic mode 
proclaiming differential going-ons  la Magliola; or one goes the way of absolutism, 
enshrined in shrouds of ineffability over a nondual stasis  la Loy. Both find the resources to 
do so in Zen Buddhism, though where Magliola loses himself in concatenating differential 
drift Loy reins in with a singular net of cosmic proportions.  
 
That for me is absolutist, and in accordance with everything I have argued thus far 
regarding discourse and translation, I will make the following claim: Absolutism is a context 
without horizons62. This is not to say it is without walls. In fact, its very raison dÕtre is to 
construct walls. It appears we have not wandered far from the fabled Tower. The 
fundamental problem of both critics in my view is that they fail to sufficiently inhabit the 
systems they are critiquing, choosing instead to dwell in similarities by either bridging 
(Magliola) or homogenising (Loy) them. This justifies in part my earlier criticism that both 
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 In this way it also explains why absolutist renditions do not translate things very well, for there are no 
contexts to pass through and contest, and in their comparative approach both have failed to translate (in the strict 
Derridean sense) the nuanced specificities of their intended subject. 
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critics fail to respect the contexts necessary for their mutual translation. It is also in such a 
context, I argue, that it would be more fruitful to understand the model of rapprochement as 
being ensconced in a relation of familiarity without similarity. It has to be admitted that some 
of the perennial philosophical problems addressed by Derrida and N!g!rjuna are indeed 
familiar, certainly when one considers the general economy of the concepts in which they are 
found and circulated. If, however, we understand both Derrida and N!g!rjuna as employing a 
method of no-method, it would be conceptually inconsistent then to proceed by establishing a 
common ground between them, especially when both Derrida and N!g!rjuna have argued for 
the groundlessness of any such putative grounds: ÒDeconstruction repeats or mimes 
grounding in order to account for the difference between a ground and that which is 
grounded, with what can no longer be called a groundÓ (Gasch, 1986: 154-55). While a 
possible objection might be that one cannot theorise in a self-made vacuum in the absence of 
a coherent framework, I believe this might be circumvented to some degree with the 
understanding of rapprochement I am forwarding here. Familiarity63 allows us to understand 
this relation in an equivocal manner (as simultaneously grounds and ungrounds), whereas 
similarities demand a univocal correspondence by effacing any differences between them: 
 
[I]t is, of course, impossible and pointless to completely recast N!g!rjunaÕs 
positions as those with which we in the West are familiar and to replace his 
technical terminology with ours. For N!g!rjuna is not a Western philosopher. 
He is an Indian Buddhist philosopher whose work we approach through a vast 
Asian Buddhist commentarial literature. And while many of his concerns, 
problems, theses, and arguments are recognizable cousins of ours, many are 
not, and there are genuine differences in outlook. This is what makes 
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 This notion of familiarity also underscores the filial relations that obtain between concepts, giving rise to 
each other through their circulation within a certain oikos-nomos. 
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N!g!rjunaÕs work so exciting to read and to think about Ð it provides a 
genuinely distinctive perspective on a set of problems and projects that we 
share. (Garfield, 1995: 95, emphasis mine) 
 
As we shall see, this is largely ignored by both Magliola and Loy in their attempt to found a 
common ground that will subsequently allow them to Ògo beyondÓ Derrida with N!g!rjuna. 
This is prima facie patronising, though in the attempt to heal Western metaphysical psychosis 
through Eastern mysticism, I argue, this fails to do justice to the clarity of N!g!rjunaÕs MMK 
by exoticising it. In this chapter I will attend to the stress points of their respective discourses 
in order to unhinge them, one by one. To do so, I shall issue three pairwise censures drawn 
from Derrida and N!g!rjuna over the course of this chapter to serve as critical leverage into 
their texts, beginning with the pair below: 
 
To produce this signifying structure obviously cannot consist of reproducing, 
by the effaced and respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, 
voluntary, intentional relationship that the writer institutes in his exchanges 
with the history to which he belongs thanks to the element of language. This 
moment of doubling commentary should no doubt have its place in a critical 
reading. To recognize and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and 
requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. Without this recognition 
and this respect, critical production would risk developing in any direction at 
all and authorize itself to say almost anything. But this indispensable guardrail 
has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading. (Derrida, 1997: 158, 
emphasis mine) 
 
 ! 178 
For him to whom emptiness is clear, 
Everything becomes clear. 
For him to whom emptiness is not clear, 
Nothing becomes clear. 
 
When you foist on us  
All of your errors 
You are like a man who has mounted his horse 
And has forgotten that very horse. (MMK XXIV: 14-15) 
 
MagliolaÕs differential Òoff/trackÓ reading of Derrida and N!g!rjuna was the first 
significant attempt at engaging both in a creative manner. It was provocative in its own right, 
eliciting varying degrees of admiration and admonition. It also set the path for Loy later: an 
example of this is evident in Loy (1988: 254) citing MagliolaÕs translation (1984: 32-3) of a 
key passage in ÒDiffranceÓ that differs from the original in Derrida (1991a: 66). I will only 
point out here that this departs from usual scholarly practice, though such lapses (conceptual 
or otherwise) are frequent in the emergent Derrida-N!g!rjuna discourse. Perhaps one of the 
most glaring lapses occurs when Magliola attempts to justify his own theoretical approach: 
ÒThroughout this chapter, I identify myself with a body of Nagarjunist scholarship which is 
very substantial (perhaps dominant) and which is most currentÓ (Magliola, 1984: 93). The 
endnote to this claim, however, states something rather different: ÒI shall cite my authorities 
shortly, but let me make clear now that when Ôbuilding a caseÕ it shall be my practice, 
especially when dealing with matters other than $%nyat!, to adduce evidence from all 
competent BuddhologistsÓ (Magliola, 1984: 208, emphasis mine). I am not sure if Magliola 
has indeed considered all existing scholarship (we shall leave the issue of competence aside 
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for now), because while he cites established Buddhist scholars such as Inada, Murti, Sprung, 
and Streng; it is also Inada who provided the most scathing criticism of all in his review of 
the book: 
 
Magliola has indeed used utmost license in interpreting Buddhist texts and 
translations from various sources but he should keep in mind that the 
contribution by Stcherbatsky, Sprung, Streng, Suzuki, Matilal, Misra, Inada 
and others are mere interpretations. They are guides to Buddhist thought and 
must be used judiciously. Interpretation of interpretations is risky and to go 
beyond them, although always a disederatum [sic], one must proceed with 
utmost caution and indeed proceed at oneÕs own risk. (Inada, 1985: 222, 
emphasis mine) 
 
I agree with InadaÕs censure regarding Magliola taking liberties in his account of Buddhist 
philosophy, by Òextract[ing] concepts from the corpus of N!g!rjunaÕs philosophy, nay the 
whole of Buddhism, merely to suit oneÕs purposesÓ (Inada, 1985: 220). I believe InadaÕs 
charge of Òinterpretation of interpretationsÓ to be somewhat unfounded, however, as Magliola 
does not provide his own reading of the texts he cites64; they are given as if they were self-
explanatory, leaving the reader with the burden of an interpretative gestalt because of the 
various lapses and inconsistencies in his understanding of fundamental concepts in Derrida 
and N!g!rjuna. 
 
 MagliolaÕs own point of departure lay in what he saw as the common ground 
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 For example, in the thirty-odd pages devoted to Buddhist Differentialism, Magliola had managed to include 
just about the entire text of MatilalÕs article on the doctrine of Two-truths, along with huge tracts from Streng 
and Zen parables littered everywhere in between. 
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between Derrida and N!g!rjuna: ÒI found that Derridean deconstruction and Nagarjunist 
Buddhism, the former to dismantle the principle of identity, the latter to dismantle an 
entitative theory of dharmas, resorted to the ÔsameÕ logical techniquesÓ (Magliola, 1984: ix). 
Further, this notion of identity is always dualistic: ÒIn its most classic form, logocentrism 
posits a Ôtranscendental signifiedÕ (or absolute Origin) whose ÔvoiceÕ (or transcendental 
signifier) is so immediately and essentially ÔproximateÕ to its Ôother halfÕ (its Ôoriginating 
factorÕ, that is, the Origin), that the two ÔhalvesÕ constitute a supreme IdentityÓ (Magliola, 
1984: 3). Taking into consideration GarfieldÕs caveat about recasting N!g!rjunaÕs theses, I 
will point out that mind is considered the sixth organ in Buddhist philosophy. This also 
means then it avoids the usual mind-body dichotomy or subject-object relationship otherwise 
prevalent in the West. Also, it would not be strictly correct to identify a common basis 
between Derrida and N!g!rjuna in their rejection of logocentrism. This will be made clear 
shortly. The two halves that Magliola refers to above is the dialectical relationship 
constituting the signifier-signified dyad: 
 
Thus to study the principle of identity, that is, how things are self-identical 
(Ôwhatever is, isÕ), is to study language. When ÔIÕ identify a thing as self-
identical, the formula is, ÒÔIÕ identify you as Ôsuch-and-suchÕÓ (and the 
identification is a binary combination of Ôoriginating factorÕ and Ôexpression,Õ 
of ÔsignifiedÕ and Ôsignifier,Õ no matter whether understood in a narrower or 
broader sense). DerridaÕs strategy will be, then, to assault the principle of 
identity, that is, the theory of signified and signifier, as it functions in 
explanations of language and of how language composes the identity of 
things. (Magliola, 1984: 6) 
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The same logical techniques in question refer to the four-fold arguments65 that Magliola 
characterises of Derrida on the one hand, and the tetralemma (recast as the catu(ko)i, or 
fourfold negation) in N!g!rjuna on the other. This constructs a neat logical structure of two 
halves for Magliola to Òbuild his caseÓ. What is referred to as the same (logical techniques) is 
significant here, however, as it also unwittingly characterises the relation between MagliolaÕs 
differentialism and LoyÕs nondualism despite their ostensible differences. While this seems a 
reasonable account of both Derrida and N!g!rjuna, the ÒlogicalÓ aspect is ultimately 
relegated to the back-seat of a suffix Ð the epistemological challenge invariably turns into an 
onto-logical reappropriation. This shift is a direct result of oneÕs progression along the 
ladder66. 
 
 The Tao unity of opposites is the fundamental trope employed by Magliola, and as a 
leitmotif it allows him to delve between, a/mid, and athwart67 the Tao and its homogenising 
effects to achieve a differential liberation (or Ògoing-onÓ) that he sees in Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna: ÒDerridean activity is a differential ÔbetweenÕ which cleaves (or better, 
eludes/elides) the ÔTaoistÕ unity of opposites, or any other organicismÓ (Magliola, 1984: xi). 
Magliola further characterises this as Òthe between in between conventional betweensÓ 
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 Magliola believes that Derrida assaults the principle of identity by employing the principle of arbitrariness, 
which refers to the arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified. This in turn leads to the principle of le 
ddoublement, the principle of lÕeffacement, and finally the principle of dissemination and the trace). I will not 
rehearse here the progression from one argument to the next, except to point out that each argument is placed 
sous rature by the following step, according to how well it ÒÔapproximatesÕ the Ôway things really areÕ better 
than [the] other alternativesÓ (Magliola, 1984: 27). 
66
 As I have pointed out separately, rather than building a bridge Magliola is actually constructing a ladder. This 
architectonic trope is particularly enduring, not least because of WittgensteinÕs contribution in recent times, for 
it also recalls pillars, ziggurats, and towers. I will also point out here that this trope cannot be maintained in the 
absence of teleological orientation, along with the necessary steps demanded by it. Where Magliola believes he 
is employing the Tao trope of flux and differentiality he is actually straddling the twin guardrails of Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna; though in building towards what he sees as its logical conclusion Magliola inevitably dispenses with 
the specific contexts in which the borrowed concepts (deployed as steps) are lodged. 
67
 These are taken from MagliolaÕs chapter titles, and his aim is to emphasise movement and transgression 
through typographical play and neologism. In the absence of a rigorous theoretical framework, however, this 
ends up becoming more ludic than lucid, and is the reason why DerridaÕs caveat applies here. It is also the 
reason why I hesitate here in writing ÒTaoistÓ, because I reserve doubts about MagliolaÕs characterisation of 
what he sees as its philosophical project. 
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(Magliola, 1984: 41). As before, I would point out here with N!g!rjuna that: 
 
Where there is no beginning or end, 
How could there be a middle? 
It follows that thinking about this in terms of 
Prior, posterior, and simultaneous is not appropriate. (MMK XI: 2)  
 
This criticism would certainly be valid once we move from this Òdifferential betweenÓ to a 
hypostatised differentialism. What Magliola intends by ÒorganicismÓ is the absolutism 
exhibited by logocentric systems of thought, and he ultimately turns to Zen philosophy, in 
particular, to what he characterised as Òdifferential ZenÓ. This was to separate what he saw as 
ÒN!g!rjunismÓ in Zen from the remaining logocentric elements that he also called Òcentric 
ZenÓ (1984: 96). What I find intriguing, however, is that this distinction was never contested 
nor commented upon by Loy, considering that he is a qualified Zen teacher and by 
MagliolaÕs reckoning he would fall under the category of Òcentric ZenÓ in positing a 
nondualist ground. Magliola characterises centric Zen as such: Ò[I]ts whole effort is to 
transcend logos understood as the language of is and is not and to achieve the 
Ôundifferentiated centerÕ (of course, Ôundifferentiated centerÕ is just a permutation of logos, in 
the specialized Derridean terms we have already worked through at such length)Ó (1984: 97). 
This undifferentiated centre is also where Loy would identify a core theory of nonduality, and 
Magliola goes so far as to claim: ÒThe supreme self-identity, indeed the only self-identity in 
the ultimate sense, is centric ZenÕs $%nyat!Ó(1984: 97). There is perhaps no real need for Loy 
to debunk Magliola, as both differential and centric Zen (which we shall accept for sake of 
argument) will turn out to be flip sides of the same coin.  
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While I understand the general reason for this particular Tao trope (viz., that 
deconstruction ÔdissolvesÕ or ÔdestructsÕ dialectical oppositions), it is nevertheless awkward, 
for in its application to a discourse on Derrida and N!g!rjuna it necessarily presupposes an 
existing dualism (cast in black-and-white) between $%nyat! and diffrance. This points to a 
theoretical misconception in Magliola that persists in Loy, viz., Òthe key to [deconstructive] 
critique is that absolute negation destroys the possibilities of ÔthingsÕ as such, i.e., self-
identical entitiesÓ (Magliola, 1984: 34). With this notion of destruction in hand, Magliola is 
thus able to envision a logical method that climbs the tetralemmatic ladder (or the four-fold 
argumentative structure of Derrida), where each rung destructs the preceding order (1984: 
118), leaving the ÒglimmerÓ of diffrance (and $%nyat!) to shine through under erasure, as 
the Òforever-altering movementÓ that is Ògoing onÓ (1984: 42). A particular example of this is 
when Magliola employs the fourfold argumentative structure of Derrida to recast what he 
sees as N!g!rjunaÕs methodological procedure in the MMK:  
 
The employ of ddoublement to entrap adversaries in dilemma, and then the 
dialectical playing out of whatever first lemma has been shown self-
contradictory, until the whole tetralemma which has been Ôset in motionÕ 
exhausts itself, together forms a logical sequence that Nagarjuna [sic] uses 
throughout the twenty-seven chapters. (1984: 108, emphasis mine) 
 
This characterisation is called into question by Inada, as it imposes an overtly linear structure 
to the MMK in terms of this logical sequence (1985: 220). Further, this treatment of 
N!g!rjuna also renders him indistinguishable from Ved!nta philosophy, where Brahman (as 
its supreme identity or transcendental signified) sublates the preceding orders of truth-claims. 
Indeed, this is ultimately what Loy does in order to extract a core theory of nonduality. 
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Nevertheless, Magliola is careful to point out this does not mean that both Derrida and 
N!g!rjuna are engaged in negative theology68, despite their deployment of negative dialectic 
(as via negativa): Òwe can say Derrida radicalizes the process of defining by negative 
reference, and he does so by making negative reference absolute (i.e., no nucleus of identity 
survives the process; the nucleus is effaced)Ó (1984: 25). On the subject of absolute negation 
in N!g!rjuna, Inada claims: ÒN!g!rjuna would be hard pressed to justify an absolute denial or 
negation of objects of beings [sic], nor is his philosophy programmed to absolutely negate, 
deconstitute and constitute a directional traceÓ (Inada, 1985: 220). One cannot simply recast 
conceptual terms from one context to the next without its necessary translation. What is really 
being negatively defined through the destruction of entities for Magliola is consciousness 
(Skt. vij!na), such that Derrida becomes a Òmodified phenomenologistÓ (1984: 27): 
 
If we adjust our scopes again and broaden our language, we can see that 
Derrida, in a very general way, is translating the workings of negative 
theology to the ÔrationalÕ but unconscious workings of everyday mind. As 
negative theology defines God only by what God is not, the human mind, for 
Derrida, always defines by negative reference and only by negative reference. 
(Magliola, 1984: 24)  
 
Magliola makes it clear that while Derrida adopts negative reference (from the Òworkings of 
negative theologyÓ) he does not engage in negative theology: Ò[É] Derrida corrodes away 
any transcendental nucleus such as a Supreme Identity (whereas negative theology obviously 
must grant a Transcendental Nucleus to which all negative referents are the contradictory)Ó 
                                                
68
 Loy makes the contrary claim, however, with respect to Derrida and N!g!rjuna: ÒDerrida points to the 
Ôhyperessentiality,Õ the being (or nonbeing Ð an hypostatized $%nyat! can work as well) beyond Being whose 
trace lingers in most negative theologies, infecting them with a more subtle transcendental-signifiedÓ (Loy, 
1992: 248-9). 
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(1984: 24-25). The privileging of consciousness (Skt. vij!na) mentioned above also leads to 
what Magliola calls the ÒDerridean quandaryÓ in terms of a latent Cartesianism of Òmind and 
outsideÓ that he alleges of Derrida. In doing so, he also paves the way towards Yog!c!ra and 
Zen. 
 
To make this clear, Magliola argues: ÒBy proving the theory of presence is false does 
not mean one necessarily forwards a theory of non-presence as its logical contradictoryÓ 
(1984: 35). While it is clear that non-presence here is merely the flip side of the same 
(ontological) coin, Magliola also points out that: 
 
But the greater danger, warns Derrida, is not that we mistake formulae as 
adequate for differance [sic], but rather, that we hypostatize, that we ÔnameÕ 
the ÔglimmerÕ we cannot formulate, and thus behaviorally treat the under-
writing not as writing but as Logos. Perpetual drift becomes a mystical 
Ineffable. For to ÔnameÕ means to frame within the relational presence of a 
signifier and signified, and thereby assuage manÕs psychic need for control of 
the mysterious. The temptation is for man to worship what he does not know. 
(Magliola, 1984: 41, emphasis mine) 
 
This process of reification arrests the otherwise disseminatory effects of differnce, though 
Magliola fails to heed his own caveat: ÒSince that which survives absolute negative erasure 
cannot be an identity, i.e., a ÔwholeÕ constituted by signifier and signified, I shall call it the 
ÔDerridean elseÕÓ (1984: 28). What follows this assertion then is particularly ironic: ÒDerrida 
resorts to such techniques [of non-synonymic substitution] because each of them, in its own 
way, tends to undercut what he regards as the threat of reification, a kind of hypostasis of 
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ideas, and hence a deceptive recovery of a theory of identityÓ (Magliola, 1984: 29). 
MagliolaÕs solution around this is the extensive use of scare-quotes throughout his book, 
employed in what he understands to be Òthe spirit of DerridaÕs performance of Ôcrossing outÕ 
or Ôputting under erasureÕÓ (1984: 13). In MagliolaÕs case, however, this is used to mask the 
fact that he has performed the very threat of reification that he otherwise cautions us against. 
 
MagliolaÕs aim is to affirm these differential Ògoing-onsÓ that eludes the totalising 
effects of logocentrism: ÒDifferentialism, I shall argue, deconstructs all logocentrisms but 
re/appropriates according to a dissemination which I call variously the Buddhist trace, 
$%nyat!, the differential Ôgoing-onÕÓ (1984: xi). While Magliola correctly identifies the 
differential movements in Derrida and N!g!rjuna, the shift from adjectival (differentiality) to 
substantive (differentialism) also marks the difference between a descriptive and ascriptive 
characterisation. What differentiality describes is a state of interdependency, whereas 
differentialism ascribes ontic status to what cannot be defined, the suffix -ism marking a 
system or complex of philosophical concepts grounded in some axioms that are taken to be 
central and/or apodictic69. A relevant objection here may be found in Nayak: ÒIf anything 
beyond $%nyat! is adhered to it will itself amount to an incurable ÔismÕ which Buddha had 
taken much pain to overthrowÓ (1979: 486). This reminds us that $%nyat! is an empty 
designation, and as a signifier there is no referent Òstanding behindÓ it. I am thus unable to 
accept the notion of a ÒBuddhist traceÓ forwarded by Magliola, and as a characterisation of 
$%nyat! it is deeply misguided: 
 
I shall argue that NagarjunaÕs $%nyat! (ÒdevoidnessÓ) is DerridaÕs diffrance, 
                                                
69
 This recalls the descriptive fallacy discussed in Section 4.4, such that one takes the conventional to be more 
than merely conventional, and how we commit this mistake under a regulative theory in section 4.3, when we 
wrongly ascribe causal powers to conditions. See also (Arnold, 2001: 248; Nayak, 1979: 483). 
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and is the absolute negation which absolutely deconstitutes but which 
constitutes directional trace [...] They can savor and create the exquisitely 
esthetic (think of Zen painting, ceramics, gardens, poetry); yet I argue, they 
are doing all this as trace, as indeed, Derridean trace! (1984: 89) 
 
InadaÕs response here is equally emphatic: ÒNow, I may have a dim notion of the Derridean 
trace but Taoist and Zen masters, being earthy creatures, constantly remind their charges that 
Ôbirds fly but do not leave any traces.Õ [...] Likewise, then, there are no traces left in Zen 
painting, ceramics, gardens and poetry. If there are, those works of art are not Zen inspiredÓ 
(Inada, 1985: 220-1, emphasis mine). Consequently, while Magliola celebrates the 
differential going-ons that Derrida and N!g!rjuna purportedly ÒfrequentsÓ we are not, 
however, privy to the party. Not to put too fine a point to it, Magliola has reified 
differentiality in the process of celebrating it, and while the Òindispensable guardrail has 
always only protected, [but] never opened, a readingÓ; in dispensing altogether with the 
context in order to transgress towards what he saw as the Derridean else, Magliola is 
consequently thrown into absolute translation without so much as a pole of reference. This 
does not seem to bother Magliola too much, however, as he dryly remarks: ÒDerrida would 
deny almost all, if not all, of my above account of his thinking and its behaviorÓ (1984: 28). 
 
This is my translation of MagliolaÕs thesis: 
 
NagarjunaÕs Madhyamika ÔphilosophyÕ, as we shall see, teaches the Ôand/orÕ 
which is between the Ôand/orÕ of existence and non-existence, identity and 
non-identity, causality and non-causality. I shall argue in this chapter that 
NagarjunaÕs Middle Path, the Way of the Between, tracks the Derridean trace, 
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and goes Ôbeyond DerridaÕ in that it frequents the Ôunheard-of thoughtÕ and 
also, Ôwith one and the same stroke,Õ allows the reinstatement of the 
logocentric too. (Magliola, 1984: 87) 
 
I can only assume here that the ÒÔand/orÕ which is between the Ôand/orÕ of existence and non-
existence [etc.]Ó refers to differentiality, and that in ÒtrackingÓ the Derridean trace Magliola 
also refers to the differential movements (as movements of diffrance in its non-synonymic 
substitutions) that circulate within any structural ensemble. It is clear what Magliola meant 
by Ògoing beyond DerridaÓ is also the step beyond language, to the Òunheard-of thoughtÓ (as 
the silent reserve of $%nyat! that is later redeployed as nondual reality in Loy), for which 
ÒNagarjuna attains a supplmentation (permit me, please, the earnest jest) that Derrida never 
quite doesÓ (1984: 93). This is because, while Òit is not [DerridaÕs] intention to deconstruct 
everyday behaviorÓ (1984: 47); Òwith the collapse of the sign, [however,] Ôour entire world 
and language would collapseÕÓ (1984: 48). This anxiety Òstems from a latent Cartesianism, an 
irremediable split between ÔmindÕ and the ÔoutsideÕÓ, such that Ò[Derrida] cannot concede a 
ÔknowingÕ which is not consciousness-bound and logicalÓ (1984: 124). Note that once again 
this privileges consciousness (Skt. vij!na) which is central to the vij!nav!da doctrine of 
Yog!c!ra (see also Section 2.2), such that it is consciousness that is considered to be $%nya 
instead. It is also from the Yog!c!rin Avata.saka S%tra that Loy appropriates the metaphor 
of IndraÕs Net, which was adopted by the Chinese Hua-Yen tradition that later developed into 
the Sino-Japanese ChÕan/Zen tradition. We are thus trying to make sense of N!g!rjuna (and 
Derrida) through the extended looking-glass of Zen as if they were entirely commensurable 
without any discernible differences. It is in this context that Magliola speculates: ÒOne senses 
Derrida is indeed on the verge (from Latin, vegere: to bend, to be at the turn) of someway 
else, if not a something else, but surely he is not yet broken out of the turnÓ (1984: 48). This 
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is not the case with N!g!rjuna, however, as the Òreinstatement of the logocentricÓ may be 
found in his assertion that Òsa.s!ra is nirv!&aÓ, so we can still Òhave it both waysÓ (1984: 
87) with the doctrine of Two-truths, thus freeing Òthe differential mystic to shift to and fro 
between the logocentric and differential, according to what the situation-at-hand requiresÓ 
(1984: 127). The choice is between silence and philosophical verbiage (characterised by 
concatenating differential drift)70. My translation, before anyone should raise objections, is 
not disrespectful Ð hardly so Ð because it performs the ddoublement that MagliolaÕs text 
never did: it respected the context of not taking things into context. Better yet, this oscillating 
Òdisrespect-respectÓ indeterminacy allowed me to put some clarity on his thesis using his 
own supplementary splices.  
 
There is another supplmentation, however, which further demonstrates the virtue of 
philosophical silence: 
 
Hogen of Seiryo went to the hall to speak to the monks before the midday 
meal. He pointed at the bamboo blinds. At this moment, two monks went and 
rolled them up. Hogen said, ÔOne [has] profit; the other [has] lossÕ (Magliola, 
1984: 123, qtd. as in original) 
 
While Magliola distinguishes between what he called differential and centric Zen he fails to 
provide any rigorous distinction between them, such that Zen koans and parables are 
marshalled regardless to supplement his reading of Buddhist concepts. Magliola believes the 
above mondo captures Òthe beauty of the Buddhist Two Truths [É] and their unexpected 
dnouementsÓ (1984: 123). Magliola draws from this: ÒBlythÕs differentialist commentary 
                                                
70
 And it appears there are two further forms of silence, one empty and the other pregnant. We shall consider 
this notion of pregnant silence in Loy. 
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does not deliver the expected distinction between enlightenment and unenlightenment, but 
rather a lesson in the Two truthsÓ (1984: 123). He declines to comment exactly what the 
lesson in Two-truths consisted. However, with this very supplement Ð [has] Ð Magliola also 
demonstrates his fundamental misunderstanding of the concepts he is marshalling towards his 
arguments. The criticism here may take one of two forms: the weaker argument would point 
to this as an instance of isogetical interpretation, such that, given the latitudes of 
interpretation made possible by the non-teleologically motivated (i.e., equivocal) koans, one 
sees what one wishes to see in support of oneÕs hypothesis Ð in short, a hermeneutical 
circularity. The stronger argument will point out that while one may speak of profit and loss, 
these terms remain conventional and make sense only within the context of everyday 
discourse. While they cancel each other out, this does not open the path then to some 
ineffable absolute substratum underlying the phenomenal world. Once we see this, it would 
be untenable to hold that the ultimate truth disparages the conventional Ð we do not refute the 
everyday world (as being illusory) with some hypostatised notion of truth, this would be the 
position of Ved!nta. What constitutes Buddhist ultimate truth as promulgated by N!g!rjuna 
simply lies in the conventional status of linguistic thought-constructions (Skt. kalpana), 
which demonstrates its provisional status (as prajapti, or conventional designation) through 
its self-vitiating distinctions (such as profit/loss, self/other, etc.): ÒAll dependently arising 
entities are conceptually constructed (prajapti), and in this sense their arising is unrealÓ 
(Burton, 1999: 99). Surely, it would not make sense, even to a Zen master, to say that one has 
profit/loss Ð the verb here is exorbitant. Translating this to our discussion at hand, we have 
also established such possession to be logically impossible in Derrida; while N!g!rjuna 
would argue this form of possession as attachment leading to false d+()i (view). This 
dangerous supplement, [has], fulfils a lack that was never there to begin with, just as its 
original silence should have been left empty. 
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To better understand this notion of empty silence I will turn to MagliolaÕs reading of 
the Two-truths doctrine. Magliola cites Streng: ÒUnenlightened man constructs his existence 
through his discrimination and produces emotional attachments in the process. As long as his 
knowledge is discriminatory, i.e. [only] about ÔthingsÕ, man is simply producing the energies 
(karma) to continue this fabricationÓ (1984: 125, emphasis mine). This is not wrong, though 
once we juxtapose this with N!g!rjuna we have an apparent contradiction: 
 
Those who do not understand  
The distinction drawn between these two truths 
Do not understand  
The BuddhaÕs profound truth. (MMK XXIV: 9) 
 
How should we reconcile this apparent contradiction concerning distinction, such that it is 
denied in one sense and upheld in another? I argue that to be able to discriminate between 
these two senses of distinction is also to understand the Buddhist Two-truths, which is, at 
heart, yet another distinction. To the extent that we may make discriminations of the 
phenomenal world through language, these discriminations remain conventional, as are the 
phenomena under consideration. All phenomena are conventional, and we are unenlightened 
insofar as we continue to take the conventional to be more than merely conventional. In other 
words, we believe they exist inherently, as being non-empty. This is the mistake that leads to 
suffering within Buddhist perspective. The profound truth of this distinction is that it was 
never simply a case of privileging either conventional or ultimate truth, on their own, but 
precisely to demonstrate the dependency between them that is Òoff/logicalÓ (to employ 
MagliolaÕs terminology), and it is because of these off/logical limits that the Two-truths may 
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be thus delimited and distinguished, so that N!g!rjuna is able to claim Òsa.s!ra is nirv!&aÓ. 
In other words, what MMK XXIV: 9 asserts is not only the ability to distinguish between 
conventional and ultimate truths, but, more importantly, to discern that this distinction is 
itself conventional; it also implies that the Two-truths cannot be understood as ÒthingsÓ that 
could be discriminated in the sense Streng had intended71. I draw further support here from 
Garfield: ÒManju'ri indicates that the distinction between the conventional and ultimate is 
itself dualistic and hence merely conventional (from Vimilak"rti-nirde$a-s%tra) therefore the 
only proper attitude to adopt is silenceÓ (Garfield, 1995: 325). This does not mean, however, 
that silence is thereby accorded to $%nyat! because it is some ineffable, extra-linguistic, 
reality that supervenes upon the phenomenal world. 
 
Without a proper understanding of emptiness (i.e., that emptiness is itself empty), it is 
not possible to understand this distinction between Two-truths as being empty. This failure 
may be demonstrated in the way Magliola had chosen to translate emptiness as ÒdevoidnessÓ 
(following Sprung) in order to capture what he sees as its double movement of negation and 
constitution: 
 
ÔDevoidnessÕ as a translation evokes negation (the Latin prefix de meaning 
Ôcompletely.Õ so we have Ôdevoid,Õ or Ôcompletely voidÕ); and ÔdevoidnessÕ 
also evokes constitution (the Latin prefix de meaning Ôaway from.Õ so we have 
Ôdevoid,Õ or Ôaway from voidnessÕ). (1984: 89) 
 
While I grant this is somewhat preferable to the ÒVoidismÓ rendered in other translations, it is 
                                                
71
 See also section 4.4 where I argued the right-view to take with respect to the MMK does not lie in the 
promulgation of some absolute truth of emptiness. Whatever we assert through language cannot be anything 
more than conventional, even when it apparently asserts the ultimate nature of things. 
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hardly appropriate when Magliola glosses $%nyat! as ÒBETWEEN Ôeasy come, easy go,Õ 
AND Ôhard to come byÕÓ (1984: 104). In fact, it appears that Magliola does not seem to 
understand the import of MMK XXIV at all. He cites InadaÕs translation of MMK XXIV: 18 
in support of his claim that, ÒThe action which is dependent co-arising, and which comes 
within the range of pure negative reference sous rature, Nagarjuna calls $%nyat!Ó (Magliola, 
1984: 115-16): 
 
We declare that whatever is relational origination [dependent co-arising] is 
$%nyat!. It [$%nyat!] is a provisional name (i.e., thought construction) for the 
mutuality of being [dependent co-arising]  and, indeed, it is the middle path. 
(MMK XXIV: 18, InadaÕs translation) 
 
Now, the ÒactionÓ referred to by Magliola should be understood in its functional rather than 
substantive capacity72. What is placed sous rature is the substantive element of prat"tya-
samutp!da, not its functional description. This is incompatible with InadaÕs translation of 
prat"tya-samutp!da as Òrelational originationÓ (non-dependent non-origination would be 
more appropriate), such that Magliola understands it to designate Òthe mutuality of beingÓ, 
which may be discerned from his various supplmentations. We have established this earlier 
in Section 2.3, where we discussed how Inada misconstrues the gerund and extending it to 
read Òfor the mutuality (of being)Ó. The notion of Òrelational originationÓ is awkward, and 
Òmutuality of beingÓ is worse, because nothing originates strictly speaking and thus no 
conception of beings are mutually entailed by prat"tya-samutp!da. Thus, we also demonstrate 
that MagliolaÕs understanding of the term ÒactionÓ to be substantive which is counter to the 
                                                
72
 This recalls the hermeneutical distinction between causes (Skt. hetu) and conditions (Skt. pratyaya) 
forwarded by Garfield  in Section 4.2. The ÒactionÕ here proper to prat"tya-samutp!da is pratyaya and not kriy! 
(power possessed by a cause to bring about its effect). MagliolaÕs characterisation of $%nyat! thus fails the 
litmus test provided by this distinction. 
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MMK, unless he does not see any difference at all between these two aspects. 
 
In order to maintain his translation of $%nyat! as ÒdevoidnessÓ (even though there is 
no notion of any non-empty void that one needs to turn away from), Magliola marshals 
further support using translations of MMK XXIV: 14 from Inada and Streng73. I will 
juxtapose this with Garfield's translation, which is already provided in the above censure: 
 
InadaÕs translation: 
Whatever is in correspondence with $%nyat!, all is in correspondence (i.e., 
possible). Again, whatever is not in correspondence with $%nyat!, all is not in 
correspondence. (MK XXIV: 14 IN) [Inada adds the note: ÒThe meaning 
conveyed here is that $%nyat! is the basis of all existence. Thus, without it, 
nothing is possibleÓ p. 147.]   
 
StrengÕs translation: 
When emptiness ($%nyat!) Ôworks,Õ then everything in existence Ôworks.Õ If 
emptiness does not Ôwork,Õ then all existence does not Ôwork.Õ (XXIV: 14 S) 
 
In InadaÕs translation, if $%nyat! is the basis of all existence such that the phenomenal world 
is either in correspondence with it or not then this would be the instatement of an Absolute Ð 
one could just as easily insert ÒGodÓ here and it would make no real significant difference. It 
further supports my earlier claim that Magliola fails to understand the action designated by 
prat"tya-samutp!da. StrengÕs translation is better, stressing the functional rather than the 
substantive with the term, work. The term, existence, remains awkward though, because it is 
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 Both translations may be found in (Magliola, 1984: 116), and as I have quoted ad verbatim along with 
Magliola's interpolations I am providing the reference here instead to maintain clarity. 
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an ontological term placed in a functional relation74. GarfieldÕs translation avoids the 
difficulties of both (as cited above), and he supplements this with a footnote: ÒThe Tibetan 
term translated as ÔclearÕ here is Ôrung-baÕ which literally means suitable, or appropriate. But 
while that makes sense in Tibetan, it clearly doesnÕt in English, and the context indicates 
ÔclearÕ as the word that best captures the meaningÓ (1995: 301, fn. 113, emphasis mine). 
What is the context then? This assertion comes after MMK XXIV: 13 in which N!g!rjuna 
denies a nihilistic reading of $%nyat! by his opponents, such that if emptiness were treated as 
nonexistence (or non-empty Void), then all the absurd conclusions alleged by his opponents 
from verses 1-6 would entail. This turning of tables onto his opponents is arguably 
N!g!rjunaÕs philosophical coup de grce in the MMK. It is not appropriate to treat $%nyat! 
either as a basis of correspondence, or reverting to some implicit notion of existence by 
viewing it as absolute negation. Magliola is clearly confused in his understanding of Buddhist 
concepts Ð what is there ultimately to be negated, and from the turning away of what is de-
voidness meant to designate? In the spirit of taking things in its proper context, I shall allow 
N!g!rjuna his rightful dnouement here with the missing verse 13: 
 
You have presented fallacious refutations 
That are not relevant to emptiness. 
Your confusion about emptiness 
Does not belong to me. (MMK XXIV: 13) 
                                                
74
 See also section 4.2 where I discussed activity as an embodiment of both functional and substantive 
condtionality. 
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§ The Safety Net of Nondualism  
 
It comments, explains, paraphrases, but does not translate. (Derrida, 2002: 
109)  
 
The victorious ones have said 
That emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. 
For whomever emptiness is a view, 
That one will accomplish nothing. (MMK XIII: 8) 
 
We have seen with Magliola in the previous section how kicking away the ladder 
reveals the glimmer en abyme that is forever-altering, and also, how we consequently find 
ourselves cast adrift in this textual freedom without a pole of reference. In this respect, Loy is 
arguably more astute than Magliola, for he understands that one should never attempt to kick 
away the ladder without so much as a safety net. And not just any net will do for this 
differential drift, barring a nondual stasis. Loy characterises three types of nonduality: 
negation of dualistic thinking, nonplurality of the world, and nondifference of subject and 
object (1988: 17). He then proceeds from one argument to the next, in a similar fashion to 
Magliola. Loy argues: It is because of our dualistic ways of thinking through language that 
we also perceive the world pluralistically, as a collection of discrete objects, one of them 
being me (i.e., within a subject-object dyad). Once we are able to negate dualist forms of 
thinking, this way of viewing the world changes, such that the discrete phenomenal are not 
really distinct anymore but constitutes some integral whole (1988: 21). If so, then this notion 
of negation or deconstruction must be understood in a primarily destructive sense, though in 
dismantling logocentric identity (which is established through a signifier-signified dyad) 
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through arguing for their mutual dependency neither Derrida nor N!g!rjuna hypostatise this 
form of dependency itself, which otherwise becomes ontological in nature Ð Loy would 
prefer the term ÒspiritualÓ instead, when talking about this nondual reincorporation into the 
One Mind.  
 
In opposition to the dualist forms of philosophical knowledge is the ultimate 
nondifference of self and object. I am somewhat bemused, therefore, that after having 
deconstructed dualist thinking and its essentialist categories of identity, Loy should forward 
this nondifference of self and object as nondual mind that is $%nya, because one might just as 
easily read this nondifference as the Òbecoming-objectÓ of the self (i.e., self-objectification), 
thus perpetuating a subtler form of reification. But perhaps there is no significant difference 
between the two, as this nondualism also becomes the absolute unifying principle of all 
phenomena. Loy argues: Òthe world is not really experienced as a whole if the subject that 
perceives it is still separate from it in its observation of itÓ (1988: 25). For Loy, this 
nonduality achieves a true liberation outside of philosophy, though Derrida also warns that 
for such contrary values to be in opposition (e.g., inside and outside), one of them  Òmust 
already be accredited as the matrix of all possible oppositionÓ (1991c: 130). It is also in this 
context that I consider Loy to be engaged in a form of Kantian transcendental critique, as 
opposed to the immanent critique of Derrida, or the pr!sa#gika approach of N!g!rjuna. The 
difference lies in the hermeneutical telos towards which his critique is oriented. This for me 
is patently clear in Loy privileging Chapter 25 (Examination of Nirv!(a) over Chapter 24 
(Examination of the Four Noble Truths) of the MMK. Not only does this depart from the 
general scholarship in the field, I believe it also preserves a latent disposition in LoyÕs 
discourse towards a certain -!nta (Sanskrit suffix for end or limit) by focusing on the status 
of nirv!&a as a nondual reality rather than the epistemological nonduality of the Buddhist 
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Two-truths as forwarded by N!g!rjuna in MMK XXIV.  
 
To see how this is so, a hermeneutical distinction needs to be made regarding 
nonduality, such that it is significant in a way for Loy that is at odds with whatever I have 
argued thus far about N!g!rjuna. Failing that, it would indeed seem justified to attribute 
absolutism to N!g!rjuna. Murti makes this very clear for our purposes here: 
 
A distinction must, however, be made between the advaya of the M!dhyamika 
and the advaita of the Ved!nta, although in the end it may turn out to be one of 
emphasis of approach. Advaya is knowledge free from the duality of the 
extremes (antas or d)*+is) of ÔIsÕ and ÔIs notÕ, Being and Becoming etc. It is 
knowledge freed of conceptual distinctions. Advaita is knowledge is 
knowledge of a differenceless entity Ð Brahman (Pure Being) or Vij!na (Pure 
consciousness). The Vijn!av!da [sic] although it uses the term advaya for its 
absolute, is really an advaita system. ÔAdvayaÕ is purely an epistemological 
approach; the advaita is ontological. (1955: 217) 
 
This distinction is not lost on Loy, however, as he points out that: ÒM!dhyamika cannot be 
said to assert nonduality at all, since it makes few (if any) positive claims but confines itself 
to refuting all philosophical positions. M!dhyamika is advayav!da (theory of not-two, here 
meaning neither of two alternative views, our first sense of nonduality) rather than 
advaitav!da (the theory of nondifference between subject and object, our third sense)Ó (1988: 
28-9). Nevertheless, Loy maintains that nonduality will always refer to this third sense unless 
otherwise noted (1988: 30). The difference, as I have argued thus far Ð and is also pointed out 
above by Murti Ð lies ultimately in oneÕs emphasis of approach. What does this mean then? 
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Loy has ultimately reified the anti-dualist thesis of M!dhyamaka into the !nta (trans. end) of 
nonduality, and this cannot be established without resorting to philosophical speculation. 
Nayak cautions, however, that: Ò[T]here is no further scope for talking about the existence of 
a transcendental Absolute in $%nyav!da, which strictly speaking is not a v!da or ÔismÕ at all, 
but is simply a model of philosophical activity leading to the critical insight into the nature 
and function of concepts which in its turn gives us nirv!&a or freedom from all sorts of 
kalpana or thought-constructionsÓ (1979: 483).  
 
Therefore, while I acknowledge that Loy has a much better grasp of Buddhist 
concepts in general than Magliola, this form of grasping persists nevertheless at the level of 
his discourse, in its attempt to transgress and reach the other shore (which is also how 
nirv!&a is commonly characterised), by Òtranscend[ing] philosophy itself and all its 
ontological claimsÓ (Loy, 1988: 4). To put the same argument in a different manner, 
N!g!rjuna points out that emptiness (or nirv!&a) is the relinquishing of all views. A common 
metaphor used to demonstrate this form of relinquishing is to say that the candle flame has 
Ògone outÓ. Now, to posit this emptiness as being absolute would be to attempt to go where 
the flame has gone. This is absurd, and while LoyÕs arguments employing N!g!rjuna and 
Derrida may seem valid, I take issue with the ends to which they are deployed, ultimately 
invalidating the core theory of nonduality he is attempting to construct with their conflation. 
Therefore, while Loy might argue that: ÒEach alternative deconstructs the other, leaving no 
residue of Ôlower truthÕ to interfere with the inexpressible Ôhigher truth.Õ In classical 
M!dhyamika fashion, the analysis is parasitic upon the problematic duality and ends in a 
silence which reveals a different way of experiencingÓ (1986: 21, emphasis mine); this 
dissolution does not mean that one is therefore justified in hypostatising it as an absolute 
entity, as being non-empty. While I have mentioned at various junctures that there is a 
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soteriological dimension within Buddhist hermeneutics, I have also stressed that this notion 
of soteriology cannot, however, be conceived in terms of a hypostatised or non-empty entity. 
 
 How does Loy characterise this particular end? He claims: 
 
The important thing in Buddhism is that the coming-to-rest of our using names 
to take perceptions as self-existing objects actually deconstructs the 
ÔobjectiveÕ everyday world [É] we unfind ourselves ÔinÕ the dream-like world 
that the Diamond Sutra describes, and plunge into the horizontality of moving 
and light surfaces where there are no objects, only an incessant shifting of 
masks; where there is no security and also no need for security, because 
everything that can be lost has been, including oneself. (1992: 250, emphasis 
mine) 
 
While I note the poststructuralist terminology here, I will not, however, raise the vexatious 
question as to how we should understand the term ÒobjectiveÓ here. Rather, I am genuinely 
curious as to how such an end might be even vaguely edifying for anyone? More specifically, 
what form of existence would that take? Now, compare this with GarfieldÕs commentary on 
MMK XXV: 19-20, which Loy takes to be central to the MMK: ÒTo be in nirv!(a, then, is to 
see those things as they are Ð as merely empty, dependent, impermanent, and nonsubstantial, 
but not to be somewhere else, seeing something else. [É] Nag!rjuna is emphasizing that 
nirv!&a is not someplace else. It is a way of being hereÓ (Garfield, 1995: 332, emphasis 
mine). This is at odds with the dream-like world that Loy finds himself in. Nonetheless, I 
have also pointed out that nirv!&a is commonly characterised as Òthe other shoreÓ, which 
would seem to support LoyÕs claim. I will point out here that one needs to realise that this 
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characterisation remains conventional, and this Òother shoreÓ is not simply found there or 
elsewhere. Even if one should persist in believing the efficacy of some Derridean else, I will 
then refer to the etymology of the word ÒelseÓ, taken from the Old English el-lende, meaning, 
Òin a foreign landÓ. Now, if Garfield claims that for N!g!rjuna nirv!&a is a way of being 
here, it also then means we are here in a foreign land. And in accordance with everything I 
have argued thus far, we are always inhabiting within this foreign land, even if we should like 
to dwell in it. Now, I am certain that an entire host of valid objections may be raised at this 
point, and indeed I stress this must be possible, because what I have forwarded is a 
translation that is itself oriented by certain hermeneutical choices. The virtue of my rendition 
Ð as far as I would like to believe Ð is that it violates neither conventional nor ultimate 
Buddhist truths. Loy, however, would like to efface them altogether by extending the twin 
ends of sa.s!ra and nirv!&a into a multidimensional web of cosmic interdependence. The 
key verses that Loy takes to be central to the MMK are given below: 
 
There is not the slightest difference 
Between cyclic existence and nirv!(a. 
There is not the slightest difference  
Between nirv!(a and cyclic existence. 
 
Whatever is the limit of nirv!(a, 
That is the limit of cyclic existence. 
There is not even the slightest difference between them, 
Or even the subtlest thing. (MMK XXV: 19-20) 
 
The significance of these verses for Loy will be apparent once we consider the trope of 
 ! 202 
IndraÕs Net. A consequence of this, however, is that Loy argues: ÒIt is becoming obvious that 
we cannot discriminate ourselves from the interdependent web of life without damaging (and 
perhaps destroying) both it and ourselves. Awareness of mutual identity and interpenetration 
is rapidly developing into the only doctrine that makes sense anymore, perhaps the only one 
that can save us from ourselvesÓ (1993: 483). Loy did genuinely believe in the efficacy of a 
theory of interdependence, that it would be able to explain and make sense of the world that 
we live in, and to that extent I can agree with him. In fact, I would point out that our 
discussions thus far have been engaged in such a theory of interdependence, though it has yet, 
as a discourse, to summon its own heterological opening. This shall be addressed in the 
conclusion. LoyÕs mistake, however, is proceeding to claim this fact of interdependency into 
a universal principle (as a non-dual sameness that is self-identical) against essentialist 
thought. Such a view is ultimately untenable, from both deconstructive and M!dhyamika 
perspectives. 
 
Before going any further, I have to emphasise that my account of Loy spans a number 
of his works, each dealing with various aspects of nonduality, in order to address the critical 
junctures where he borrows from Derrida and N!g!rjuna. As I have argued thus far, the 
nondual vision forwarded by Loy is absolutist and incompatible with both thinkers, even 
though it is also in their conflation that he finds the resources to support his reading of IndraÕs 
Net in Hua-yen75, before moving ultimately towards meditative practice in Zen as the 
nonphilosophical site par excellence. A preliminary criticism of Loy here is that he has 
homogenised entire traditions into the common fold of Mah!y!na Buddhism: ÒIn Yog!c!ra 
the claim that experience is nondual, in all three of our senses, attains full development and 
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 Though the trope of IndraÕs Net appears in his writing as early as 1988, its full implications are not drawn out 
till later, where arguments from Derrida and N!g!rjuna are marshalled explicitly to support his nondualist 
thesis. 
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explicitness, and so it is fitting that with that claim Buddhist philosophy may be said to have 
reached its culminationÓ (1988: 30, emphasis mine). This form of homogenisation is 
problematic, and is only cursorily acknowledged by Loy. In doing so, Loy also stresses 
N!g!rjuna as a Mah!y!na thinker instead of pr!sa#gika-m!dhyamika. He does admit, 
nevertheless, that $%nyat! and diffrance may be subject to metaphysical reincorporation, 
even pointing out this has repeatedly happened in later Buddhism.  
 
To N!g!rjunaÕs admonition that those for whom $%nyat! is a view are incurable, Loy 
replies, Òthe question why so many people seem to be incurable must be addressedÓ (1992: 
234), only to add: 
 
I shall not review the controversies about whether Yog!c!ra is an idealism 
(therefore a reversion to logocentrism) and how compatible it is with 
M!dhyamika, except to emphasize that its methodology was different: rather 
than offering a logical analysis of philosophical categories, it attempted to 
work out the implications of certain meditative experiences. (1992: 234-5) 
 
For a thorough-going nondualist this assertion nevertheless conserves a binary distinction 
between what is to be considered philosophy and nonphilosophy. It also points to a 
bifurcation between Buddhist theory and practice, which should otherwise be in conjunction. 
Finally, it questions the viability of reading N!g!rjuna as a Mah!y!na thinker, as he would 
almost certainly reject LoyÕs nondualist conclusion. As Magliola had warned earlier, 
somewhat prophetically, perpetual drift becomes a mystical ineffable (1984: 41). It then 
comes as hardly surprising when Loy laments: ÒDerridaÕs freedom is too much a textual 
freedom, that it is overly preoccupied with language because it seeks liberation through and 
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in language Ð in other words, that it is logocentricÓ (1992: 239). To the dualism between 
signifier and signified in language Loy thus supplements another dualism, between that of 
language and silence: 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, however, we can notice that N!g!rjunaÕs 
critique of such dualisms itself generates another dualism, one that during the 
following millennium would become increasingly problematical: that between 
language and silence. This dualism became so important because it reflects an 
essential and perhaps inescapable dualism at the heart of Buddhism: between 
delusion (of which language is a vehicle) and enlightenment (to which silence 
is believed to point). (1999: 250, emphasis mine) 
 
As we recall from the previous section, the choice is between silence and philosophical 
verbiage. Loy made this remark partly to explain the relation between D,gen and N!g!rjuna, 
juxtaposing the formerÕs literary approach to the latterÕs dialectical approach towards 
language, such that Òin each case there is a parallel with deconstructions in 
M%lamadhyamakak!rik!Ó (Loy, 1999: 255). It is also from here that we have to distinguish 
between a pregnant silence and an empty one. 
 
For now, the step beyond philosophy (and Derrida) would therefore consist in the step 
beyond language. This is because if all language is logocentric (a common claim made by 
both Magliola and Loy), then the only possibility for the step beyond philosophy 
promulgated by Derrida has to be found outside the domain of philosophy and its dualistic 
categories of language. Loy, however,  takes this notion of non-philosophical site literally, 
opposing the meditative practice of zazen in ChÕan/Zen Buddhism to Òthe ÔotherÕ of 
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philosophy, [as] the repressed shadow of our rationality, dismissed and ignored because it 
challenges the only ground philosophy hasÓ (Loy, 1993: 485). In doing so, Loy will instate 
$%nyat! as a nondual net extending its infinite textual relations like some miraculous web 
across all of reality. The price of this as I see it, however, is a schizoid stasis petrified into 
silence. This, I argue, is the result of taking emptiness itself as a view. Ultimately, the 
strategy common to both Magliola and Loy is to argue that DerridaÕs deconstruction does not 
go far enough, that it fails to deconstruct itself (for the simple reason that Derrida arrives at 
his insights through language, and thus, ipso facto incomplete): 
 
From the nondualist perspective, the problem with DerridaÕs radical critique of 
Western philosophy is that it is not radical enough: his deconstruction is 
incomplete because it does not deconstruct itself and attain that clture which, 
as we have seen, is the opening to something else. This is why Derrida 
remains in the half-way house of proliferating Ôpure textuality,Õ whereas 
deconstruction could lead to a transformed mode of experiencing the world. 
(1988: 249) 
 
Loy views this pure textuality as a form of bad infinity that tends to become increasingly 
ludic (1988: 249), even though I should point out here that it is precisely this textual freedom 
(notably, of graft and citation) that allows him to extrapolate these claims about textuality to 
the whole universe in the first place (see Loy, 1992: 235; 1993: 481). Where Magliola argues 
that to study the principle of identity is to study language, Loy claims: ÒIn Derridean terms, 
the important thing about causality is that it is the equivalent of textual diffrance in the 
world of things. If diffrance is the ineluctability of textual causal relationships, causality is 
the diffrance of the ÔobjectiveÕ worldÓ (Loy, 1992: 247). The onto-theological trope of 
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IndraÕs Net becomes then the figure par excellence of nondualism extending beyond 
language through its conflation of textuality and $%nyat!76. 
 
I wish to take a detour here to point out that this ÒoutsideÓ of philosophy also means, 
for both Magliola and Loy, outside of the Western philosophical tradition. But in doing so we 
face an immediate problem, because we would have to establish, on the one hand, a common 
rejection of logocentrism in both Western and Eastern philosophies, in order to justify the 
extrapolation of the latterÕs insights to bear upon whatever discussion at hand. This not only 
confirms Òthe enduring attraction of logocentrism and onto-theology, not just in the West but 
everywhereÓ (Loy, 1992: 238), but also the perpetuation of this centrist mode of thinking in 
the form of a barely-masked ethnocentrism. On the other hand, assuming that this common 
rejection of logocentrism is indeed valid, then the resources of this ÒOtherÓ from which we 
seek a corrective to our malaise is not so alien after all. Unless, of course, one seeks recourse 
to a brand of Eastern mysticism capable of outstripping Western rationality so as to cure it of 
its metaphysical psychosis, just as Magliola had pointed out: ÒAny philosophy of presence 
can be disproven. The contradictory which unseats the conclusion of a philosophy of 
presence is also illogicalÓ (1984: 35). The net result is that we privilege the non-logical (I 
hesitate to say, ÒillogicalÓ), quasi-mystical insights of the East to undo the entrenched 
rationalism of the West, while remaining unassailable in the process Ð for who can argue with 
the ineffable? Thus, we perpetuate not only the very logocentric discourse that we seek to 
contest, but also a back-handed Orientalism, for Reason would always seem to be the sole 
province of Western philosophy. This reinforces my earlier claim in Section 1.2 that the 
distinction between Oriental and Occidental thought had always depended upon the criterion 
of rationality. It also recalls ThurmanÕs caution against exoticising Eastern thought as non-
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 This was meant to be commensurate with DerridaÕs notion of an unthinkable structure without centre, though 
this is incompatible with the absolute nondualism that Loy posits. 
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rational or mystical. Where I have consistently argued that the prima facie mysticism of 
N!g!rjuna (and the purported obscurantism of Derrida) actually demystifies the myth of 
common sense; Loy would end up celebrating this mysticism as being superior, in 
outstripping the confines of rationality. Such an approach, in my view, is guilty of either 
ethnocentrism or a back-handed Orientalism, but it cannot be innocent of both. In this respect 
then, LoyÕs nondualist solution is arguably the pice de rsistance to this dilemma by 
ultimately collapsing these dualisms altogether (of East and West, Self and Other, Text and 
World). This is not to invalidate the possibility of cross-cultural discourses and its 
interactions, but rather, to point out that one does not facilely attain the hoped-for plane of 
exteriority with ease. 
 
I will now turn to the discussion of LoyÕs IndraÕs Net, which may be traced in embryo 
from a passage in Of Grammatology:  
 
In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There 
are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to 
the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer simple origin. 
(Derrida, 1997: 36) 
 
Magliola had earlier employed this to forward what he called the ddoublement argument 
from Derrida (1984: 9). Now, the same passage is employed by Loy to draw parallels 
between Derrida and Hua-yen philosophy in terms of a multi-dimensional textuality that 
extends beyond language: 
 
Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net 
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that has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches 
out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of 
deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each ÒeyeÓ of the net, 
and since the net itself in infinite in all dimensions, the jewels are infinite in 
number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a 
wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for 
inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface 
there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only 
that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the 
other jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring.... [I]t 
symbolizes a cosmos in which there is an infinitely repeated interrelationship 
among all the members of the cosmos. This relationship is said to be one of 
simultaneous mutual identity and mutual inter-causality77. (Loy, 1992: 235-6) 
 
Loy immediately states, like Magliola did before, that N!g!rjuna would not accept such an 
onto-theological trope, for obvious reasons, but maintains nevertheless that the metaphor is 
not without value (1992: 236). What Loy wishes to demonstrate with this metaphor is cosmic 
interpenetration and lack of self-presence, and, recalling here the strategic value of MMK 
XXV: 19-20 for Loy, one may say that he has extended the twin ends of sa.s!ra and nirv!&a 
to coincide into an absolute context without horizon. Put in another way, Loy is here 
forwarding his theory of interdependence by extending Derridean textuality as infinite 
parabh!va: ÒThat this textuality (literally, Ôthat which is woven, webÕ) extends beyond 
language means that right now you are reading more than the insights of Mah!y!na 
Buddhism, as interpreted by me: for in this page is nothing less than the entire universeÓ 
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 The original text is taken from Francis H. Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra. (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977: 2). 
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(Loy, 1993: 482). Loy claims that such a world is non-hierarchical, as there is no centre, or if 
there is one, it is everywhere (1992: 236). He also claims that it is non-teleological, in the 
absence of a simple origin and end, but this Òimplies not the meaninglessness of life but its 
meaningfreeness78. Meaning may not be fixed, but it is not lacking. Life becomes play; yet it 
has always been play: the issue is whether we suffer our games because they are the means 
whereby we hope to ground ourselves somewhere in IndraÕs Net, or whether we dance freely 
within the Net because we are itÓ (Loy, 1993: 484). While IndraÕs Net may seem at first sight 
to be formally similar to the medium of differentiation, it fails to account for the dynamism of 
differential drift. Non-synonymic substitution is not the same as mirroring, and more 
importantly, reflection only takes place in a linear plane. The kaleidoscopic expansion 
afforded by this trope also leads to what I would characterise as a schizoid vision, such that 
everything is reflected in everything else.  
 
Loy believes his account to be a contemporary restatement of M!dhyamika: ÒIndraÕs 
Net, in which everything functions as a cause for everything else, is a more ÔpositiveÕ and 
metaphysical way to restate N!g!rjunaÕs denial that anything has self-existenceÓ (1993: 485). 
Loy believes this to be a shrewd, positive re-affirmation of N!g!rjunaÕs negative dialectic: If 
everything is a cause for everything else they then cease to be causes, insofar as we do not 
arrive at any effects. Loy admits this is a limitation of Hua-yen, from which he will 
ultimately part ways: ÒThere is a practical problem with Hua-yen: it casts its net too wide. To 
say that something is caused by everything else in the universe is so general that it is also 
useless; in daily life we need a more efficient causality which correlates one cause with one 
effectÓ (1993: 486). In other words, this notion of causality needs to be grounded somehow, 
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 Loy intends with this neologism to designate what is between meaningfulness and meaninglessness. As is the 
problem of taking things too literally, one fails to translate, except by awkward and redundant 
supplmentations. This criticism is not reserved solely to Loy, but applies to Magliola as well. This is the result 
of subscribing to a rigid hermeneutical methodology. 
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even though the premise that Loy began with Ð viz., the absent centre of textuality, or the 
emptiness of causation Ð meant that there is no longer a transcendental signified capable of 
grounding our concepts. The solution to overcoming this for Loy lies in identifying with the 
general structure of textuality itself as IndraÕs Net. If there is no single transcendental 
signified that governs the web of textual relations, then it is that general field of textual 
relations that supplants and provides the ultimate ground: 
 
If each jewel in IndraÕs Net mutually conditions and is conditioned by all the 
others [i.e., prat"tya-samutp!da], then to become completely groundless is to 
become completely grounded, not in some particular [transcendental signified 
that we have already jettisoned], but in the whole web of interdependent 
relations. The supreme irony of my struggle to ground myself is that it cannot 
succeed because I am already grounded Ð in the totality. I am groundless and 
ungroundable insofar as delusively feeling myself to be separate from the 
world; I have always been fully grounded insofar as I am the world. (Loy, 
1993: 489, emphasis mine)  
 
The first part of LoyÕs argument here may be answered retrospectively with a point made 
earlier in Section 3.1, where I argued that the human impulse to philosophise (and in 
particular, to reify) is so deeply entrenched that if we were told emptiness leads to the 
cessation of all views, we would persist in holding that as another view in order to ground us. 
We summarily surrender the causal link of dualism to the unbridled yoke of nondualism, and 
this continued manner of grasping may be demonstrated with N!g!rjuna:  
 
ÒI, without grasping, will pass beyond sorrow, 
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And I will attain nirv!(a,Ó one says. 
Whoever grasps like this 
Has a great grasping. (MMK XVI: 9) 
 
The latter part of LoyÕs argument above is in fact spurious, specifically, when he asserts, ÒI 
am groundless and ungroundable insofar as delusively feeling myself to be separate from the 
worldÓ. Within the perspective of the MMK, it is precisely because of the persisting 
psychological certitude and belief in my own self-identity as an independent agent separate 
from the world that I thus feel grounded. In other words, I subscribe to an implicit dualism 
between self and the world. This is our everyday understanding of reality. We may agree that 
such a view is deluded, because the entities under consideration, myself and the world, are 
equally empty because of prat"tya-samutp!da. Loy would characterise this as nonplurality of 
the world. The dualism collapses as a result of that. But that does not necessarily commit us 
to the logical opposite of nondualism as an absolute identity found in the nondifference 
between subject and object: ÒI have always been fully grounded insofar as I am the worldÓ. If 
that were the case, then there is no need for cultivation of the path, for there is ultimately no 
prospect of cessation. 
 
More importantly, how do we begin to identify with this Net? I should point out here 
that the dissolution of dualism leads, for Loy, towards the plenitude of nondual sameness. 
This effectively condemns us to a nondual stasis, despite whatever Loy might say: ÒLetting 
go of myself and merging with that nothingness leads to something else: when consciousness 
stops trying to catch its own tail, I become nothing, and discover that I am everything Ð or, 
more precisely, that I can be anythingÓ (1993: 504). This notion of Òletting-goÓ is significant 
here for Loy in identifying with IndraÕs Net, and he argues that the move beyond language is 
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an attempt to liberate rather than eliminate concepts into a nondual realm which is ultimately 
recuperated into the One Mind79. This is because:  
 
As long as we identify with language at all, even with language as a whole, we 
are still trying to retain a self-existing ground which reveals that we are still 
anxious about our feared lack-of-ground. Later we shall see how meditation Ð 
letting-go of all thought/language Ð is necessary if we are to resolve the 
problematical dualism between language and the objectified world we live 
Ôin.Õ (Loy, 1993: 489) 
 
As mentioned earlier, meditation is the nonphilosophical site that unseats logocentrism, for 
Loy also sees in this the intimate relation between meditation, letting go of oneself (through 
linguistic forgetfulness), and finally identifying with the Net: ÒÔForgettingÕ itself is how a 
jewel in IndraÕs Net loses its sense of separation and realizes that it is the Net. Meditation is 
learning how to die by learning to ÔforgetÕ the sense-of-self, which happens by becoming 
absorbed into oneÕs meditation exerciseÓ (Loy, 1993: 503). This also means that letting go of 
oneself is to forget the linguistic dualisms of knowledge (j!na) in order to realise (through 
praj!) the nondual nature of the Net: ÒThe relationship between names and things is the 
archetypal signifier/signified correspondence, and the nondualist goal is nothing else than its 
complete deconstructionÓ (Loy, 1988: 250, emphasis mine). Therefore, in stressing 
meditation as a non-linguistic practice Loy also finds there the wherewithal of praj! (or 
wisdom as non-conceptual knowledge) to contend with j!na in order to transcend 
philosophy altogether. Nayak argues, however, that:  ÒThere is no implication in the 
M!dyamika philosophy of N!g!rjuna of praj! (wisdom) as consisting in the knowledge of 
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 Loy cites a Chinese ChÕan master as saying: ÒThe One Mind can take in all minds and return them to the One 
Mind, this is the meaning of Indra's NetÓ (Loy, 1993: 505). 
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an Absolute Reality; when one realizes the $%nyat! or nai'sv!bh!vya (essencelessness) of all 
concepts and desists from indulging in all sorts of thought-constructions, that is the state of 
praj! or wisdomÓ (1979: 485). We will also recall here that McCagney had made a similar 
point regarding N!g!rjuna employing j!na rather than praj! to refute his opponents in the 
MMK. In pointing this out I am not disparaging the significance of praj!, nor am I 
consequently privileging j!na as the only valid means of attaining enlightenment. What I 
wish to stress here is their relative dependency Ð one is the cessation of the other Ð and to 
point out the dialectical opposition between praj! and j!na as constructed by Loy to be yet 
another kalpana in itself. Also, we should note that deconstruction is employed here in a 
destructive sense, and this is meant to cohere with Candrak$rtiÕs characterisation of nirv!&a 
as the utter dissipation of ontologising views. Loy goes on to claim: ÒOnce 
prat"tyasamutp!da is used to ÔdissolveÕ svabh!va, then the lack of ÔthingnessÕ in things 
implies a nondual way of experiencing in which there is no awareness of cause-and-effect 
because one is the cause/effect. Again, each pole ÔdeconstructsÕ the other, and what remains 
is inexpressible in the dualistic categories of languageÓ (Loy, 1986: 16). I can fully agree 
with Loy here that once any form of entitative identity has been deconstructed or 
demonstrated to be empty this leads to a nondual (i.e., advaya) apprehension of worldly 
phenomena, though this does not justify the ontological sleight-of-hand he performs with the 
claim: Òone is the cause/effectÓ. This assertion is advaitic in the sense significant for Loy that 
is not upheld in N!g!rjunaÕs MMK: he would rightly argue that one should not say ÒisÓ or Òis 
notÓ. This ontological sleight-of-hand inevitably requires the complicity of silence to mask its 
operations. 
 
What is ultimately inexpressible in language is $%nyat!, and Loy provides a gloss of 
the term to support his argument: ÒThey derive from the root su which means Ôto be swollen,Õ 
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both like a hollow balloon and like a pregnant woman; therefore the usual English translation 
ÔemptyÕ and ÔemptinessÕ must be supplemented with the notion of Ôpregnant with 
possibilitiesÕÓ (1992: 233). In order to understand the fecundity of this silence and its 
significance towards LoyÕs core theory I shall trace its inception to Mah!k!'yapa, the first 
ChÕan/Zen patriarch. In the Flower Sermon Buddha held a white flower in his hand, twirling 
it, while saying nothing to the sangha (trans. assembly). Only Mah!k!'yapa smiled, 
whereupon Buddha affirmed his enlightenment. The significance of this s%tra not only 
establishes Mah!k!'yapa as BuddhaÕs successor, but it also formed the basis of a unique 
emphasis on wordless and direct transmission from teacher to disciple, thus establishing an 
uninterrupted lineage from Mah!k!'yapa to ChÕan/Zen. This also developed into the doctrine 
of sudden enlightenment which is unmediated by language. It is not difficult to see its 
significance towards LoyÕs theory of nonduality, whence his stress on zazen as the 
nonphilosophical site par excellence. Note that I have stressed wordless rather than silence, 
for the reason that silence may be re-interpreted as expressing the ineffable nature of nirv!&a, 
and in doing so, predicating silence onto nirv!&a as some existent entity. This is what I 
believe Loy ultimately wishes to interpret the silence of $%nyat!. Nayak makes the position 
very clear for us: 
 
One may say that the justification for silence on the part of the philosophically 
enlightened person lies not in the inscrutable nature of some absolute outside 
the world of our ordinary discourse; the explanation lies in the essencelessness 
or $%nyat! of the concepts which are only conventionally useful or sa.v+ti 
satya. A philosopher with the critical insight of $%nyat! is noncommittal with 
regard to contending metaphysical thought-constructions; this constitutes his 
t%(&imbh!va or silence. (1979: 488)  
 ! 215 
 
I would justify the hermeneutical choice of wordless over silence as it best demonstrates this 
noncommittal attitude towards contending thought-constructions. In other words, we are not 
silenced by the Òabsolute outsideÓ that Loy believed silence to be pointing towards. I argue 
instead that silence points to nothing, is nothing other than the cessation of such reference, 
linguistic or otherwise. Of course, LoyÕs nondual vision goes beyond this absolute outside, by 
dissolving any such notions of inside and outside altogether into a petrified stasis: ÒOur 
minds need to realize that they are ab-solute in the original sense: Ôunconditioned.Õ 
Meditative techniques decondition the mind from its tendency to secure itself by circling in 
familiar ruts, thereby freeing it to become anythingÓ (1993: 505).  
 
LoyÕs claim that our minds are thus free to become anything seemingly invalidates 
my criticism of his nondualist position as being static. I shall demonstrate this need not be the 
case. A support of this may be found in LoyÕs criticism of Derrida: 
 
Derrida understands that all philosophy, including his, can only Ôreinscribe,Õ 
but for him the sole solution is to disseminate wildly, in the hope of avoiding 
any fixation into a system that will subvert his insight. One wonders what 
freedom can be found in such a need to keep ahead of yourself. In contrast, we 
have the nondualist example of a Zen master, who plays with language Ð 
moving in and out of it freely Ð because he is not caught in it. His laconic 
expressions emerge from / are one with an unrepresentable ground of serenity, 
and although they cannot directly point to this ground, there are ways to 
suggest it for someone else. (1988: 256, emphasis mine) 
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I believe it should not be necessary to rehearse here the reasons why Derrida needs recourse 
to non-synonymic substitutions. Indeed, this is a common complaint of both Magliola and 
Loy. What is inconsistent, however, is the criterion according to which such differential drift 
is denied any positive implications for Derrida but is held to be positively affirmed by Zen. I 
will draw the relevant passages here from both Magliola and Loy: 
 
Magliola:  
The Master wrenches the viewpoint of the monk this way and that, so he 
might learn to live the going-on of alterity. And so he might learn that alleged 
centers are not to be foisted onto the differential flow; rather, alleged centers 
are really a matter of shifting perspectives, and the adept is one who can 
control these shifts at will. Buddhist diffrance, in other words, belongs to no 
viewpoints, but can be regarded from all viewpoints. (1984: 102-3, emphasis 
mine) 
 
Loy: 
The an!tman doctrine of Buddhism is often contrasted with the Upani*adic 
identification of !tman with Brahman [...] but these two extremes turn out to 
be identical: the Buddhist Ôno-selfÕ is indistinguishable from the Ôall-SelfÕ of 
Ved!nta, for the shrink to nothing is to become everything. (1986: 15, 
emphasis mine)  
 
What is immediately apparent above is the shift between dialectical extremes affirmed by 
both Magliola and Loy. Recalling the significance of Kacc!y!nagotta-s%tra to N!g!rjunaÕs 
MMK, the only appropriate reply here would be: without approaching either extreme, the 
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Tath!gata teaches a doctrine by the middle. NayakÕs remark eloquently sums up for me here 
both differential drift and the shifts between dialectical extremes of Magliola and Loy: 
 
Freedom from all sorts of metaphysical vagaries is the ideal for the 
M!dhyamikas. One concept leads to another, one idea leads to the other, and 
this is alright in its sphere. But metaphysicians make an illegitimate use of 
these concepts, thereby falling into the trap of absolute confusion and 
inconsistencies. Philosophical insight consists in avoiding these extreme 
metaphysical positions by a perfect understanding of these concepts as being 
$%nya or ni'svabh!va, that is, as devoid of essence. (1979: 488, emphasis 
mine) 
 
This trap of absolute confusion and inconsistencies also means that we no longer know how 
to act in the face of absurdity entailed by such radical nondual revision Ð indeed, we are 
petrified into stasis entailed by a nondualist reality, because we no longer know how to make 
sense of our being in the world. This not only violates conventional truths, but also vitiates 
the very aim of LoyÕs theory of interdependency that he began with. This is most glaring 
when Loy addresses the issue of ethics: 
 
That is the origin of the ethical problem we struggle with today: without some 
transcendental ground such as God or Buddhanature, what will bind our 
atomized selves together? Again, there is an answer in IndraÕs Net. When my 
sense-of-self lets go and disappears, I realize my interdependence with all 
other phenomena in that all-encompassing net. It is more than being dependent 
on them: when I discover that I am you, the trace of your traces, the ethical 
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problem of how to relate to you is transformed. We donÕt need a moral code to 
tie us together if we are not separate from each other. (1993: 500) 
 
This argument is specious, and may be easily demonstrated with a counterfactual: say for 
example I am standing trial for mass genocide, and I proceed to justify my actions (or non-
actions, by LoyÕs reckoning) by pointing out that I have not killed anyone, for the simple 
reason that everyone is me, and if I were guilty as charged I would not be standing here in the 
first place, because that would mean I have killed myself in the process. But strictly speaking, 
I would not even be on trial to begin with, for there is no concept of an Other that might 
otherwise call me to account. Clearly, this is untenable, and I do not know of any moral 
philosophy, Buddhist or otherwise, that might affirm such a position. This rejection of a 
moral code also means, ultimately, that, nondifference results in indifference. I argue this is 
the result of absolutism (as a context without horizon), because there are no longer passages 
of translation (that always presuppose some boundary or limit) through which one may 
engage ethically with the other. This nondualist stasis violates both ultimate and conventional 
truths in Buddhism, and runs counter to the path-based hermeneutics I am forwarding. 
 
What I have done in this chapter is to course a middle path between the philosophical 
extremes of MagliolaÕs differentialism and LoyÕs nondualism, though upon analysis, both 
extremes would turn out to be rather similar. I have also demonstrated the untenability of 
their positions, through intervening at the stress points of their discourse with my 
understanding of Derrida and N!g!rjuna established previously. As I have consistently 
argued, there is nothing particularly mystifying about either Derrida or N!g!rjuna. This 
misconception only arises when one attempts to understand the step beyond philosophy in a 
radically absolute manner. This results in absurd or inconsistent conclusions which obtain so 
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long as one persists in methodological hegemony Ð as I have stressed, the method, if there 
ever was one, can only be a method of no-method. In doing so, I should also maintain that my 
refutations do not constitute any judgements, negative or otherwise, regarding Zen 
Buddhism. To do so is to base interpretation upon interpretation. What I have demonstrated, 
however, is that both criticsÕ renditions of Zen are incompatible with N!g!rjuna (of which he 
is a precursor), and not necessarily capable of providing the heterological opening that both 
allege Derrida misses. Both do so in order to attain the other shore of their discourse, though 
as both Derrida and N!g!rjuna are only too well aware, this can only be achieved at the cost 
of arrogating oneÕs being in finitude to the mistaken presumption of infinitude, in the form of 
an impossible step: 
 
I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the operations of 
childbearing Ð but also with a glance toward those who, in a society from 
which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet 
unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary 
whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in 
the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity. 
(Derrida, 1978: 370) 
 
We say that this understanding of yours 
Of emptiness and the purpose of emptiness 
And of the significance of emptiness is incorrect. 
As a consequence you are harmed by it. (MMK XXIV: 7) 
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§ In-Conclusion: Heterological Avenues 
 
I had pointed out at the beginning that the initial idea which prompted this thesis was 
that of relation. However, while relations are readily apparent in our daily lives, we do not 
find this relation itself, nor the categories it presupposes (e.g., causality, time, space and 
being), existing anywhere on their own. This meant that while our common sense view of the 
world understands these relations in terms of being, we never quite arrive at the very thing 
itself, and in spite of that we continue to dwell in the ontological grounds of our own making. 
This necessarily involves some latent form of metaphysical speculation in our desire to 
produce something from nothing, even though this attempt to lift ourselves above (meta) the 
flux (physis) is as efficacious as pulling oneself up by the boot-strings. This is untenable, as 
Derrida and N!g!rjuna have demonstrated separately. Both have done so, however, by 
approaching the problematic from diametrically opposed trajectories, converging around the 
same gaping hole in our understanding. This, in turn, led me to consider the possibility of 
relating both as a means of engaging with the general hypothesis that everything has a 
context, insofar as they are dependently arisen. I was interested in the form of hermeneutical 
consciousness that was oriented towards a structure of openness, to articulate an alternative 
way of understanding our existential relatedness in the absence of being. To do this I 
proposed a path-based hermeneutics as a middle path between deconstructive dmarche and 
m!dhyamika m!rga in order to address the various linguistic, epistemological and 
ontological implications of this aleatory relation/no-relation. I was also aware that these paths 
ultimately diverge, though what interested me was the possibility of their intersection (and 
interaction). 
 
Once this is established, it would appear there is no logical necessity governing these 
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relations, in the absence of some transcendental signified, and it also became clear that this 
notion of relation can no longer be understood in terms of a dialectical middle or between, 
along with the conceptual opposites it distributes, according to a binary logic of is/is-not. 
This is because any form of identification cannot be divorced from objectification. This 
effectively eliminates Being (and its corollary, non-Being) from serving as an identifiable 
absolute substratum, though we have yet to account for some other way of understanding our 
phenomenal world. There is no third way, however, in the form of some radically other shore 
at which we may decisively arrive. To posit absolute alterity would be secretly to hanker 
after the dream of absolute presence. Not only is this counter-intuitive, it is also aggravated 
by the fact that we are implicated in the very act of its observation. This also accounts for my 
first positive claim regarding Derrida and N!g!rjuna, viz., that both do not claim an absolute 
point of departure position vis--vis the metaphysics they are critiquing, which also 
necessitates that there cannot be a determinable method in advance. Any such notion of 
method would still be metaphysical, a wondrous raft leading to some mythical, transcendent 
shore. This is counter to the immanent critique of Derrida, as well as the pr!sa#gika-
m!dhyamika approached espoused by N!g!rjuna. As I have argued extensively in the chapter 
on methodology, both Derrida and N!g!rjuna are acutely aware of the methodological 
implications of their respective strategies, such that for both, the method is the argument.  
 
The implication of this was that both no longer dwelt in ontological categories of 
thought, and it is for this reason one may claim that diffrance and $%nyat! are not merely 
non-conceptual, they are, strictly, a-conceptual, while at the same time allowing for the 
possibility of conceptuality in general. In the absence of an alternative position both inhabited 
the metaphysical systems they were critiquing. Further, this form of inhabiting cannot be 
reified into a fixed, determinable position, and in pointing out that this form of inhabiting 
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cannot be reified into a fixed position, I would have to supplement this inhabiting as being in 
medias res. This, however, can only be understood in terms of the countervailing movements 
and pro-regressing flux that constitute its discourse, coming together and coming undone at 
once. This made sense, given the open-ended nature of the problematic in question Ð if this 
relation can no longer be understood within categories of is/is-not then it also points to what I 
saw as its necessarily equivocal or undecideable status. This also meant that no single way is 
proper to it, that it can go by many different names through the detours of language. The 
challenge, however, is how to proceed in a consistent manner without impinging upon either 
Derrida or N!g!rjuna, in seeking to establish some common ground when both thinkers have 
precisely argued against the groundlessness of any such putative grounds. This has to be 
circumvented in a way that would cohere both without homogenising them into a common 
horizon. If that were the case then there would be no need for their mutual translation. This is 
possible by addressing their rapprochement as being ensconced in a relation of familiarity 
without similarity. 
 
By doing so I was able to avoid equating diffrance with $%nyat!, though this also 
meant that I was thus obliged to engage with their strategic deployment in their respective 
contexts. I will not rehearse here the arguments where I offered my own readings of 
diffrance and $%nyat!. This can only be done by inhabiting within the discourse from which 
the terms are borrowed and attending to them closely, in order to elicit a heterological 
opening that would lend itself to possible mutual illumination and translation. Such an 
opening gradually emerges in my refutation of Magliola and Loy by dismantling their 
discourse from within, and as I have pointed out in the process, we are always here, 
inhabiting within a foreign land, even if we should like to dwell in it. In accordance with a 
path-based hermeneutics I would affirm this opening in the figure of the pilgrim, either as le 
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juif errant or ambulant monk, summoned by a call that is at once inviting and menacing, 
always saying, Come.  
*All phenomena as far as N!g!rjuna is concerned Ð insofar as they are dependently arisen Ð are conventionally existent.
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Kaccayanagotta-Sutta
THUS HAVE I HEARD: THE BLESSED ONE WAS ONCE LIVING AT
Savatthi, in the monastery of Anathapindika, in JetaÕs Grove.  At that time the venerable
Kaccayana of that clan came to visit him, and saluting him, sat down at one side.  So
seated, he questioned the Exalted one: ÒSir [people] speak of Ôright view, right view.Õ  To
what extent is there a right view?Ó
ÒThis world, Kaccayana, is generally inclined towards two [views]: existence and
non-existence.  To him who perceives with right wisdom the uprising of the world as it
has come to be, the notion of non-existence in the world does not occur.  Kaccayana, to
him who perceives with right wisdom the ceasing of the world as it has come to be, the
notion of existence in the world does not occur.
The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bound by approach, grasping and
inclination.  And he who does not follow that approach and grasping, that determination
of mind, that inclination and disposition, who does not cling to or adhere to a view: ÔThis
is my self,Õ who thinks: Ôsuffering that is subject to arising, arises; suffering that is
subject to ceasing, ceases,Õ such a person does not doubt, is not perplexed.  Herein, his
knowledge is not other-dependent.  Thus far, Kaccayana, there is Ôright view.Õ
ÔEverything exists,ÕÑthis, Kaccayana, is one extreme.
ÔEverything does not exist,ÕÑthis, Kaccayana, is the second extreme.
Kaccayana, without approaching either extreme, the Tathagata teaches you a
doctrine by the middle.
Dependent upon ignorance arise dispositions; dependent upon dispositions arise
consciousness; dependent upon consciousness arises the psychophysical personality;
dependent upon the psychophysical personality arise the six senses; dependent upon the
six senses arises contact; dependent upon contact arises feeling; dependent upon feeling
arises craving; dependent upon craving arises grasping; dependent upon grasping arises
becoming; dependent upon becoming arises birth; dependent upon birth arise old age
and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair.  Thus arises the entire
mass of suffering. However, from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance, there is
ceasing of dispositions; from the ceasing of dispositions, there is ceasing of
consciousness; from the ceasing of consciousness, there is ceasing of the psychophysical
personality; from the ceasing of the psychophysical personality, there is ceasing of the six
senses; from the ceasing of the six senses, there is ceasing of contact; from the ceasing of
contact, there is ceasing of feeling; from the ceasing of feeling, there is ceasing of
craving; from the ceasing of craving, there is ceasing of grasping; from the ceasing of
grasping, there is ceasing of becoming; from the ceasing of becoming, there is ceasing of
birth; from the ceasing of birth, there is ceasing of old age and death, grief, lamentation,
suffering, dejection and despair.  And thus there is the ceasing of this entire mass of
suffering.Ó
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MMK I: “Examination of Conditions” (Jay L. Garfield) 
 
1. Neither from itself nor from another, 
Nor from both, 
Nor without a cause, 
Does anything whatever, anywhere arise. 
 
2. There are four conditions: efficient condition; 
Percept-object condition; immediate condition; 
Dominant condition, just so. 
There is no fifth condition. 
  
3. The essence of entities 
Is not present in the conditions, etc É 
If there is no essence, 
There can be no otherness-essence. 
 
4. Power to act does not have conditions. 
There is no power to act without conditions. 
There are no conditions without power to act. 
Nor do any have the power to act. 
 
5. These give rise to those, 
So these are called conditions. 
As long as those do not come from these, 
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Why are these not non-conditions? 
 
6. For neither an existent nor a non-existent thing 
Is a condition appropriate. 
If a thing is non-existent, how could it have a condition? 
If a thing is already existent, what would a condition do? 
 
7. When neither existents nor 
Non-existents nor existent non-existents are established, 
How could one propose a Òproductive cause?Ó 
If there were one, it would be pointless. 
 
8. An existent entity (mental episode) 
Has no object. 
Since a mental episode is without an object. 
How could there be any percept-condition? 
 
9. Since things are not arisen, 
Cessation is not acceptable. 
Therefore, an immediate condition is not reasonable. 
If something has ceased, how could it be a condition? 
 
10. If things did not exist 
Without essence, 
The phrase, ÒWhen this exists so this will be,Ó 
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Would not be acceptable. 
 
11. In the several or united conditions 
The effect cannot be found. 
How could something not in the conditions 
Come from the conditions? 
 
12. However, if a non-existent effect 
Arises from these conditions, 
Why does it not arise 
From non-conditions? 
 
13. If the effectÕs essence is the conditions, 
But the conditions donÕt have their own essence, 
How could an effect whose essence is the conditions 
Come from something that is essenceless? 
 
14. Therefore, neither with conditions as their essence, 
Nor with non-conditions as their essence are they any effects. 
If there are no such effects, 
How could conditions or non-conditions be evident? 
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MMK I: “Examination of Conditions” (David J. Kalupahana) 
 
1. No existents whatsoever are evident anywhere that are arisen from 
themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause. 
 
2. There are only four conditions, namely, primary condition, objectively 
supporting condition, immediately contiguous condition, and dominant 
condition. A fifth condition does not exist. 
 
3. The self-nature of existents is not evident in the conditions, etc. In the 
absence of self-nature, other-nature too is not evident. 
 
4. Activity is not constituted of conditions nor is it not non-constituted of 
conditions. Conditions are neither constituted nor non-constituted of 
activity. 
 
5. These are conditions, because depending upon them these [others] 
arise. So long as these [others] do not arise, why are they not non-
conditions? 
 
6. A condition of an effect that is either non-existent or existent is not 
proper. Of what non-existent [effect] is a condition? Of what use is a 
condition of the existent [effect]? 
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7. Since a thing that is existent or non-existent or both existent and non-
existent is not produced, how pertinent in that context would a 
producing cause be? 
 
8. A thing that exists is indicated as being without objective support. 
When a thing is without objective support, for what purpose is an 
objective support? 
 
9. When things are not arisen [from conditions], cessation is not 
appropriate. When [a thing has] ceased, what is [it that serves as] a 
condition? Therefore, an immediate condition is not proper. 
 
10. Since the existence of existents devoid of self-nature is not evident, the 
statement: ÒWhen that exists, this comes to be,Ó will not be 
appropriate. 
 
11. The effect does not exist in the conditions that are separated or 
combined. Therefore, how can that which is not found in the 
conditions come to be from the conditions? 
 
12. If that effect, being non-existent [in the conditions] were to proceed 
from the conditions, why does it not proceed from non-conditions? 
 
 ! 232 
13. The effect is made of conditions, but the conditions are themselves not 
self-made. How can that effect made of conditions [arise] from what is 
not self-made? 
 
14. An effect made either of conditions or of non-conditions is, therefore, 
not evident. Because of the absence of the effect, where could 
conditions or non-conditions be evident? 
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